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The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze and evaluate American
foreign

policy toward the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea
during the period 1952 to the oresent.

The basic procedure followed was a thorough

examination of uublic documents, speeches, selected interviews, newspapers, journal
articles, and other sources.
This study is essentially historical in its approach.

However, in keeping with

current academic conventions, the focus was in part on the "processes" involved in

formulating decisions by emphasizing the interplay among key congressional figures,
executive decisions, "opinion leaders", United Nation debates and etc.

While giving attention to those activities which bear directly on policy making,
it is necessary that style factors in decision making be balanced off against other

elements prevailing in the domestic and international environment within which the

total foreign policy-making machinery functions.

Operating within this context, then, the study shows that it is safe to hypothesize a very low priority for African policy issues in the American policy-making
system.

In this regard the relations between the United States and Portuguese Africa

are in many ways typically "African", in the sense that these relations illuminate a

central weakness in the formulation and execution of American foreign nolicy.

This
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weakness manifests itself in our relations with
Portugal by exposing a confusing if
not contradictory duality; from enthusiastic support
for self-determination for
colonial peoples in Portuguese Africa there has been a
drift toward regret that there

should be so much turmoil.
On the basis of this study, it may be concluded that
the dilemma confronting the

United States in Portuguese Africa is a very real one.

The closest friends and most

significant allies of the United States are the West European powers
that have in
the cast been the most successful in gathering colonial possessions.

Even though

these allies have in great part divested themselves of their overseas
dependencies

,

a

particularly unfortunate problem is presented by Portugal, a NATO ally which, in the
past

,

cies

.

has denied that its extensive overseas holding are non— self— governing dependen-

In the United Nations and presumably even more vigorously behind the scenes, the

United States, although it has tried to soften the tone and content of the more
hostile resolutions, has usually lined up with Portugal’s critics; however, this has
not eliminated the charge that it has been NATO's support and arms that have enabled

Portugal to carry on expensive colonial warfare.

Relationships are further complica-

ted by Washington's desire to extend its occupancy of a strategically important base
in the Azores, held by agreement with Portugal since the end of World War II.

What then are the implications for future United States-Portuguese relations,

especially in view of the recent political changes in Portugal?

Indications of appre-

ciable political-military stress in Portugal and its African Territories are more than

sufficient to warrant a thorough policy review.

Portugal and its Territories lacks coherence.

As it stands American policy toward

The first task of formulating a
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United States policy would be to help create a
strategically sterile environment in
Africa.
Basically, this objective will require taking
the initiative to remove

Southern Africa as an area of direct or indirect cold war
military competition.

This,

in turn, means attention to the possibility of an understanding
or agreement between
the United States and the Soviet Union, tacit, or explicit,
regarding security matters
in Southern Africa.

Such an understanding encouraged by a new spirit of "detente"

between the two major superpowers is a distinct possibility.

PREFACE
This dissertation was written before
the recent

Portuguese coup of April 25, 1974.

My examination of Amer-

ican foreign policy towards Portugal and its
territories,

which is essentially historical, deals exclusively
with
events beginning in 1952 continuing up to 1972.
Obviously, American foreign policy can be studied
from different perspectives and for different purposes.

In

keeping with current academic conventions, one might want to
focus on the "processes" involved in formulating decisions,

emphasizing the interplay among key congressional figures,
"opinion leaders," executive agencies, etc., while giving

attention to the content of actual policies only to the extent that it can be treated as one among many variables that

affect the process.

By concentrating on those activities

which bear directly on policy-making, however, one neglects
to consider that because of the powerful constraints that

exist to check the purely subjective goals of any decisionmaker, it is necessary that style factors in decision-making
be balanced off against other elements prevailing in the

domestic and international environment within which the total
foreign policy-making machinery functions.

Operating within this context, then, it is safe to

hypothesize a very low priority for African policy issues in
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the American policy-making
system.

In this regard the rela-

tions between the United States
and Portuguese Africa are
in
many ways typically "African," in
the sense that these relations illuminate a central weakness
in the formulation and
execution of American foreign policy.
This weakness manifests
itself
our relations with Portugal and
the rest of Africa
by exposing a confusing if not
contradictory duality; from
enthusiastic support for self-determination
for colonial
peoples in Africa there has been a drift
toward regret that
there should be so much turmoil. The
United States still
finds it impossible to turn its back on
rising peoples, but
from time to time it gives plain indications
that it wishes
they would sit tight and not start trouble.
The effect on

m

Africans was best portrayed by Tom Mboya, then General
Secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labour, who wrote
in

1956 that

for Africans America was the symbol of the anticolonial
struggle, but that as a result of the American alliance with
the

colonial powers and its neutrality on colonial issues, "this
feeling is gradually changing to puzzled disappointment."
The dilemma confronting the United States is a very

real one.

The closest friends and most significant allies of

the United States are the West European powers that have in
the past been the most successful in gathering colonial pos-

sessions under their imperial wings.

Even though these allies

have in great part divested themselves of their overseas

dependencies, it is inevitable that they should in some impor-

V

tant respects and on some important issues
base their policies on interests and assumptions that
are at variance with
those of the United States. As this thesis
will show, a particularly unfortunate problem is presented by
Portugal,
a

NATO ally which, in the past, has denied that
its extensive
overseas holdings are non-self-governing
dependencies.
Portugal- is sure to be confronted by continuing
dis-

affection in its African territories, and until the
recent
changes in its political system, appeared incapable of
meeting the kind of demands the present anticolonialist
era in-

sistently puts forward.

In the United Nations and presum-

ably even more vigorously behind the scenes, the United
States

,

although it has tried to soften the tone and content

of the more hostile resolutions, has usually lined up with

Portugal's critics; however, this has not eliminated the
charge that it has been NATO's support and arms that have

enabled Portugal to carry on expensive colonial warfare in

Angola

(a

similar charge was also made concerning the French

in Algeria)

.

Relationships are further complicated by Wash-

ington's desire to extend its occupancy of a strategically

important base in the Azores, held by agreement with Portugal
since the end of World War II.

What then are the implications for future United

States-Portuguese relations, especially in view of the recent
political changes in Portugal?

This dissertation will examine

the pros and cons of three possible alternatives for American
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foreign policy toward Portuguese
Africa.

The last chapter

of the dissertation will attempt
to speculate as to the
feasibility of these policy choices
in dealing with the new

Portuguese government.

Option

complete dissociation from

1:

all military, technical and economic
support of Portugal,

public and private, in the hope that (with
or without support
for liberation movements) this would
forcibly
speed the

process of self-determination for the
territories.

Option

2:

increased across-the-board support for the
Spinola government
with the aim of encouraging democratization,
modernization,

metropolitan integration into Europe and reform in
the African territories.
Option 3: both selective dissociation and
association, tying all economic and technical relations
to

programs of economic, educational and political reform but

eliminating all further military assistance.
As it stands, however, American policy has lacked the

coherence of any of these options

.

Thus indications of appre-

ciable political-military stress in Portugal and its African

territories are more than sufficient to warrant

policy review.

a

thorough

Otherwise, there is the risk of awakening

later to the realization that American policy has only helped
to or has facilitated the consolidation of Angola and Mozam-

bique into a Pretoria-led coalition of white-ruled states.
In all of this,

inconsistencies between statement and action,

between public and private involvement, raise precisely the

Vll

sorts of questions about the credibility
and consequences of
policy that the tragedy of the Vietnam war
must force us to

examine with great care.
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INTRODUCTION
The Portuguese empire in Africa is
made up of Angola,
Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, the Cape
Verde Islands, and
the islands of Sao Tome and Principe.

overseas provinces of Portugal.
of the "estatuto do indigenato"

All are considered

Since the abolition in 1961
(native's statute), which

applied to the first three provinces, Africans,
subject to
educational and residential qualifications, theoretically
enjoy the same status as Europeans.

Angola and Mozambique,

whose combined area of 800,000 square miles is more than
twenty times that of continental Portugal and whose population
of eleven million people is two million more than Portugal's,

are by far the most important of the Portuguese African ter-

ritories and the main reasons why Dr. Caetano was determined
to maintain Portugal's position in Africa.
In the study of international affairs, Portuguese

Africa has special significance.

Intense discussions of

Portugal continue in the United Nations at

a time

when ethnic

nationalism, insurgency, and guerrilla conflict are increasingly acute.

The Portuguese territories offer an unusual

challenge to United States foreign policy experts.
To illustrate the point, Portuguese Guinea is a pos-

sible door to the Cape Verde Islands, which could become a

major maritime base for a great power, and Mozambique is

XI

located on the increasingly important
Indian Ocean. Angola
and Mozambique are geopolitically the
strategic flanks to
transport between white- and black-ruled
Africa.
All of

these situations demonstrate how manifold
are the international implications of trends in Portuguese
Africa, especially
view of the emerging economic interlock
of Mozambique,
Rhodesia, and South Africa.

m
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CHAPTER

I

THE SALAZAR AND CAETANO ERAS 1928-1972

Prime Minister Antonio de Salazar, from the
time he
became Prime Minister of Portugal in 1930 until
his departure
in 1968, was inspired by the ideal that Portugal
should re-

tain its African territories.

In fact, his plan was to develop

these territories with Portuguese rather than foreign
capital.

Despite international pressure to give up the colonies, Salazar was determined to control both the budget of Portugal
and the colonies.

His wish was to end permanently the spec-

ulation that Portugal would have to relinquish its African
territories.^"

Accordingly, the new government viewed all

foreign activities and loan offers with distrust.
In the 1930s and 1940s, Portugal ignored most of the

humanitarian-inspired attacks from abroad.

Occasional critics

of her African policies were credited Bolsheviks or inter-

national Jews.

Skillfully moving Portugal from the Axis camp

to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which Portugal

joined in 1949, Salazar allied his country with those nations

who sympathized with her colonial position in Africa. 2
At the end of the Second World War, it became apparent
to the Salazar government that the stronger Portugal's ties
1 James Duffy, Portugal in Africa (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1962), p. 206.
^ Ibid

.

,

p

.

206

2

with Western Europe and America became,
the stronger Portugal's position in Africa would become.
During the War, the
government had tempered its Fascist
sympathies to the extent
of permitting the United States to
construct and maintain

an

air base in the Azores, and it was this
military association
which was largely responsible for her entry
into NATO.
Portuguese diplomacy, of course, exploited this
membership
to

the hilt in Britain and the United States.

Britain once

again became Portugal's oldest ally, while toward
the United
States Portugal put forth the face of militant
anti-Communism
in Europe and Africa.

3

Throughout the 1950s, these tactics were successful.
While a minority of opinion in both countries questioned the
moral and political reliability of the Salazar dictatorship,
the seeming necessities of the Western Alliance or of colonial

policies in Africa obliged Britain, the United States, and
more often than not, France in effect to dance to the Portuguese tune.

Thus, until late 1960, the Portuguese government

relied on both military and diplomatic support to strengthen
her control over the territories, provoking world protest

against her repressive colonial policies.

These powerful

alliances bolstered Salazar's position at home.^
3 Ibid

.

,

p

.

208

.

^African nationalism was assiduously interpreted by
Portuguese statesmen into a Communist menace, against which
the Portuguese colonies were represented as the last bulwarks
of Western European civilization.
The necessity of maintaining

3

Shortly after Salazar had taken
office it became
apparent that there was a new direction
with regard to the
Portuguese policy in Africa: a policy of
overseas provincial
integration and an assimilation policy which
inevitably
had

to result in less autonomy for the
territories themselves.

Gilberto Freyre, noted Brazilian sociologist,
postulates the
concept of "lustropicology " as a basis for
the systematic
study of ecological and social integration
in a tropical
environment.

He states that Portuguese expansion in
the

fifteenth century produced a peculiar civilization
in the
Cape Verde Islands.

White Portuguese and Black Africans,

because of the isolation of the archipelago and prolific
miscegenation, formed a social and racial harmony unknown
r

elsewhere in the tropics.
Salazar

1

s

new African policy as reflected in the

Colonial Act of 1930 and the Organic Charter of 1933 provided
internal cohesion within the Western Alliance moved Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles to praise Salazar and join Portuguese Foreign Minister Cunha (in a joint statement) in December, 1955, during the height of the Goan controversy, to refer
to the "Portuguese province of Goa." Khrushchev then demanded
that Goa and the other Portuguese colonies in India "must and
will be returned to India."
(Subsequently, the Soviet leaders
repeatedly endorsed India's claim to Goa.)
See Department of
State Bulletin
(December 2, 1955), p. 1008.
In May, 1960,
President Eisenhower, returning from the Paris Summit Conference, visited Portugal and later declared that the U.S. and
Portugal "have worked together without a single difference of
opinion." Prime Minister Salazar was reported to have urged
President Eisenhower to comprehend Portugal's civilizing mission in Africa and to insure that the U.S. do nothing either
See New York Times
by omission or commission to weaken it.
May 24, 1960, p. 13.
,

—

—

^Gilberto Freyre, Urn Brasileiro emterras portuguesas
(Rio de Janero: n.p., 1953).

,

4

for a new administrative system which
in effect sought to
integrate the overseas provinces into the
mother country.
This concept was eventually embodied in
Portugal's Constitution of 1951.
In that year the legal status of
the overseas

possessions was changed from colonies to
provinces. 6
Salazar had repeatedly denied accusations
that Portugal occupied its overseas territories for
material gain only.
In a speech on November 30,

1967, he stated:

"Our course is

set for us by a centuries-old history which moulded
the Por-

tuguese Community into its present Euro-African form,
and
also by that historical experience which has enabled
us to
learn by our contact with widely varied peoples all over
the

world.

Material interests have not been the essential aim of

Portuguese action in the world, rather have we sacrificed them
for the progress of the population." 7

The idea of an integrated, multiracial society was
an essential component of the Salazar policy.

Intermarriage

6

Thomas Okuma, Angola In Ferment (Boston: Beacon Hill
Press, 1962)
Okuma writes that outwardly there were
p. 33.
many manifestations of this new orientation. The letter heads
of official documents were changed from "Colonia de Angola"
to "Provincia de Angola."
Throughout the territory, towns
with local names were renamed. Names such as Bocoio Catabola,
were changed to European names: Vila Sousa Lara and Nova
Sintra
,

7

Washington Post December 23, 1967, p. 18. Foreign
Minister Nogueira (speaking while unofficially touring the
U.S.) accused the major Western nations of "failure" in their
African policies, wasting money given for aid, misleading
Africans with illusory promises of freedom, investing in unproductive schemes, hampering African economic development by
price control of raw materials, exploitation of natural re,

5

and cultural assimilation were
encouraged in order to accelerate the process of creating Portuguese
citizens in the
African provinces.
Salazar went on to attack those
people
who laugh at Portuguese "paternalism"
towards certain backward peoples, and at Portugal's "missionary
spirit" as being
both degrading and uncivilized. He continued
to believe in

Portugal

s

mission in the world and consequently felt
that

Portugal had rights and duties which imposed a
certain line
of behavior on the Portuguese people— "that
of tenacious

resistance to the forces of disintegration which
infiltrate
into the overseas provinces from abroad." 8

To promote this

"assimilation process," the official policy prior to 1953

made provision for a native "elite" (assimilados) in the
overseas territories who by virtue of certain cultural standards could enjoy the same civil rights as the Portuguese.
However, by 19 50, less than

1

percent of the population was

assimilated, and the system was abolished in 1953.

From then

on all inhabitants were entitled to full Portuguese citizen,

.

ship.

9

sources, lending money "in order to merely repay past loans
and interest. " He charged that Communist bloc nations
"blackmailed" the West into an anti-colonial policy based on
a "complex of culpability."
See New York Times, October 9,
1967.

^Ibid
^

Ibid

.

,

p

.

18

.

,

p.

18

6

In 1953,

the status of assimilado was
abolished,

although the term is still widely used,
and the benefits of
full Portuguese citizenship granted to
assimilated Africans.
At the same time, however, the new statute
allowed
for the

revocation of citizenship granted to Africans
if they failed
to comport themselves in a manner considered
proper
by the

authorities.

This left-handed gift aroused suspicion in
the

minds of the assimilados.

Midnight came for the Cinderella colony of Angola
early in 1961.

Before the year was out, it was apparent that

Portugal was engaged in a struggle that she could not win.
Nor could the Salazar government be certain that policies
that had so manifestly failed in Angola would succeed in

Mozambique and Guinea, beyond whose borders militant African

opposition-forces were gathering.

The government hinted at

liberal reforms in the colonies and continued to speak of

multiracial societies living harmoniously, but when the rebellion broke out in Angola, it was widely believed that the
days of the Portuguese in Africa were numbered.

Salazar then took the unprecedented step of permitting
the state-controlled Portuguese press to publish a long list
of particulars indicting his government as both "autocratic"

and "repressive."

The opposition charged that "fear governs

social relations within the nation and that the government
is guilty of flagrant violations of the civil rights promised

by the Portuguese Constitution."

The attack added that Por-

tugal’s international standing suffered from angry attacks

7

on Portugal's African policies in the
United Nations and the
outbreak at the Angolan capitol. 10

The initial outbreak of violence
was followed by a
series of spontaneous upheavals that
plunged Angola into

protracted unrest.

Switching from conventional to guerrilla

tactics, the UPA (Union of Angolan Peoples)
established strongholds in the nearly impenetrable bush of the
northeastern

quarter of the country.

While the level of fighting declined,

the UPA changed its name the following April
to the Angolan

Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) with the hope
of
gaining international recognition. Salazar later commenting
on the Portuguese government tactics, stated:

"The violence

and savagery of the rebellious Angolans" forced the govern-

ment to take steps toward an immediate solution.

He further

emphasized that "an understanding" between the United States
and Portugal was imperative to "avoid situations which might
be prejudicial

...

to the United States, the West in general,

and to the Portuguese nation.

^ New

York Herald Tribune February 9, 1961, p. 69.
The following explanation was offered in Lisbon for Salazar's
sudden willingness to publish criticism of his own regime:
his hand was forced by publication of the attack in an Oporto
newspaper, long an opposing center of his regime; he discovered secret parachute reinforcements to Angola's capitol,
leading him to believe trouble brewed there; and he knew he
must achieve national unity quickly in metropolitan Portugal
before a threat to the country's 400-year overseas empire was
realized.
He believed the best way to obtain colony support
from Portuguese allies, especially the U.S., lay partly in
dismantling Portugal's international reputation as a dictatorship
,

.

-^New York Times, May 30, 1961, p.

1.

8

In 1966

,

first the MPLA (People'

s Liberation Movement of Angola) and then UNITA
(National Union for the
Total
independence of Angola) opened
fronts in eastern Angola.
But in spite of a gradual
increase in guerrilla strength
and
foreign assistance, the Angolan
nationalists remain

frag-

mented in rival movements, the
differences mainly being
ideological and ethnic.
Insurgency inevitably spread to
Portugal's other
African territories.
in Guinea-Bissau, a thin
wedge of territory on the west coast between
Senegal and the Republic of
Guinea, the PAIGC (African Independence
Party for Guinea and
Cape Verde) spearheaded the drive for
independence by
assaulting Portuguese military outposts in
the last months
of 1962.

The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)

launched

the military phase of its revolution in the
northern districts
of Niassa and Cabo Delgado in September,
1964.

Under the

late Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO penetrated into
Mozambique,

while promoting limited social and educational services
for
the inhabitants in rebel-held areas.

Mondlane

's

death by

assassination in early 1969 temporarily hampered the southward thrust of FRELIMO guerrillas until Samora Machel, one of
12 Af rica Report

vol. 12, no. 8 (November 1967); vol.
The reader is cautioned that the above
citation carries a heavy anti-Portuguese bias. See also
Portuguese Africa: A Handbook eds. David M. Abshire and
Michael A. Samuels (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 429, for a
slightly biased pro-Portuguese account. See also New York
Times June 7, 1971, p. 8, and The Toronto Globe and Mail,
January 10, 1971.
15,

no.

5

(May 1970)

,

.

,

,

9

the members of the triumvirate,
assumed the FRELIMO presidency a year later. Since then
Machel, who was Mondlane
m ilitary commander, has attempted
to cripple the construction
Of the internationally financed
Cabora Basse dam on the Zam13
bezi River.
'

As the crescendo of protest against
Portugal's often

brutal suppression of the African
insurgents rose in the outside world, particularly at the United
Nations, and as the
importance of several newly formed Portuguese
African parties
exile began to increase, Portuguese
repression

m

in the

colonies intensified.

Professor James Duffy interprets these

events in the following manner: "Communism was
the most damning
label that the Portuguese could attach to the
Union of Angolan
Peoples, the movement that had directed much of the
nationalistic activity in northern Angola, and such a tactic
was

clearly consistent with the anti-Communist image Portugal had
been projecting to the world.

The Salazar regime need not

have been over-cynical to realize that in the Western World,

especially in the United States,

a cry of

Communism is often

sufficient to condemn." 14
.

.

On June 27, 1962, United States Secretary of State

Dean Rusk visited Portugal.

The New York Times observed that

13"portugal s Changing Fortunes in Africa," Current
March 1973, pp. 106-107.
'

History

,

l^Duffy, op. cit.

p.

217.

10

Several factors

have lowered the temperature
between

.

Lisbon and Washington to the lowest
degree in many years.
The United States is blamed for
not having sided openly with
Portugal when the luxury liner Santa
Maria was seized in January, 1961." Since then the United
States' condemnation of
Portugal's administration in Angola, its
frequent siding
with the anti-Portuguese Af rican-Asian
bloc in the United
Nations, and its alleged failure to do
something when India
invaded Portuguese Goa all led Salazar to
accuse the United
States of "welching on an ally in the North
Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

Salazar went on to proclaim a policy of bilateral

cooperation with countries that were willing to concur
fully
with Portugal.

He stated that the U.S. had undermined the

worldwide position of its allies, notably of Portugal, and he
omitted the United States and Britain from the list of countries with which Portugal had satisfactory relations.
The post-Salazar government of Marcello Caetano,

although seemingly more modern and popular, has disappointed
those who had hoped that it might act to extricate Portugal

from its colonial wars.

It is impossible to know how the

government would have fared in a free and open election.
15 New York Times

In

June 28, 1962; February 4, 1961.
Henrique Galvao, Santa Maria: My Crusade for Portugal
(Lisbon: n.p., 1963).
It was Galvao's contention that he succeeded in focusing world attention on Salazar's dictatorship
and the plight of the African colonies; thus creating a discord between Portugal and her NATO allies, who refused Salazar's request to treat the incident as piracy.
,

,

^New York

Times, October 29, 1969, p. 46.

11

the October, 1969 election
only
-u
percent
Y 20U P
ercen t nf
of the
population
was enfranchised and 40
percent abstained from voting.
The
4

Caetano government candidates
defeated the harassed opposition by a vote of 980,000
to 134, 000. 17 After this
carefully supervised election,
the new government pledged
itself
to defending the constitutional
assertion that overseas
provinces" of Angola, Guinea and
Mozambique constituted
integral, inalienable parts of
Portugal. On October 7,
1969,
Premier Caetano, speaking at a
political rally i n Lisbon,
endorsed the African policy of his
predecessor, but added
that a "progressive administrative
autonomy" for the overseas
territories was desirable. He stated
his opposition
to pro-

posals that the government enter into
negotiations with rebel
groups in Africa.
"For the first time since the
outbreak of
the national wars in Portuguese Africa
in 1961, the colonial
question is debated
publicly.
Premier Caetano
.

.

.

.

.

.

indicated last month that the elections would disclose
the
public attitude toward the African policy.

Since then, the

major political groups have made public their position
on
the colonial issue and it is clear that there is
a substantial

sector favoring a change in policy." 18

Jeune Afrigue later

reported that Caetano remains committed to the maintenance
of Lisbon's authority in the African territories, but he has
17 Ibid
1

.

,

p

.

46

New York Times

,

October

5,

1969, p.

6.
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expressed a willingness for some public
discussion of African
policy and has admitted that "military
solutions
,

by themselves cannot solve the problems of
the colonies." 19 Accordingly, Portugal has persevered in its
African "mission" in
the face of a nascent domestic stress
that may well adversely
affect its capability for realizing its
Euro-African ambitions.
Equipping and maintaining an African
expeditionary
force of some 130,000 to 140,000 men requires
related defense
and security expenditures that consume 45 percent
(or approximately $400 million) of the national budget, 20 funds
much

needed for the modernization of agriculture, education

communications.

,

and

Seeking gainful employment and/or escape

from military service, hundreds of thousands of Portuguese

have emigrated, both legally and illegally.

"Each year, an

estimated 100,000 Portuguese risk arrest by walking hundreds
of miles, jamming into crowded, unsafe trucks or taking boats
to sneak across Portugal's frontiers and find jobs in France,

West Germany and elsewhere."

By way of contrast, perhaps

5,000 annually accept the government's offer of free trans-

portation to the African territories where free land awaits
them for the asking.
x

There are reportedly 600,000 Portuguese

Jeune Afrique (Tunis), October 21, 1969,

20

Report

,

p.

11.

"Portugal At War: Hawks, Doves, and Owls," Africa
vol. 14, no. 7 (November 1969), p. 18.
^1

The Washington Post

,

May

2,

1971, p.

14.
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emigrants in France alone, 22 and
Portugal's total population
has decreased during the past
decade to 8.6 million (a
2 percent drop in the last decade)
well below the presumed figure
of ten million.
,

While it is true that emigrant workers
are responsible for millions of dollars in foreign
earnings coming back
into Portugal via their families,
manpower shortages constitute a spur to war-related inflation and
have already led to
the importation of some 15,000 Cape
Verdian and African
workers to meet needs for unskilled labor. 24
This response,

in turn,

threatens social stability, as the government
unwittingly creates a new potential for internal,
in this

case,

racial, conflict.

Incessant government propaganda stressing

the alleged "barbarism" of African "terrorists,"
has nurtured
a

bitter climate of opinion within which repressed anti-war

sentiment may understandably find deflected expression in

anti-black reaction.

Portugal's population reflects, in

short, a certain indicator that points to present and poten-

tial social dysfunction.

It represents a serious,

long-term

constraint upon Portugal's capacity to maintain and expand
economic, military and settlement programs designed to pre-

serve its political rule in Africa

— for

a key to all these

programs is manpower.
22 The Financial Times
2^ Ibid

.

,

24 Ibid.,

(London), May 21, 1971, p. 33.

September 14, 1971, p. 57.
July

9,

1971, p.

21.
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Western Europe, not Africa,
attracts Portugal's
emigrants, and also buys half of
Portugal's exports.

The

government has begun negotiations for
association with the
European Common Market (EEC)
the only way it
could avoid

,

stultifying economic isolation in the
wake of the probable
entry of Great Britain and other
Portuguese partners of the
European Free Trade. Association (EFTA)
into that market.
But while a new generation of modern
economists and businessmen, spurred on by concern over Portugal's
still respectable,
but recently declining economic growth
rate (a reduction of
the GNP growth rate from 6.3% in 1968 to
25
4.7%
in 1969),

work for association or integration into Western
Europe's

expanding and prosperous economic system, they face
implacable

opposition from the country's Africa-first vintage Salazarists, who demand a contrary set of national priorities.

Prime Minister Caetano reaffirmed that Portugal will continue
to defend her overseas territories.

He declared that while

the African nationalists are receiving moral and material

support from many groups, Portugal is waging its war without

outside financial aid, in the face of international criticism,
and at a cost of almost half the national budget.

He stated

that Portugal had much to gain from participating in a Euro-

pean Economic Market, but that political integration was not
25 The Washington Post

,

August 18, 1971, p. 43.
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possible because

m

European federation Portugal
would have
little influence in decision-making.
26
Ultra-right politicians, Africa-linked economic
interests and officers heading
Portugal's swollen and frustrated
armed services demand even
greater resources for campaigns to
repress insurgency
a

in

Portugal's far-flung African "provinces."

They are the first
to recognize that it would be
difficult enough to make the

adjustments necessary to prepare
metropolitan Portugal’s
gradual association with the EEC without
an attempt to accommodate Portugal's colonial structure.
To them, Africa is
more important. Consequently, a fundamental
Europe versus
Africa cleavage has begun to polarize the
ruling stratum of
Portuguese society.
Of more immediate consequence, a degree
of war weari-

ness has been evident. 27

The view of the regime's foremost

colonial experts, apparently shared by Caetano, is
that Portugal cannot lose the wars in Africa militarily or
economically,

but only politically.
26

"The Algerian war was lost in Paris,"

*

Prime Minister Caetano speaking on September 27,
1970, commemorating his government's second anniversary.
^7

Noticias e Factos (New York)
no. 180, September 29,
1970; The Financial Times (London), January 8, 1971.
The ARA,
the first effective and disciplined urban underground, has
eluded police and successfully destroyed ships and aircraft,
disrupted communication, and damaged NATO facilities. See
The Times (London)
March 11, 1971, p. 5c; The Guardian (Manchester)
June 4, 1971; New York Times October 2, 1971, p. 16,
for a fuller comprehensive analysis of these movements.
Government officials have claimed the "real" enemy may be at home.
In terms reminiscent of those employed by American officials
reacting to the unpopularity of the war in Vietnam, Lisbon
,

,

,

,
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so Caetano has said.

Gaetano has insisted that the
Portuguese
people remain firm in their
determination to preserve
the

African provinces and that the
government must convince nationalists that they are better off
with Portugal than without her.
Caetano has waged a two-pronged
offensive to increase
military effectiveness in the colonies,
on the
one hand, and

has promoted social and economic
development, on the other.
The absence of public protest in
Portugal does not

necessarily mean that the Portuguese people
are solidly supporting the colonial wars.
It is due rather to the harsh
controls on information and expression as well
as official
intimidation.
The government has categorically proclaimed
that to question official colonial policy is
treason.
The principle catalysts of Portugal's internal fer-

ment are the nationalist guerrillas in Africa, who, after

a

decade of insurgency, continue, albeit slowly and indecisively,
to expand the geographic span of their action.

They are still

restricted to thinly populated rural areas in Angola and
Mozambique,

28

although they have reduced Portuguese control

authorities denounce universities as centers of "subversion."
See Le Monde (Paris), June 2, 1971, p. 9; The Guardian (Manchester), December 31, 1971, p. 8; Diario de Noticias (Lisbon), December 17, 1970, p. 16.
28

The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) operates
in the Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete districts of Mozambique.
According to some reports, a smaller group, the Mozambique
Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) is also active in the Tete
region.
The Daily Telegraph (London), October 5, 1971; The
Financial Times (London), October 6, 1971, p. 56.
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to a few towns and islands
in the di m inutive colony
of Guinea
Using mines and booby traps with
increasing effectiveness as
part of a strategy of minimal
physical contact, African na-

tionalists, belonging to PRELIMO of
Mozambique, or the MPLA,
UNITA or FNLA of Angola, also raid
army garrisons and proselytize peasants in the outlying
savanna and forest regions
of Angola and Mozambique. 29
the close quarters

m

of Guinea,
forces of the PAIGC are reported to
have begun using grenade
launchers, bazookas, mortars and rockets
against Portuguese
installations.
The PAIGC is considered the most effective
of
the liberation movements in Portuguese
Africa.
Still at a

"tolerable" level, Portuguese casualties in the
three ter-

ritories gradually mounted, totaling currently
50,000 dead
and 20,000 wounded in battle or accidents.

Government response has included the building of
numerous airfields and integrative networks of paved roads.
In order to finance this, Lisbon opened the door to external

investment in extractive enterprise: oil, iron, and diamonds.
The result has been a predictable, disjunctive and irrever-

sible break with the economic and social lethargy of the pre-

insurgency period.
2Q

MPLA represents the People's Liberation Movement
of Angola; the UNITA represents the Total Independence of
Angola; and the FNLA represents The National Liberation Front
of Angola.

^ The

Daily Telegraph (London), August

5,

1971, p.
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Political opinion in Portugal
varies concerning the
effect the colonial wars are
having on Portugal's international position. One of the
main arguments the liberals
put forth for ending the wars
is that they have isolated

the

country.

Portugal's only allies on the
colonial issue are
the white supremacist regimes
of South Africa and

Rhodesia,
who disdain the Portuguese
multi-racial ideal. Some anxious
South African leaders privately
express doubts about the
ability of half a million resident
Portuguese and, in disparaging South African terms, "their
halfbreeds" (over 100,000
mesticos)
to emulate the Rhodesian whites.
Nevertheless,
South Africa is investing heavily in the
Cunene (Angola) and
Cabora Bassa (Mozambique) hydroelectric
schemes— the latter
a half billion dollar project whose
generators will provide
South Africa with abundant electrical power.
Coupled with
,

increasing Portuguese dependence upon South African
guerrillas,
this economic linkage, which extends to trade and
private investment, pushes Angola and Mozambique into an ever-increasing

integration into white Southern Africa.
The liberals feel that Portugal's future lies in

Europe: closer ties with the European Free Trade Association
and negotiations alongside Great Britain for membership in
the EEC.

"Everything is conditioned by the colonial problem,"

^William
the United States
p.

32

Hance and others, Southern Africa and
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1968),

A.
,
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says a leader of the nationalists;

"vast new spheres of

friendship and trade will be
opened to us not only i n
Africa,
but in the rest of the Third
World and the Communist
coun"
tries
.

Conclusion

Contemporary critics of Portugal's
presence in Africa
charge that economic exploitation
is the basis of Portuguese
colonialism. They often emphasize, to
the exclusion of other
factors, economic reasons for Portugal's
past and present
stake in the tropics.
These agruments contrast
the actual

and potential mineral wealth, agricultural
procedure, and
abundant sources of hydroelectric power in
Angola and Mozambique with the lack of them in Portugal.
The Portuguese goal
is often characterized as making the
African dominions yield
a profit in investments, furnishing
raw materials, and providing protected markets for metropolitan industries.

African revolutionaries and their sympathizers reiterate these economic explanations of Portuguese behavior in
a steady stream of books,

pamphlets, and leaflets.

Marxist

in outlook, the authors couch their analysis of Portugal's

colonial motives almost exclusively in economic terms.

With

the exception of revolutionary leaders such as Eduardo Mond-

lane and Amilcar Cabral, who identified other reasons for

Portugal's retention of African colonies, many of those

20

favorable to African liberation
emphasize the economic
rationale for Portuguese colonialism.
It may further be stated that
events of the last

ten years demonstrate the
interrelationship of Africa and
Portuguese stability. Since the
beginning of the African
liberation struggles during the 1960s,
the regime for the
first time in years has witnessed in
Portugal mounting resistance to recent bombings, derailment
of trains, and other
acts of sabotage. As seen by the Lisbon
power establishment,
the nationalist wars in Angola, Mozambique,
and Guinea-Bissau

disturbed the political equilibrium.

Officially the govern-

ment fears that subversion is spreading from
the colonies to
the metropole.
Premier Caetano remarked in June,
1971, that

strikes, explosions, and the dissemination of
rumors against
the regime are the weapons of agents from
outside the

country.

TO

Increasing Lisbon's fears of a subversive connection

between revolutionaries in Africa and at home are the disquieting statements of African nationalists.

Asserting that

their struggle is exclusively directed against the government
and not the Portuguese people, the leaders of African libera-

tion movements have applauded the activities toppling the New
State.

Mario de Andrade, of the MPLA, noted that "the forces

opposing dictatorship in the colonies and the forces opposing
32 Piario de Noticias

(Lisbon), June 16, 1971, p. 20.
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dictatorship within Portugal are
fighting
Similarly, Amilcar Cabral
broadcasted

a

co^on

enemy.'.

in a "Message to the

People of Portugal" on Radio
Khartoum: "What Marcello
Caetano
fears is that the Portuguese
people will know that Guinea
and Cape Verde will be part of
a free and independent
Africa,
willing to collaborate openly and
loyally with the Portuguese people." 33 From within Portugal,
the Accao Revolucionario
Armada (ARA)
a Leftist urban guerrilla
force responsible for
most of the underground activity in
the past year, upholds the
nationalist movements in their struggles
for independence. 34
Giving further credibility to the threat
of a common front is
the liaison maintained in Algiers between
the Frente de
,

L ibertacao de Portugal and a coordinating
committee of African

nationalist movements in Portuguese territories
formed in
1961, the Conferencia das Organizacoes Nacionalistas
das

Colonias Portuguesas (CONCP)
At the very least a defeat in Africa would discredit
and weaken the army, the main bulwark of the government
and

final arbiter of politics since the 1820s.

Whereas the army's

strength and prestige has soared since NATO membership and the
wars in Africa, it is still obliged to watch the political
front at home.

During the pre-election campaign of 1969 the

army leaders hinted at possible intervention, causing opposi33 The Times

(London), June 8, 1969, p. 154.

34 Ibid.

154.

,

p.
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tion Democrats to endorse
publicly Gaetano’s regime.
The
2EEosicionistas declared their
loyalty, once more
proving that
the army wields ultimate
power. An imprudent
settlement in
Africa without the army’s
adherence or one damaging
its position could prove dangerous
uut, to tne
y
the nrptsonf
present government, which
IS already beset with
powerful right-wing critics. 35

The loss of the African
colonies entails grave political implications for the
Lisbon government. For
similar
reasons any diminution of
control in the territories
also
involves serious problems for
the authoritarian regime.
The
wars in Angola, Mozambique, and
Guinea-Bissau provide a
rationale for curtailing civil
rights in Portugal.
his
first public address as Premier,
Gaetano explained that the

m

overseas insurgencies required national
unity and ’’made any
restoration of civil liberties in
Portugal impossible.” 36
This union of affairs is of crucial
importance
to any anal-

ysis of Portuguese policy, although it
is often ignored by
all but the most perceptive critics
of Lisbon's role in
Africa. Eduardo Mondlane understood the
interrelatedness of
Portugal and Africa when he suggested an
inverse view of
John Stuart Mill's significant assertion
that empire abroad
was incompatible with democracy at home. The
revolutionary
leader declared that "since the Fascist government has
35 Douglas A. Wheeler,
"Thaw in Portugal," Foreiqn
Affairs vol XLVIII (1969), no. 4, pp. 776-777.
.

,

3

fi

New York Times

,

September 28, 1968.
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eliminated democracy within
Portugal itself, it can
scarcely
allow a greater measure of
freedom to the supposedly
more
backward people of its colonies." 37
Those who felt that civil
liberties and party elections
endangered the New state
often
felt the same way about
liberalization in Africa.
For this reason Premier Caetano's
initial pledges of
increased local administrative
autonomy for the overseas
provinces carried with them a double
threat to conservative groups
in Portugal.
A loosening of ties that bind
the colonies
to

the mother country weakens Lisbon's
position there and poses
the possibility of a similar
slackening at home. The old

guard believed more decentralization
presaged independence in
Africa and liberalization in Portugal,
and their ominous
mobilization quickly resulted in Caetano
proclaiming his
"unshakable determination to remain in Africa.'' 38

Past events

and present policies shape much of Lisbon's
response to
nationalist movements in Angola, Mozambique, and
Guinea-

Bissau
Lisbon policy-makers do not admit that these selfserving political considerations determine the retention
of

African colonies.

Rather they tout Portugal's historical

mission as justification for remaining in Africa despite the
37

(n.p.

Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle For Mozambiaue
“
1969), p. 124.
38 Piario de Noticias

(Lisbon), April 16, 1971, p.

2.
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military opposition of
nationalist forces and the
disapproval
of much of the international
community.
i„ the words of
Adriano Moreira, former
Minister for Overseas, the
Portuguese
"have always had a clear
notion that they were the

instruments of a great national
and civilizing mission. "33
S ummarized, the mission is to
transform African people into
a
Lusitanian community, by miscegenation
and Christianization to
achieve social integration. By
linking nationalism
and the

"civilizing mission," Portugal
revealed yet another expression
of national insecurity.
For if by civilizing, the
Portuguese
mean assimilation of large numbers
of African people,
then
the added citizens increase the
chances of Portuguese national
survival

Gilberto Freyre, the Brazilian
sociologist, is the
chief theoretician and proponent of
the Portuguese

"mission"

and what he calls "Lustropicology

.

"

Believing the Portuguese

uniquely qualified by long and relatively
harmonious relations
with non-European peoples, Freyre
envisions Portugal's role
as promoting racial fusion and Christian
conversion in order
to produce a seemingly homogenized society
like that of the

Cape Verde Islands or Brazil.

In short, a new or luso-

tropical civilization is the "mission" of Portugal in
southern

latitudes
39 Adriano Moreira,
Portugal's Stand In Africa
York: University Publishers, 1962), p. 95.

(New
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Portuguese spokesmen applaud
Freyre's recognition
of their task and adopt his
contentions to buttress their
case for holding onto African
soil.
Frequent references to
or quotations from Freyre's
works are reproduced under
the
gurse of scholarship to reinforce
Portugal's arguments for
remaining in Africa.
In spite of ten years of
active guerrilla warfare and repeated criticism
in the United Nations,
there exist no outward signs of
ideological wavering on the
part of Lisbon.
So convinced are Portuguese
officials of
their mission that they entertain no
public doubts as to its
righteousness.
In a press interview, Caetano
argued that the
primary reason for defense of the colonies
"is because millions of Portuguese, black and white, live
there who
trust

Portugal and wish to continue living under
its banner and
enjoying its peace." 40 That Lisbon's protestations
of a

civilizing mission" smack of rank hypocrisy when
practice is
measured against principle is charged by the opponents
of

Portugal's policies in Africa, but the evidence suggests
that
the Portuguese are victims of self-delusion.

From their pub-

lic statements and publications it appears that Portuguese

officials and apologists resolutely deny an alternative to
the Lusitanian "mission."
In the mind of the Portuguese, non-economic factors

for retaining Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau exert

great power, although they are nonetheless self-serving.
40
p

.
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Seara Nova

(Lisbon)

,

quoted in Atlas

,

January 1971,
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Nostalgia, patriotism
national revival, political
stability
and the call of destiny
are significant motives
in Lisbon's
unyielding colonial rule.
Drunk with history,
Portugal is
compelled to preserve its
heritage and to maintain
continuity
and solidarity with the
past, present and future.
The three
colonial wars in Angola,
Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau

have,
fact, hardened Lisbon's
convictions of its historic
mission just as the seizure of
Goa by India in 1961 steeled

resistance to further losses of
territory lest all fall as a
row of dominos. 4 ^
Against the complexities of almost
five centuries of
domination, Africa's control by
Lisbon defies a simplistic
explanation based solely on economic
leverage.

An explanation,

encompassing a wide range of forces,
helps to explain why
tiny state on the rim of western
Europe carries out three
long and costly wars against the
aspirations

a

of its colonies.

After all, Portugal is not the first
state to become bogged
down in colonial wars for historical and
political reasons
while seeking after a great national
purpose.
Perhaps this is partially the reason why world
opinion
concerning Portuguese colonialism has taken a softer
tone than
in the past.

At the United Nations, for example, the United

States has reconsidered its once condemning attitude
toward
the colonial problem.
41 Michael A.

of Change

,

"

Interplay

Samuels, "Southern Africa: The Strategies
December 1970, p. 26.
,
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The united States as
a world power is
faced with the
problem of relating to an
internal (colonial) war.
She has
in theory three choices:
,1) aid the incumbent.
,2) aid the
insurgents,
3
attempt to conciliate the
two.
Ge orge ModelSkl haS convincin gly argued
that a fourth option of
total noninvolvement does not exist
concerning internal war.
To do
nothing, especially in the
case of a great power,
,

,

in fact,

aids the "stronger party
(usually the incumbent) to
supprlss
the weaker irrespective of
the merits of the case." 4 ?
Thus,
some degree of involvement
is inevitable.
If noninvolvement is not a
realistic option, however,
neither is it realistic to assume
that policy-makers will not
hedge their bets.
Therefore, acts of both covert and
overt
aid to incumbents as well as
insurgents are combined with

offers of "good offices."

Thus the third party's involvement

or intervention has a central thrust.

Shifting, ingenious

and sometimes perilous combinations
of advocacy, duplicity,
and mediation must be anticipated. 43

-

~

2^

George Modelski, Int ernational Aspects of
Civil
^P rinc eton, New Jersey: University
Press, 1964
)

43

Ibid.

,

p.

26

.
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CHAPTER

II

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC
INTERESTS IN
PORTUGUESE AFRICA

Military
well to keep in mind that the
Portuguese hold
important strategic maritime and
air routes in the world:
the Azores Madeira, the Cape
Verde Islands, Portuguese
Guinea, Angola and Mozambique.
Because of their pivotal
positions, the Portuguese possessions
could become economically and strategically important
in certain conflict
situations. Military patrol aircraft
operating from these
areas can effectively survey the eastern
South Atlantic, the
Western Indian Ocean, and the seas south
of the Cape.
Portugal itself has neither the naval nor the
air power to effectively control this area. From Portuguese
possessions in the
,

Atlantic, a strong naval and air power could
potentially control a substantial portion of the Atlantic and
at

the same time,

the gateway to the Mediterranean, metropolitan
Portugal,

Madeira, and the Azores.

In effect, they constitute a strate-

gic triangle in the North Atlantic.
It is no secret that the United States has shown in-

creasing interest in a naval presence in the Indian Ocean,
which, by necessity, would involve some degree of collaboration

29

With the Portuguese
territories and South
Africa.
There are
also powerful special
interests, inside and
outside the
United States, which are
presenting very forcefully
the case
for alignment with the
Southern African regimes,
and which
use the "strategic
importance" of their coastlines,
and any

soviet shipping in that
general area, as an argument
for that
alignment. A major assumption,
usually not explicitly
stated,
is that independent African
countries are irrevocably
under
the influence of "Communism";
Portugal then becomes the
"bastion of western Christian
civilization," and defender of

democracy
A high percentage of the world's
shipping turning the
Cape and continuing on to the
eastern coast of Africa and
into the Indian Ocean passes
through the Mozambique Channel.
Mozambique has several excellent harbors.
For example, the
bay where the new port of Nacala is
located is so large that
it could accommodate the entire
U.S. Seventh Fleet.
If Por-

tuguese rule continues in Mozambique, or
if an independent
Mozambique is pro-Western, this would be
important especially
since the British have decided to withdraw
east of Suez and

phase out all their aircraft carriers by the
end of 1972

Significantly

,

.

Russian naval vessels for the first time in

about sixty years have visited the Persian Gulf and
Moscow
is negotiating with India for Indian Ocean bases.

It must

be pointed out that Soviet naval presence in the Indian
Ocean
has been only very recent.

It has been, in fact,

sometimes
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non-existent, and at no stage more than
a token force.
Vessels have been present in the Indian
Ocean only since 1969;
at the peak in 1970 there were only
twenty craft in that vast
ocean, including submarines and support
1
craft.
Should unrest come to eastern Africa,
or should the
United States become militarily engaged
with a major Communist power, the extensive air and port
facilities offered
by Mozambique could well become an important
support factor
(for possible U.S. involvement in the Indian
2
Ocean).
However, the potentialities of Mozambique's harbors
notwithstanding, South African harbors are the only ones in
Africa

south of the Sahara that have docking, bunkering, and
repair

facilities for major naval vessels.

The ports of Mozambique

should be viewed with these facts in mind.

2

One other important strategic area for the United

States is Portuguese Guinea with its naval base at Bissau,
the Cape Verde Islands.

The latter, while physically separated

from the African continent, is a centerpost of the South
1

The Economist (London), December 16, 1972, p. 12.
The Economist maintained that "the Russians may have reached
the maximum number of ships they can support without a regular
base." The Soviet Navy has no shore bases in the Indian Ocean,
and above all no air cover.
2

A publication on the Indian Ocean for the International
Institute of Strategic Studies, by Geoffrey Jukes, published
in June 1972, called the Soviet presence "much exaggerated."
The Report quoted official British and American statements to
the effect that there appeared to be no large Soviet submarine
force in operation.
See also. The Times (London), June 16,
1972, p. 3.

^Rudolf Gruper, "The Strategic Importance of the Cape,"
Perspective August 1967, pp. 4-5.
,
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Atlantic "strait” between Latin
America and Africa.
Because
Of the volume of shipping
and other maritime
communications
between Latin America, Africa,
and Europe, the Cape
Verde
complex, with its air base at
Sol, the only facility
of its

kind in the area, functions
as a significant link in
both sea
and air communications.
The Portuguese have constructed
an
operational naval base in the Cape
Verde Islands. Cape Verde

could also provide an in-route air
base for the airlift of
the forces of any great power
into Africa.

Because of its vast natural resources
and its unique
relations with the Congo, Angola serves
as the door to one of
the most minerally rich parts of Africa.

Of special impor-

tance are the Cunene River chain of dams
and power stations
on the Angola -Namibia border, and its
strategic, as well as
economic, significance.
The Cunene scheme parallels to some extent the
Cabora

Bassa Dam in Mozambique, which is under attack by
FRELIMO and
the subject of heated debate in Africa and Europe,
since both

Cunene and Cabora Bassa involve the mass removal of Africans,

settlement of European immigrants to take advantage
of the economic benefits of the schemes.

4

Cunene differs from Cabora Bassa in being a series of
small projects, managed mainly by local firms with large-scale
4

New York Times

,

February 12, 1972, pp. 23-25.
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financing by international
consortia of banks. Cabora
Bassa
Will have ten times the power,
but Cunene will eventually
cost twice as much. 5
The two dams are considered by
critics 6 as an essential part of the process of
strengthening the hold of the
white minority regimes in Southern
Africa, through the economic and strategic links of the
Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola with South Africa
and Namibia— which South
Africa is "occupying in violation of
7
international
law."

There is also a "third dam" according
to critics: "the Azores
agreement between the United States and
Portugal, which will
provide the ailing Portuguese economy with
almost half a
billion dollars in export credits and other
assistance." 8
Seen in this light, the Cunene Dam scheme
will form a
strategic barrier to the liberation movements of
Angola (MPLA)
and Namibia (SWAPO)

in areas of increasing tension.

The

Namibian side in particular has been an area of conflict,
with
Ovambo workers sent home after the general strike in

the south

showing increasing resistance to South Africa's occupation.
5

Ibid

.

,

p.

9

25

g

A symposium of sixty church and action group representatives, organized by the World Council of Churches held in
West Germany, February 29-March 3, 1972.
7

ibid
The mandate to the churches to oppose involvement in such schemes already exists in a resolution from the
World Council of Churches Central Committee, meeting in Addis
Ababa in January 1971.
.

8

9

New York Times
Ibid

.

,

p

.

23

,

February 12, 1972, p. 23.
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A consideration bearing
heavily on U.S. relations
with
Portugal is the significance
to U.S. security of
the Azores,
whrch the U.S. has been
using for naval and air
force bases
since 1951 and which sometimes
has been called the single
most important air base the
United States has
10
anywhere.

Besides providing a strategic
air transport base, the
islands
serve the U.S. Navy -as a vital
communications center and constitute the hub of its anti submarine
operations in the
eastern Atlantic.
The Azores assist the U.S. Navy
in protecting American shores from the "threat" of
the Soviet Union's growing
nuclear submarine fleet. The time
and distance factors inherent in the Atlantic undersea
battle-ground are important,

considering that, should American
anti-submarine planes be
denied the use of the Azores bases, they
would have to fly
four or five hours to and from the
mid-Atlantic, thus severely
restricting their on-station time. 11 Nevertheless,
in recent
years, normal use of the Azores has shown
a significant
decline: although in 1962 it was estimated that
approximately
80 percent of U.S. military air traffic depended
upon the

Congressional Record
Part

'

I,

p.

1126.

1X

,

87th Cong., 2nd sess.

,

vol.

108,

New York Times November 20, 1962, p. 42. The best
U.S. Navy patrol aircraft, the turboprop P3, now operating
from the Azores, can carry equipment with which to protect
convoys and ferret out hostile underwater craft in the midAtlantic, flying less than three hours en route.
,
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Azores, by 1970 that
dependence had dropped to
less than
z
20 percent.
The need for retaining
African rights to the air
bases, however, is
heightened by a growing

^^

capability to execute the
strategic deployment of
ground
forces in conventional
warfare.
In

1963, for example, exercise Big Lift in which
the entire personnel
of a U.S. armored
division was moved from Texas
to Germany by using
the facilities at the Azores was
successfully conducted. Big
Lift
proved that planes can't do
such jobs without the use
of such
bases as the Azores.^

With increased tensions in
the Middle East, the Azores
assume even greater importance.
Fully loaded C-5 transports
can fly nonstop from the United
States base in the Azores to
Israel.
u.S. F-4s being delivered to
Israel also
go via the

Azores.

Equipped with special fuel tanks they
can make it
from the United States to Israel
with one stop: the Azores. 14

The strategic importance of the
Azores hardly needs
emphasis. From 1946 to 1951 the United
States maintained a
military presence in the Azores on an
informal basis. Then,

m

September 1951, a formal agreement was signed
granting the
12

Ibid

.

,

p.

42.

Congr essional Record

,

88th Cong., 2nd sess.

,

p.

13994

14 U.S. Congress,
House, Hearings before Subcommitt ee
_
o n Africa
93rd Cong., 1st sess.T'April 6, 1973, p.“3oT:
_

,

.
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United States access to the Azores
in time of war for the
duration of the NATO treaty. In
peacetime, the agreement
gave the United States the right
to maintain and improve
military facilities on the Azores for
five years, after which
Lisbon could demand the evacuation
of all U.S. personnel on
six month’s to one year's notice. 15
After lengthy negotiations in 1957, this agreement was
renewed until December 1962.
it was clear that U.S. strategists
did view the Azores
as indispensable during the period
from 1961 to 1963.
His-

torian Arthur Schlesinger

,

Jr. has written that in the summer

of 1961 the "Joint Chiefs of Staff declared
the Azores base

essential to American security in case of trouble
over
„
,
Berlin
.

.

,16

U.S. officials explain, however, that although
the

U.S. military regard foreign bases as desirable,
they are no

longer as essential, and they view with comparative
equanimity
the recent losses and planned cutbacks in the U.S. bases
On June 29, 1956, Portuguese Defense Minister
Fernando Santos Const announced that Portugal was placing two
airfields on her metropolitan territory at the disposal of the
U.S. and other NATO members.
He declared that "Portugal
quickly agreed to enlarge the two bases in view of certain
recent international developments she felt might have an adverse effect on the system of western defense." The New York
Times reported:
it was clear he was alluding to the
possibility that the United States bases in Iceland and North
Africa might not be available in the future for the defense
of West Europe." New York Times June 6, 1956, p. 11.

"...

,

"^Robert A. Diamond and David Fouquet, "Portugal and
the United States," Africa Report vol. 15, no. 5 (May 1970),
pp. 15-16.
,
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throughout the world. 17

This thinking was behind

^^

willingness of the Johnson and
Nixon Administrations-to
say
nothing of Senator Fulbright's
Foreign Relations Committeeto pay the $200 million
price which Spain is reported
to have
asked at the end of 1968 for
a five-year renewal
of u.S. base
rights.
The Spaniards eventually had
to accept $50 million
for a two-year renewal.
The reluctance of Congress-and
particularly the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee— to support expensive foreign base
arrangements has not been lost
on

the Portuguese.

Nor has it been lost on U.S.
military and
diplomatic officials, who have said
that if Portugal raised
the price for allowing a continued
American presence in the
Azores, a withdrawal would be
considered."^

Not only is this a clear indication
of the value U.S.
officials now place on the Azores.
It also suggests that the
leverage which Portugal can exert today over
U.S. policy is
9
much reduced.
1

Aside from the Azores, Lisbon's contributions
to the
evolving bargain with Washington
17

Ibid

.

,

p.

— and

NATO as a whole

— have

16

IP Even

accepting the contention that the base had
residual importance within the framework of NATO defense,
was
there no alternative to what Basil Davidson has described as
a "positive cornucopia of payment"?
See Basil Davidson,
"Nixon Underwrites Portugal's Empire," New Statesman, vol. 83,
no. 2132 (January 28, 1972), p. 13.
19

Senator Fulbright gave expression to this attitude
when he asked why Portugal, as a member of NATO, "could not
itself assume responsibility for the very minor activity con-

37

been very small.

Portuguese armed forces have
never been
expected to play anything but a
minimal role in the defense
of the NATO area.
it is well known that
Portugal has diverted
between two-thirds and three-quarters
of its armed forces
to

the colonies, retaining enough
at home only for necessary
internal security purposes. 20

Strong pressures confront Lisbon
to withdraw from its
dependencies.
In Portugal, there is a deepening
disenchantment at many levels of society with
continuing three rearguard colonial wars.
Spending upwards of 40 percent of
her
national budget to equip and maintain a
far-flung expeditionary
force Portugal lacks capital for industrial
and agricultural
modernization.
Social and educational reforms unsuccessfully
vie for funds with wars thousands of miles away. 21
,

Active opposition to the African wars has made
its

appearance in the form of a disciplined and effective
urban

underground movement, the Armed Revolutionary Action (ARA)

which advocates social and political reform in Portugal and

African independence for the colonies.

In the spring of 1971,

the ARA launched a widespread campaign of sabotage which has

ducted from it." See U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before
the Committee on Foreign Relations 92nd Cong., 2nd sess.,
February 1-3, 1972, p. 52.
,

2

^see Thomas H. Henriksen, "Portugal's Changing
Fortunes in Africa," Current History, vol. 64, no. 379
(March 1973)

,

21 Ibid

17-19.

pp.
.

,

p

.
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had singular and dramatic
success in puncturing
Portugal's
authoritarian tranquility, with
blown-up ships and airplanes,
disrupted communication centers
and damaged NATO installations.
as a result of subversive
activity, government officials speak of the "real" enemy
being at home, and in
November 1971, Premier Marcello
Caetano asked the National
Assembly to declare a "state of
subversion " thne
thus empowering
the

,

government to deal severely with
its critics." 22
At this period in time Portuguese

armed forces had

risen from 80,000 men in 1962 to
182,000 men in 1971, with
some 130,000 in Africa, with the
exception of some NATO-

assigned submarine-detection aircraft,
the entire Portuguese
Air Force was in the colonies. One
army division was earmarked for NATO duty in time of war, but
it was at about
50 percent strength. 23
22

Portuguese Guinea guerrilla leader
P* 18
a
Amilcar
Cabral (at a special U.N. Security Council
which opened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on January session
28, 1972)
stated: "Portugal would not be in a position
to carry out
three wars against Africans without the economic aid
of her
NATO allies." See New York Times February
2, 1972, p. 34.
Cabral (before his assassination) was the best known
of
Africa s guerrilla leaders, and his group, the African
Party
for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) in
the
opinion of many observers is the only nationalist group that
might actually succeed in its struggle in the foreseeable
future
*

,

23

•

(London), January 2, 1971, p. 8.
"The biggest items (of the military budget) are the costs of armed
forces overseas, re-equipping the Army and the Air Force, and
the acquisition of four submarines
the blood offering
which Portugal is making for the security of its overseas
territories is by no means small. Official sources list
3,759 troops lost between 1961 and 1970 in Angola, Guinea and
Mozambique ..." For details of the 197 0 budget, see Portugal Domestic December 30, 1969, p. 2.
Tj-mes

.

,

.

.

39

Most of the arms and training
Portugal has received
is of little relevance to
any conceivable scenario
for NATO's
defense.
Similarly, the Portuguese Navy—
made up of U.S.,
French and German built destroyers,
patrol ships, and minesweepers is now more useful for
the various anti-rebel
patrol
missions along the Mozambique and
Angolan coasts and in

Guinea's many inlets than for anything
that NATO could have
,
24
„
had
mind.
,

m
.

.

For some observers the Azores base
agreements of Decern
ber 1971 symbolize what has been wrong
about U.S. approach to
the issue of African freedom for a long
time.
Dr. John Marcum has stated the essential features of
this situation: "it
required the Republican Administration of
President Richard M.
Nixon to restore an inner consistency of
Portuguese-American

relations.

After a decade of ambivalence and fudging, the

U.S. government

incumbent.

(like American private interests)

chose the

25

24

These observations give the lie to the oft— repeated
NATO position that military assistance provided to
Portugal was only for use in the NATO area. Official spokesmen have painted themselves into a curious corner; they
acknowledge that Portugal's primary military efforts are concentrated in the colonies but insist that weapons supplied to
her have remained in Europe.
2S

John A. Marcum, The Politics of Indifference: Portugal and Africa Eastern African Studies, V. Maxwell School
of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, March 9,
1972.
The Washington Post of May 10, 1972 reported on a trip
made by Clark MacGregor to Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique, and
Angola. MacGregor, who had just become a vice president of
United Aircraft after managing the President's re-election
campaign, was "beyond doubt the most politically significant
,

40

In December 1971, with the
successful negotiation

of a new Azores base accord,
Marcello Caetano could now
proclaim, "The treaty is a political
act in which the solidarity
of interests between the two
countries is recognized and
it is
in the name of that solidarity
that we put an instrument of
action at the disposal of our
American friends and allies. 26

Militarily, the United States since
1961 has maintained "an embargo on all arms for
use in Africa
by any

parties involved in the disputes over
the Portuguese territories."
The Nixon Administration has pledged
to continue
this embargo.
But aside from the rewards of diplomatic
posturing its utility becomes questionable.
The embargo, of

course

,

offends Portuguese sensitivities and, perhaps,
stif-

fens their resistance to American advice.

But as a member of

NATO, Lisbon has easy access to standard NATO
weaponry.

It is

able to purchase such crucial items as helicopters
from France
and now manufactures most of its own needs in small
arms and

ammunition.
gets.

What it really needs from the United States, it

"It is free to buy: herbicides

(defoliants)

for use

against insurgents' food crops without restrictions; heavy

American visitor to that area since Secretary of State Rogers'
visit."
"MacGregor told a Beira news conference after his
tour that he was enjoying "an agreeable and different' holiday
and that he was happy to confirm all the fine things he had
understood constituted Portuguese policy in Africa."
26

Noticias de Portugal
(Lisbon), no. 1285, December 18,
~

1971, p. ITT

27 State

vol.

LXIII

,

no.

Department Bulletin,
1633, p. 421.

(October 12, 1970),
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duty trucks and jeeps for
military supply and patrol in
the
African bush; helicopters for
use by the Zambesi Development
Office in overflying (surveillance?)
African insurgents and
serving the Cabora Bassa scheme;
and, most importantly, American aircraft for air and freight
services to the widely
separated African territories." 28
In the words of Assistant
Secretary of State for

African Affairs, David

D.

Newsom: "Though these air and
freight

services can obviously carry military
as well as civilian
passengers, the sale of passenger transport
planes to Portugal has not been deemed to come
within the terms of our 1961

embargo."

it is true that Boeing 727s sold to
Portuguese

airlines with the approval of the American
government have
long transported troops on government charter
to and from
Africa and from one colony to another. But now
even

the in-

direction of charter is being abandoned.

In January 1971,

Washington approved the sale of two Boeing 707s direct
to
28

U.S. Congress, House, "U.S. Business Involvement in
Southern Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa,
92nd Cong., 1st sess.r~June 3, 1971, p. 258.
29

David D. Newsom, "United States Policy Toward Africa,"
Department of State Bulletin
(June 8, 1970), vol. LXII, no. 1615,
p. 718.
According to Newsom, "herbicides are not subject to
special licensing arrangements and are not identified in U.S.
export figures
therefore there is no way of determining
how U.S. commercial exports of herbicides may have fluctuated
in recent years."
The need for verification and control over
such exports however is strongly suggested by a statement from
the American Committee on Africa which alleges that: "U.S. exports of herbicides to Portugal quadrupled between 1969 and 1970,
the year Portugal began to use them in Angola." See New York
ACOA "The Status of the Liberation Struggle in Africa," June 1,
,

.

,

.

.

,

,

,

1971, p.

33.

42

the Portuguese government
which was known to want
them in
order to increase the mobility
of its expeditionary
forces 30
Senator Edmund Muskie in a
speech delivered before the
African
Studies Association remarked:
"I believe the United
States
has a duty to itself as a
nation committed to the
principle of
self-determination to make our views
known to the Portuguese
government in no uncertain terms.
I believe we have a
duty,
as a friend of African independence
and peaceful development,
and as an ally of Portugal, to
work as hard as we can to persuade Portugal to change her colonial
policies 31
.

.

The United States Commerce Department
files indicate
that, as of August 15, 1969, Kaiser
Jeep Africa (purchased
from the United States parent company and
now completely
South African owned)
has sold jeeps to the Portuguese Army
,

in Mozambique for several years.

The jeeps were declared by

the company to be its CJ-5 commercial model,
not built to

military specifications.

Under U.S. export control regula-

tions, commercial-type jeeps may be exported and/or
re-

exported to

free world" destinations under the provisions

3Q The Star

p.

11.

1971, p.

(Johannesburg, weekly ed.), June 26, 1971,
Also, International Herald Tribune (Paris), January 6,
7.

31

Congressional Record vol. 117, no. 65, May 5, 1971,
Senator Muskie remarked: "... the airplanes are
clearly used to further repressive policies in Africa, policies the U.S. is on record as opposing."
,

p.

6276.

43

Of General License G-DEST.

South Africa, Portugal,
Angola

and Mozambique are included
in Country Group v.
Accordingly
such sales to these destinations
involving U.s. -origin
jeeps
or foreign-origin jeeps
using U.S. -origin components
are not
restricted under U.S. export
control regulations. 32
In support of the U.S.
government’s embargo of arms,

munitions, and implements of war
for use in Portuguese African territories, the Commerce
Department maintains that it
exercises "surveillance over exports
to Portugal and the
African territories of military noncombat
vehicles, civil and
demilitarized aircraft." 33

itary,

With respect to the South African and
Portuguese mil"all exports to the military of
commodities
and tech-

nical data subject to the requirement of
validated export
licenses are carefully reviewed in consultation
with the

Department of State and, in certain cases, with
the Department of Defense to determine whether approval would
be con-

sonant with the U.S. arms embargo policy established
for these

destinations.

"

3^

32 Military

Assistance and Foreign Military Sales
Facts. (January 1971)' issued by the“u.S. Department“of~Def ense
(Washington, D.C.
U.S. Government Printing Office).
:

33 Ibid
34

.

U.S. Congress, House, Statement of Rauer H. Meyer,
Director, Office of Export Control, Bureau of East-West Trade,
Department of Commerce, "Implementation of the U.S. Arms
Embargo," Hearings before Subcommittee on Africa, 93rd Cong.,
1st sess., March 20, 1973, pp. 54-57.
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Basil Davidson, in his article
"Arms and the Portu"35
guese,
argues that military aid has
extens ve; var ous
and continuous throughout
the 1960s.
"Most of it has come
from Portugal's NATO partners,
with the United States,
Prance
and West Germany well in the
lead.
Formally, of course, none
of these supplies to NATO are
supposed to be used in Africa.
France has never bothered with
this formal prohibition.

^

.

.

supplying Nord Atlas transports and
Alouette helicopters
without stipulation, but Britain and
West Germany have made
verbal conditions on their military aid.
Thus, Britain could
give arms and equipment to Portugal with
the understanding
that they were not to be used in Africa.

The United States

has maintained a strict enforcement of
its arms embargo on
all military arms to Portugal." 36
In addition to an annual million dollar
"NATO subsidy"

and limited arms sales to Portugal, 37 the United
States "con-

tinues to train Portuguese army, naval and air force
officers
at such centers of advanced military learning as
the Naval

35,
Basil
R eport

,

vol
36

.

Davidson,

15,

Ibid

.

,

no.
p.

5

"Arms and the Portuguese," Africa
10-15.

(May 1970), pp.

13.

37

Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales
Facts (January 1971) lists I?1 3 million in military assistance deliveries to Portugal in 1970 (p. 10) and military
sales totalling $1.1 million for the same year (p. 22), for
a combined total of $2.4 million in weaponry.
.
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Post Graduate School at
Monterey, California." 33
lt is
estimated that in excess of 100
Portuguese officers may be
receiving specialised training
in the United States at
any
given time.
This training involves receiving
useful skills
and experience in Europe through
NATO seminars, training

exercises, maneuvers, intelligence
exchanges and informal
contacts with American and French
officers experienced in
counterinsurgency action in Vietnam and
Algeria. 40
The NATO Defense College in Paris
admits 50 students
per six-month term for upgrading of
the officer corps of
the member nations.
Portuguese officers attend along with

officers from other NATO countries,

other special courses are

arranged at NATO level or bilaterally.

One such course open

to NATO countries involves training in
chemical and biological

warfare, at the Vilseck School in West Germany.

4

'*'

A list of

officers promoted illustrates Portuguese participation.

38

Washington Post

3 9^

,

April

4,

1971, p.

One

40.

,

Robert A. Diamond and David Fouquet of the Congressional Quarterly have reported a total of over 2,700 Portuguese military personnel trained in the United States through
1970.
Cited in Africa Report p. 17. To administer military
assistance, sales and training in Portugal, the U.S. maintains a 24-man Military Assistance Advisory Group in Portugal.
The Mutual Defense Assistance agreement expressly stipulates
that assistance received is for the purpose of promoting an
integrated defense of the North Atlantic area, as defined in
the NATO treaty.
,

40 Davidson,

Africa Report

,

pp.

10-11.

41

Congressional Record
p

.

4

,

U.S. House, December 29, 1969,
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officer, now in Mozambique, had
completed a NATO course in
cryptography. Another had spent
time at the Command Staff
College in Fort Leavenworth, next
at the headquarters of
the
U.S. First Infantry Division
in Germany, and then in
Angola.
A third had gone from NATO to
the Portuguese General Staff
in
Mozambique, and then back to NATO. The
result is not only
that the Portuguese officers "maintain
a broad outlook and
are up to date in military development
and techniques, but
also that officers from other NATO
countries learn about what
is happening in Africa from the
Portuguese point of view." 42
In an article entitled "Arms From
East and West Used
in Africa," James Hoagland, veteran
African correspondent for

the Washington Post, stated: "In spite of
our declaration in
1961 embargoing the sales of arms to Portugal
for use in that

country's African colonies, we continue to supply
the planes
and train the pilots that fly Portuguese soldiers
there. "43
Mr. Hoagland 's article points out some practical
steps which

have in fact been taken to support, rather than to oppose,
the denial of political self-determination in Portuguese

colonies.
the

The article notes:

"Two or three times every week

(Portuguese) military charters Boeing 727 jetliners from

the government-owned airline to transport troops to Mozambique.
42

Jornal de Exercito

,

September 1968,

43 James Hoagland, Washington Post,
p.

p.

18.

15.
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Charters have also been arranged in Boeing
707s to bring
troops from Portugal to the three
territories." 44
The credibility of U.S. denials of
involvement in the
Portuguese territories was severely strained
when in 1965

CIA complicity in a plan to smuggle twenty
B-26 bombers to
Portugal was revealed. Seven of the bombers
had already been

shuttled to Portugal from Tucson, Arizona, when U.S.
Customs,
evidently not in on the plot, caught up with the
smugglers.

The pilot, John Hawke, an RAF veteran, and a French
count,

Henri de Montmarin, were brought to court in Buffalo,
New York,
to stand trial for munitions smuggling.

Their defense was

that they had been hired by the CIA. 45

At the trial Lawrence Houston, the CIA general counsel, testified that "the CIA knew about the shipments at least

five days before they began.

Even so, he denied that the CIA

had any involvement in the affair.

Judge John Henderson

informed attorneys that 'any questions calculated to improperly discredit the U.S. and its representatives will be disallowed,' and questioning along these lines was cut short." 47
44 Ibid.

,

p.

18

45 Davidson, Africa Report
See also, Martin
p. 17.
in a letter to Ramparts (February 1967), p. 27.
,

Caidin,

4

^Ibid

.

,

p.

17

4

Ibid.
In the fall of 1965, the United
p. 17.
States testified at the U.N. that the smuggling had been
purely private affair which the government had stopped.
,

a
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In an article entitled "The
Africa Dossier," carried
in the normally conservative
British Weekend Telegraph

E .H.

.

Cookndge, wartime intelligence agent,
claimed that the CIA
had strong links with PIDE, the
Portuguese secret police, some
of whose officers are training
in America, and that CIA
"Special Forces" instructors are with
units of General Kauiza
de Arriaga, fighting FRELIMO in
Mozambique. Cookridge alleged
that the CIA had also infiltrated FRELIMO
Headquarters
in Dar,

and keeps the Portuguese military command
informed as to
48
FRELIMO activities.

Secretary Newsom categorically denied that
Portuguese

military personnel have taken counterinsurgency
courses in
the U.S. since 1963.
And it remains U.S. policy not to

ex-

tend such training to the Portuguese military.

"Two Portu-

guese officers have taken a course in Psychological
Operations
at Fort Bragg, as have officers representing other
NATO allies,

kut this course is currently not available to Portuguese mil-

itary personnel and will not be in the future." 49

James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs, Depart-

ment of Defense, made a statement to the House Subcommittee
on African Affairs to the effect that since 1961 the U.S.

policy has been to deny arms of U.S. origin to either side
48
49

Weekend Telegraph (U.K.), January
Newsom, op. cit

.

p.

719.

1,

1972, p.

9.

49

involved in the dispute in
Portuguese Africa, since
that
time, according to Noyes,
the U.S. has required
and obtained
formal assurances from the
government of Portugal that
any
embargoed equipment provided by
the U.S. government will
be
restricted to use in the NATO areas.
Mr. Noyes assured the Committee
that every alleged vio
lation of the U.S. equipment used
by the Portuguese in
Africa

has been investigated when brought
to the attention of his
department. These investigations are
normally followed by

discussions with Portuguese authorities.

He stated,

"We

know of no instance when the Portuguese
violated their
assurances, and we stand ready to examine
any such eivdence
to the contrary."'*'*'
Mr. Noyes concluded his remarks by
reiterating the

official U.S. position with regard to Portugal
as a NATO ally:

American relationships to Portugal and to NATO
have
nothing to do with the wars Portugal is fighting
in
Africa.
NATO is purely a defensive alliance whose territorial boundaries are confined to Europe and the North
Atlantic.
Its concern is exclusively the defense of
Europe ....
Moreover, the bilateral American military relations
with Portugal deal exclusively with American and European
defense. Maybe in 1961 Portugal did use American equipment allocated to NATO use in Africa instead; but now
Portugal gives assurances that new equipment received is
only for use in Europe.
.52
.

50
p.

88

.

—

Hearings before House Subcommittee on Africa, od.

.

51 Ibid

.

,

52

p

.

87

Ibid
Commenting on allegations of CIA
p. 87.
assistance to the Portuguese government, Noyes stated: "We
.

,

oil-..

50

Critics of o.S. policy toward
Portugal maintain that
even if it were true that
no newly supplied o.S.
weapons are
berng used by the Portuguese
in Africa, the o.S.
argument
would still depend on the
assumption that the role of
Portugal's military in Europe is
quite separate from its role
in

Africa, so that cooperation
in one area has nothing
to do with
cooperation in the other. They
see this assumption as
false. 53
It is false because the
Portuguese make no such clear

distinction.

They see the mission of their
armed forces as
the defense of the national
territory. The national territory includes, by definition, the
"overseas provinces." 54

Premier Caetano's public statement
makes it clear
that his government expects more in
the way of

a quid pro quo

for American use of the Azores and
continued Portuguese mem-

bership in NATO.

In a fireside chat on December
18, 1971

,

Caetano told his domestic audience: "The
treaty (the new
Azores Agreement) is a political act in which
the solidarity
know of no basis for allegations that O.S. agencies
have
provided information on the location of liberation
movement
forces in Portuguese Africa. No U.S. agency provides
any
intelligence information to the Portuguese outside of
their
NATO responsibilities
Training provided to the Portuguese military by the Department of Defense is limited to
Portugal's NATO mission, primarily to enhance its capability
in anti-submarine warfare and air defense."
.

53 Davidson,

.

.

Africa Report

,

p.

18.

54

Ibid
See also, Statement by Barbara Rogers
p. 18.
before the Subcommittee on Africa, op. cit
pp. 77-85.
.

,

.

,
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Of interests between the
two countries is
recognized and it
is in the name of that
solidarity that we put an
instrument
of action at the disposal
of our American friends
who are
5
now allies."
Declaring that "internal
difficulties
in

North American politics"
had obstructed an earlier
accord,
the Portuguese government
leader said that American
aid in
the resolution of Portugal's
economic and social problems
constituted not "payment" for the
Azores bases but rather
1,56
"reciprocity.

Within American military circles
there are those who
would stop the equivocating.
In March 1970, Admiral George
Anderson of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory
Board and a former ambassador to
Portugal, told
the House

Subcommittee on Africa that the United
States in general had
erred in "putting over-emphasis on
political progress."

Commending Portugal as an ally investing its
own money in
what it "believes is right," he concluded:
"I

think again

that if we could stop the guerrilla warfare
being waged

against the Portuguese, the Portuguese would then
have more
of their own funds available to spend in accelerating
the
55 See

.

Noticias de Portugal no. 1285, December 18,
1971, p. 11.
Also, The Guardian for an English translation
and editorial comment, March 31, 1971, p. 17.
56 Ibid

,

.

,

p.

11.
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introduction of new schools,
facilities
dcmties
their African citizens." 57
'

,

nn
workv projects for

Jennifer Davis, in a paper
entitled "U.S. South
African Relations: Some Strategic
Considerations," delivered
before the African Studies
Association’s annual
58
meeting,

pointed out "that recent revelations
in the House of Representatives and the Senate make it
clear that published figures
do not tell the whole truth
(about reported levels of U.S.
military aid to Portugal) ....
Testimony was recently given
that more than one billion dollars
allocated for the
Food for

Peace Program had been used for military
purposes.
Testimony
offered by representatives of the Southern
Africa Task Force,
United Presbyterian Church, to Senator
Proxmire indicated
that
fact no one knows in how many different
ways the U.S.
gives military aid, nor how much it adds up
59

m

to."

Mr. Gil Fernandes of the Independence
Party of Guinea

(Bissau)

and the Cape Verde Islands

(PAIGC)

expresses a view

widely shared among African spokesmen when he argues
that the
United States "has decided to come to Lisbon's rescue
by
pro-

viding the funds to enable her to continue her military
action.

p.

915.

57 Hearings before
Subcommittee on Africa, n P

—

58

—

.
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Jennifer Davis, "U.S. South African Relations: Some
Strategic Considerations," (Denver: African Studies Association, November 1971), p. 4.
59 Ibid.

,

p.

4
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It has been our expectation
that while drubbing
Portugal on

the battlefield and
isolating its forces within
defensive
enclaves we could persuade
Portugal's international
friends
to bring real diplomatic
pressure to persuade it to
sit down
and talk with us.
.

.

Despite some sympathy for the
rebel cause when represented by such persons as the
late, American-educated
Eduardo
Mondlane, the American government
has given little support
to
African nationalists.
For a few years there was a
scholarship
program for nationalist (refugee)
students and AID funding for
refugee schools in Tanzania and Zambia.
And presumably a
trickle of funds has been expended
for intelligence gathering
purposes, and, perhaps, on occasion
to shore up what have been
seen as comparatively ''moderate,'' or
"responsible" nationalist
elements.
But in semi-clandestine conversations
in Washington
lunchrooms or at diplomatic gatherings in Africa
and elsewhere,
however, insurgent leaders have been told
"that the United
States cannot aid them because it does not
intervene in

another state's internal affairs— but that it can
in fact
provide their colonial masters with military and economic
aid without really intruding." 61
60

Gil Fernandes
"The Azores Over Africa," Africa
vol. 19, no. 1 (Winter 1972), pp. 3-6.
,

Today;,

61

Paul, M. Whitaker,
Africa Report vol. 15, no.
,

"Arms and the Nationalists,"
(May 1970), p. 12.

5
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Military and financial aid
for the African
nationalist
movements of Angola, Mozambique
and Guinea (Bissau,
comes
from four main sources:
neighboring independent
states where
the movements have set up
bases from which they
direct their
operations inside the
Portuguese-controlled
territories; the

remainder of independent Africa,
including collective aid
through the African Liberation
Committee (ALC) of the Organ
ization of African Unity (OAU)
the Soviet Union, Eastern
European and Asian Communist
countries and Cuba;
;

TT

West

and the

62

The first presidential administration
to make any
effort toward enticing Portugal onto
a slippery path of reform was the Kennedy Administration.
But American initiatives
either to inject a "U.N. presence" in
the form of a visiting
mission to promote "dialogue" between
Lisbon and independent
African states, or "to reason directly
with Premier Antonio
Salazar" (the purpose of George Ball's
mission of 1963) 63
,

failed to lead to any concrete political
concessions, let
alone negotiations with African nationalists.
More significantly, there is still no more than token
African participation, at best, within top echelons of the
provincial govern6

Ibid.

,

p.

63 George W.

12.

Ball, The Discipline of Power (Boston:
Little, Brown, Co., 1968), ~pp. 245-252.

55

ments of Angola and
Mozambique.

«

The catholic order
of

Whrte Fathers withdrew
from Mozambique in 1972
lamenting the
continued impossibility of
Africanizing their services
under
the Portuguese system. 66
ln Angola, the African
population
13 SXClUded fr ° m
ngful Participation in
an economic
boom that is benefitting
powerful urban settler
interests
intent upon wresting
increased autonomy from
Lisbon 66
Mr. Gil Fernandes of the
Independence Party of
Guinea (Bissau) reminds us
that insurgent groups in
Portuguese Africa are coming to view
the United States as the
"real
enemy," the ultimate source
of Portuguese strength.
And the
fact that these movements are
increasingly committed

“

.

to

working for profound structural
change along socialist lines
suggests that short of overt military
intervention, American
officials of a conservative hue may
be tempted to authorize
covert activity designed to reduce
the likelihood
of their

success.

In this regard, Washington's
tolerance level may
64

United Nations Document A/8023, Add.
3
p
79
The
mestico (there are no Africans) In the
1
Angolan
provincial government, the Secretary of
Education
was replaced in 1971. One of Angola's
seven deputies
in the
Ahe
ln
P
Portuguese parliament is of African descln??
.

° nlY hlgh
1

,

,

65
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Un ited Nations Document A/842231, Add.
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4,
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pp.

-

60-82.
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be tested less by
anti-imperialist insurgent
rhetQrlc
by felt obligations to
protect concrete private
African
interests

Conclusion
For the policy-maker,
setting Africa in
perspective
within the range of foreign
policy priorities in
America has
always been difficult because
of the dual comment
which
this country has maintained
for freedom and independence
for
oppressed nations and the cordon
bond which, simultaneously,
it has tried to maintain
with its European allies,
coinci-

dentally colonialist powers.
Waldemar Nielsen, President of
the African-American
institute, recognizes that while it
is still possible to play
both sides at the moment, wisdom
dictates more support for
the African side than has been
given to this
date.

T he Great Po w ers in Africa

,

His book

and the previous African Battle -

line, both stem from discussion groups
in the Council on

Foreign Relations, and must be taken as
representing a significant, if still a minority, view among
the foreign policy
elite
In particular Nielsen suggests a reexamination
of

American ties with white Southern Africa.

He indicates that

sound policy may involve Portugal's exclusion from
NATO, and

restriction on the flow of American private investment.

He

also advocates non-military aid to the liberation movements,

57

thus "checking the drift
of the nationalist
movements into
bitterness extremism, and
growing dependence on
Communist
support. "
The resulting situat
on woui
creafce
future greater U.S. leverage
towards a peaceful
compromise
.

^ ^

settlement
such a readjustment of
U.S. policy must take
into
consideration the necessity of
imposing constraints upon
the
activities of private interests
that have operated in
support
of Portugal on the side
of the status quo.
Africans have long
expressed the belief that,
whereas internally the American
government will p i ace restraints
upon the activities of
private
interests so as to protect social
and individual rights and
well-being, it will countenance
"anything the traffic will
bear" concerning American corporate
and other private activities in Africa.
This leaves private interests
free to act in
such a manner as to contradict and
undermine stated government
policy

Antonio Salazar, himself, understood
this principle:
that private corporations with high
budgets and
technical

expertise could become a threat to effective
political power
And yet in spite of his fear of the political
consequences,
economic necessity born of war caused him to open
the door

to American economic interests.
7

Waldemar Nielsen, The Great Powers in Africa (New
York: Praeger, 1969), p. 3587
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Strategic Interests—
Economic

Portugal

African possessions have

^^

^

important role in the Portuguese
economy, supplying raw
materials cheaply and providing
a sheltered market
for Portuguese goods.
The African territories
still take about 24
Percent of all Portuguese
exports and supply about
13 percent
of all Portuguese imports.
More important still, the
colonies,
because of their trade with
the rest of the world,
proved a
valuable source of foreign exchange
to the escudo
tone.

The

export of Angolan diamonds and
coffee and the invisible exports of railway and harbor
services from Mozambique play
the
major role in earning such exchange;
however, the level at

which wealth was generated was,
until recently, very low.
prize was small.

The

It is the discoveries made
since the wars began that

now make the colonies really precious
possessions.
Forced by
the costs of the wars to seek new
sources of revenue, and
lacking the organizational and technological
knowledge and
capital necessary for engaging in resource
exploration and
exploitation, the Portuguese were driven to open
the doors of
their colonies to foreign investment.
In 1965, restrictions
68
Portugal, Department of Economic Affairs, Provinces
of Angola and Mozambique, Notes on the Economy of
Anqola and
Mozambique 1969, pp. 13-157
,

59

on non-Portuguese investment
were relaxed and foreign
interests moved in rapidly, SOO n
uncovering great potential
wealth;
on wells and iron mines are already
in production, deposits
of sulphur, phosphates,
diamonds, and copper are being
plored.

ex-

«

Hugh hydro-electric projects,
Cunene in Angola
and Cabora Basse in Mozambique,
are being jointly developed
by the Portuguese and the
South Africans and will
provide a
vast flow of power-some to be
sold, much to be used in further development, especially to
encourage white inmigration.
Portugal's own economic backwardness
makes it difficult for her to carry out the projects
immediately necessary
to maintain control of the colonies.
Thus, it is impossible
to organize and finance long-term
resource development.
The government in Lisbon found that
the cost of a war
Africa could not be counted simply in
escudos spent on the
military.
Numerous subsidiary services needed to be
established or developed rapidly.
Thus at the outbreak of the

m

rebellion in Angola in 1961 there were less than
200 miles
of tarred roads in the entire colony, making it
difficult to

shift troops rapidly; by the end of 1970 the government
had

built 3,750 miles of paved road, spending 763 million escudos
($27 million)

in 1967 and 1968 to reach that total.

Ibid., p. 15.
See also. Journal of Commerce,
York), January 15, 1969.
^

(New

^Portugal, Department of Economic Affairs, Province
of Angola, Notes on the Economy of Angola 1969, p. 13.
,
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once Portugal projected
increasing economic
activity
ln the COl ° nieS
11 was
that the weak and
inefficient
infra- structures would
have to be rapidly
strengthened and
expanded, and the government
was hard-pressed to
find the
necessary funds. Increasingly
it sought aid from
foreign
governments and financial groups
and found an early and
sympathetic response to its needs
in the United States.
In 1967 General Electric
provided the Portuguese with
credit loan of $1.2 million. At
the same time the
'

U.S.

Export-Import Bank granted a loan of
$7.9 million, the full
amount being allocated to the
purchase of diesel locomotives
for the transport of ore from
the rapidly expanding Cassinga
iron mines in Angola.
In 1968 the Angolan government
purchased more diesels from General
Electric, at a
cost of

$34.5 million, to be repaid in twelve
semi-annual payments at
an interest rate of 7.25 percent. 71

Repeated loans were made available to the
Portuguese

Airways Corporation, TAP, by the U.S.
Export-Import Bank;
amounts involved include $6.5 million in
1966, $4.8 million
in 1968, another $2.7 million in 1968 and
a new credit of
72
$4.1 million in 1969 for the purchase of two Boeing
707s.

71

United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the
Sp ecial Committee on the Situation with Regard
to the Imp 1 e
mentation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples A/7752, Add. 1, November
25.
1969, p. 43.
.

72

United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the
Special Committee on Situation with Regard to the Implementa tion of the Declaration of Granting Independence to Colon i a
Countries and Peoples A/6300, Rev. 1 (1966). p. 313.
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All Eximbank loans
and programs are
available to
Angola and Mozambique.
fllthough Angola and
possessions of Portugal and
are ultimately governed
through
Lisbon they have the
authority to contract
external debt.
Under the short- and
medium-term programs, the
guarantee of
a provincial bank in
Angola or a bank in
Mozambique may be
requested. Por larger
transactions under these
programs and
direct credits, the guarantee
of a Portuguese bank
may be
required.
If requests were received
for unusually large
credits and guarantees, the
Bank might require the
government
of Portugal to act as the
borrower. 73

^

,

In her struggle to maintain
her empire, Portugal has

had to assign a major role
to foreign investors for
the future
of her colonies.
Her own position has been
reduced to that of
junior partner, the giant corporations
of Western Europe and
America taking the position of the
new senior partners.
By 1972 more than thirty U.S.
companies were operating
in Mozambique and Angola.
Among these are three companies
with diamond prospecting concessions.
Diversal Inc. of
Dallas, in May 1969, was granted
prospecting rights over more
than 10,000 square miles for 35 years.
The Portuguese government is entitled to a 10 percent ownership,
without cost, in
the company.

Diamond Distributors of New York was also

73 Hearings

Piano

de Lisboa

,

,

op. cit .,

January

6,

June 3, 1971, p. 167.
1971, p. 11.

See also.
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at the same time, a
vast diamond prospecting
cession, extending down
to the bonder of
South West Africa.
Diamond Distributors holds
a 73 percent
interest in the
prospecting company called
Oestdiam; the Portuguese
government has 10 percent free
equity.
Portuguese partners hold
the rest.
The company is required
to spend more than
52 million on-shore and Sr
million off-shore in initial
exploration.
The third diamond
prospecting company, Diamul,
combines U.S. and other capital.

__

Several major oil companies
are prospecting,
of
these. Gulf Oil is the most
important.
The largest single U.S
investor. Gulf oil serves as a
good example of the impact
of
private American capital upon
Portugal's internal war capabilities.
The Gulf oil Corporation contends
that
its in-

vestment of some $150 million in an
Angolan (Cabinda) oil
field that is widely considered
as "transforming the economic
outlook in Angola" constitutes a
75
"politically
neutral act."

At the same time, the corporation
explains its motivation on
the basis of a need to find more
oil for what it terms the
free world" and states that it seeks
"to do business only
74

See a study prepared on U.S.
in Angola and Mozambique by the Africa corporate investment
Fund
Avenue, New York) and published in May 1970. (164 Madison
Se Public Documents, Department of Commerce,
U.S.
n'rt ttie
f
Portuguese African Terr itories. June 1971,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

m

^

1971)
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with those nations whose
governments our government
recognizes. " Moreover, it
brings to its foreign
undertakings
"those attitudes" ref
lec-H
nrr
a
^
reflecting a preference for
the American
"form of government."
Gulf further judges .. in
its view
apoiitically that "the people
of a nation always profit
from their oil" and that
"invariably, because a foreign
company is doing business in a
developing nation, the
citizens
of that nation are better
off than before.
which citizens
unspecified. The question is
not posed.
But what
are the consequences of Gulf's
"politically neutral act"? 77
One of the stated goals of
the Southern Africa Task
Force, United Presbyterian
Church, 78 has been to address
itself to examining the impact
of U.S. companies that are involved in support of Portuguese
colonialism.
Specifically,
the Task Force believes that the
presence of the Gulf Oil
Corporation as the largest U.S. investor,
although not the
7

'Gulf Statement to Trustees, Ohio
Conference

The
Ohio, September 10,' 1970.
the U.S. Gulf Oil Co
haq
invested $142 million in oil exploration
^nd the
steel
1
th ® potential *Y rich Cassinga mines.
See,
See™ Times
Times' (London), December 4, 1970,
p. 34.
rr

h rC
° f C rist '" Columbus,
u
S enclave
^
In the r
Cabinda
of Angola,

G„'

^

77s e U,S Con g r ess, House, Statement of Josiah
Beeman,
n
Dl
e f r
U he n Africa Task Forc e, United Presbyterian
?°
rh„rrh
fi
faA., U.S.
a
£
Church, U.S.
Business Involvement in Southern Africa,"
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa op.
cit.
11112
M lltarily Gulf 0il is an ^dispensable strategicpp.material
i
;u"
i
to the Portuguese Army, whose 130,000 troops forcibly
preserve
colonialism in Portuguese Africa."
*

Q

.

.p

.

'

,

78

Ibid

.

,

pp.

111-112.

,
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only international oil
company, in Portugal
163

,

s

African

*

to the suppression of
the aspirations
g vernment of the more than
13 million people
in these

territories 79

Gulf replies that it is
required by law to be, and
is
fact, neutral with respect
to all foreign governments,
including Portugal. -Governments
often change. Gulf states,
but contractual agreements
like its concession in
Cabinda
remain in force. Gulf insists
that its position is neither
favorable nor unfavorable to
Portugal. 80

m

Critics charge that Gulfs
payments to the Angolan
government represent a significant
source of revenue that
permits the continuation of the
colonial war. Payments by
Gulf, and to a lesser degree by
other foreign concessionaries,
are central to the financing of
the war on the Portuguese
side 81
79

—

ld
PP* 113-114.
Josiah Beeman contends: "Gulf's
close business relationship with the
Portuguese governmenthas
d,,a natUral vested interest in
Portugal's colonial
policy
,

.

'

80

Portugal does reserve the right to buy the totality
oil production.
The Governor-General of Angola, Rebocho
v az, has s tated:
in the mechanized wars of our times,
1 s (oil) principal derivative
petrol plays such a
derant part that without reserves of this fuel it is preponnot possible to give the Army sufficient means of movement.
The
machine is the infra-structure of modern war, and machines
cannot move without fuel. ..." Cited in "U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa," Hearings op. cit.
p. 114.
0

"...

—

—

,

8

,

In August 1971 PALC (Pan African Liberation Commitand AFRO (Harvard-Radclif f e Association of African and
Afro-American Students) submitted a detailed report to the
tee)
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Gulf responds that its
parents to date have not
in
fact been significant
and that they do
themselves
vade the financial
foundation for Portuguese
policy,
its
annual parents allegedly
represent a small fraction
of the
total Portuguese defense
cost and its payments
go to the
general treasury, not to
the war effort alone,
and therefore
support programs of social
and economic development
82

^

^

as well.

Gulf's total payments to the
Angolan government from
1967 to 1972 were $35.6
million.
The
ne tirst
first sizable payments
were made during the last
three years; prior to 1969

Gulfs

annual payments to the government
were just over $160,000,
with the exception of 1966
(about $860,000) and 1968
(about
83
$300, 000).
Following the pacesetting Gulf
move into the
Angolan economy, new American
investments in the exploita'on of diamonds, sulphur and
phosphates, according to critics,
promise additional support for Portuguese
colonial rule. 84
d
r P°ration recommending that Harvard
£°
sell its Gulf
stock
stock.
They argued that the operations of
Gulf
oil in Angola
end considerable financial and moral
support to the Portuguese colonial regime.
82

See Gu lfs position statement on "A
tion on Southern Africa before the Delegates Proposed ResnlnGenera! Synod of the United Church of Christ,"to ?he Eighth
presented by
r. Edward B. Walker, Vice President,
Gulf Oil Co., Grand
Rapids, Michigan, June 24, 1971.
.

.

83

vol

.

II,

See Stephen B. Farber, "Gulf and Angola," Issue,
3 (Fall 1972), p. 23.

no.
84

Ibid., p. 23.

66

m

response to critics who
demand that Gulf „
ithdraw
rom Angola, Gulf states
that withdrawal from
its contract
would simply leave the
government with all the
revenue from
a well established oil
field, which the
government itself
3 ° Perate or contract
to another oil company,
either
event, says Gulf, the
government would not be
deprived of
revenue but could, in fact,
realize a considerable
increase.
Now, after sixteen years,
substantial oil production
at
Cabinda is a reality, and
Gulf's withdrawal cannot
change
85
this fact.

m

indeed, if Gulf were in fact
to leave, its concession
would quickly be farmed out
to one of several oil
companies
that already operate in Angola.
Petrangol a Belgian-Portuguese company, has long experience
in production and refining
in Angola, and several
other European and American
companies
have staked out concession areas
along virtually the entire
length of the Angolan coast.
It is probable that any of
these
,

companies would welcome the opportunity
to take over the Cabinda
operation even on terms that would
provide the government with
still larger payments. 86

r7

85
Ibid.,

p. 27.
See also, "Remarks by Paul Sheldon
ice President of Gulf Oil to the
Eastern/Southeastern
1 In
stors Study Group on Corporate Responsibi-

„

n
litv^qonJhh
^
AprU 12? 1972)!'

86 Ibid

.

,

p.

27
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The Kansas_City_star,
a disinterested
observer, has
summed up this writer’s
opinion of the controversy
surrounding
Gulf s Cabinda operations:
5
poor est'of the WesHurooe ““ been that in time, the
cost-in money anfmanner
° f the
^TlhTt hesls 13 Enable
only if the price of ho“
i 0
?
t
greater than the returns.
®^ ritorles is
The prospect of
major oil
revenues from Anqola aHpv-c
3 cost - b enefit
equation
radically. The
rt
V
08 ' Wh ° sup P ort
their cause will now hav^r
another P e 9 than economics to hang their hopes on.
87
’

.

L

^

.
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Texaco too, among major American
oil companies, is
oil prospecting and was
granted its first concession
in 1968.
It has a joint agreement
with Angola (a Portuguese and
South
African controlled company) for
oil prospecting in the Congo
area of Angola, on- and off-shore.
Initial minimum
invest-

ments will total $15.5 million.

Essex Corporation and Union

Carbide are also in the oil race; and
again there are several
oil industry servicing firms,
subsidiaries
of U.S.

firms,

such as Tidewater Marine of New
Orleans, Schlumberger Ltd.,

Halliburton Company, now active in the busy
oil prospecting
88
boom in Angola.
Tenneco was granted a concession for sulphur,
gypsum
and anhydrite prospecting and mining near
Benguela in Decem87 Kansas City
Star , May 1,
88

May

8,

1970, p. 7.

Unit ed Nations Document A/AC 109/L62S. Add.

1970^para. 94."

l

68

ber 1968.

By May 1969, there
were reports of rioh
sulphur
deposits and Portuguese
officials reported that
Tenneco intended to spend $50 million
developing the deposit.
Tenneco
has a contract fairly
typical of all current
mining contracts
in the Portuguese
territories, making provision
for set minimum expenditure by the
company, giving the
Portuguese government a 50 percent share of
profits and a direito de
concessSo
(right to a share of the
production or its value.)
Tenneco
has also been seeking oil
rights in its sulphur
prospecting

areas
As is the case in Angola,
most U.S. investment in

Mozambique is currently concentrated
in resource exploration
and development, with a heavy
emphasis on oil prospecting.
In October 1967, a consortium
formed by Clark Oil,

Skelly Oil and Sunray (the operating
partner) was granted a
three-year on- and off-shore oil concession.
In January 1970,
after two years of exploration the
drilling ship Glomar Conception began work on the first of six
projected exploratory
wells off-shore. Work is simultaneously
being conducted onshore in the 15-million-acre concession. The
consortium,

optimistic about its prospects, estimated the current
drilling

program would cost $6 to $7 million. 90
89 Ibid

compiled from Notes on the E conomy of Angola and
United Nations A/AC 109/L6 25 Ads'. 2 Part II May 15 T9To

para. 86,

,

,

'
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Gulf

OH

and the Pan American Oil
Company have a joint
concession and have been
prospecting since 19 58;
expenditure
to date has been some $22
million, when the contract
was
renewed recently, the companies
agreed to invest a further
S9 million by 1970, making
them the largest individual
participants in the Mozambique oil
drive.
This group has found
natural gas at Pande,- near Beira,
and has recently commissioned a giant drilling platform
for off-shore work.
Hunt
international (a Placid Oil subsidiary)
and Texaco are other
active oil concessionaries in Mozambique.
Texaco has prospecting rights in the north, along
the Tanzanian border. 91
All the oil concessions are very
recent— many contracts
post-dating the inception of the liberation
movements' armed
struggle; several promising areas lie in
ground now being
hotly contested. All oil contracts
contain standard clauses
in which the Portuguese government
undertakes to ensure the

security of the company and its operations
against any "third
parties." Other clauses cover payments to be made
to the

government in the form of taxes, shared profits, defense
payments, Mining Fund contributions and royalties. 92
91 u-j
Ibid.

The major portion of this area is now inside
the zone controlled by FRELIMO the Mozambique Liberation
Front.
,

92

Ibid.
Ingersoll Rand, S.A., another American subsidiary, is reported to be supplying material for the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam.
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Finally, it is interesting
to note that several
u s
corporations have played an
active role in Angola and
Mozambique indirectly, through
subsidiaries operating in
the
Republic of South Africa.
Kaiser Jeep S.A., a subsidiary
of
Kaiser Jeep International, has
been selling jeeps to the
Portuguese army in Mozambique for
several years, despite the
U.S. official prohibition
on the supply of arms to
Portuguese
Africa. Chase Manhattan has an
interest in the Standard Bank
of South Africa, which in turn,
in collaboration with the
Banco Totta Alianca of Portugal,
has established banks in
Angola and Mozambique under the title
Banco Standard Totta. 93
In assessing the total impact of
private sector in-

vestment, one must also consider trade.

The U.S. is not the

largest trading partner for either Angola
or Mozambique, but
it plays a very special role in relation
to Angola.
Americans
are the largest outside buyers of Angolan
coffee
(over 50 per-

94
cent of the exports) at some $60 million
annually.

The

major U.S. purchase in Mozambique is shelled cashew
nuts; more
than 80 percent of the total available in
1970, worth $10 million, was sold to U.S. buyers. 95
93

The government has fixed

"Supplement on Mozambique," Standard Bank Review,
ii

1970, pp. 8-10.
94

Statistical Abstract of the United States 1971,
(Washington, D.C.: u7s~i Government Printing Office,
pp. 769-770.
,

92nd ed.
1971)

,

95
,

(Part kk)

United Nations Document A/AC 109/L625, Add.

~para

.

90

2,
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minlmUm

for cashews
purchased

fro, the traditional
(i.e., African, sector,
but most of the
trading is in non-African
hands and African income
from the
-op is very low. The Industrial
Association of Mozambique,
3 rSCent SUrVSy
the average income for
the
800,000 persons who collected
the 120,000 tons produced
outside the plantation sector
was only 375 escudos a
year

^

'

“

96

($13.20)

Add to this an annual
expenditure of over $80 million
by American tourists in
Portugal, 97 some $15 million
spent b y
Americans connected with the
Azores installations and the
total
input of American money
(excluding the operations of
Gulf)

comes to something in excess
of $275 million.
A question is
raised: Without this inflow of
American money, could or would
Portugal bear the cost of protracted
colonial war? 98
In conclusion, other categories
of less pecunious pri-

vate American organizations have
become involved in the support
of African insurgency. Humanitarian
aid, medical, educational
and the like, from church, relief
and liberal or radical
groups, of course, constitutes political
intervention in internal war just as much as the investments
of Gulf Oil.
Such aid
9

Ibid.

,

para.

90.

7

e Europa Yearbook 1971, vol. I (London:
ffl
Europa
Publishers, 1971), p. 1053.
In 1970, 304,000 American
tourists visited Portugal.
—,

,

.

.

,

98

New York Times

,

December 19, 1965,

p.

5
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'
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far less significant

That the corporate may
predominate over the non-corporate
in
a conflict between such
private interests is suggested
by the
case of the Ford Foundation,
which withdrew its support
from
the Mozambique Institute
(FRELIMO-related) in 1964 following

strenuous objections to such
support from the Ford Motor
Company of Portugal, as well
as the Portuguese government.

Conclusion
The absolute size of U.S.
investment in the Portuguese
territories (principally Angola and
Mozambique) is, as yet,

fairly moderate; but its impact is
great because the economies
of the two largest Portuguese
provinces, Angola and Mozambique,
are small and undeveloped.

Both are still primarily agri-

cultural subsistence economies with small,
highly organized
export sectors in the hands of the white
settlers.
It is clear then, that the Portuguese
government be-

comes the prime beneficiary of the growing
foreign participation in the economy of the territories. Vast
new revenues
still flow into Portugal's coffers from income
tax, profit

sharing, special defense taxes and other payments.

These

revenues are needed and have been used to strengthen Portuguese resolve in the colonial wars.

Capital is consistently being drained out of the Por-

tuguese economy for military use in the territories.

Premier

Caetano described the process himself: "all the military
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effort overseas has been
and will go on being
supported by
resources coming from the
ordinary income, which
before was
largely used to cover
development expenses ." 99
The gain for the people
of Angola and Mozambique
is
much less certain. Nothing
in the process win
ensure them
future control over the
resources of their own
country.

Much has been- made by the
Portuguese and by corporations such as Gulf of the
fact that Africans will
be trained
in new skills, and that
new jobs will be created.
That appears
to be true in a few cases,
though the pattern of
differential
opportunity and differential
wages is well established
in
both Angola and Mozambique.
The central issue remains
that
of colonialism; no people can
share equally in the wealth
of
their country while it is a
colony. Even so conservative
a
commentator as the London Financial
Times saw little hope of
a true sharing of the
benefits of the new wealth:
For the time being— and probably
for the next five vears—
Angola s boom will prove of major
benefit
ropean elite in Angola and in Portugal to a primarily
itself.
00

In attempting to sort out that
elusive sense of the

"national interest," Professor Samuel
Huntington, who has
studied problems of national security as
they relate to the

" united
1969

Nations Document A/7621. Add.

1,

September 25,

.

100 The

Financial Times (London), July 23, 1969, p. 11.
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process of policy-making.
finds that there is
differentiation
in the 'political process"^^
with respect to interests
and
programs I have defined above
as "strategic. "102 As
chapters
III and IV of this study
will show, the principal
groups
concerned with the determination
of strategic program
decisions are the State Department,
the Secretary of
Defense,

the Armed Services, the Treasury
Department, the Budget
Bureau, plus a few other
governmental departments. Similarly,

Congress as a whole. Appropriations
Committees, Finance, Ways
and Means, Foreign Relations,
Foreign Affairs, Space and
Atomic Energy Committees are all
part of the political process
which makes decisions about strategic
programs.
101 Samuel

Huntington, The Common Defense:
NatiDna_l_Pgiitics
P
19 61)
p. 80:
Huntington describes quite specifically
u f K
what
he means by the "political process": A
process is Legislative in character to the policy-making
extent that (1) the
units participating in the process are relatively
equal in
power and consequently must bargain with each
other, (2) imsa 9 reem ents exist concerning the goals of
policy,
there are many possible alternatives. A process,
on
ll
her hai d is executive in character to the
extent
?
that
?f
/if
(1) the participating units differ in
power (i.e., are hierarchically arranged)
(2) fundamental goals and values are not
at issue, and (3) the range of possible choice
is limited.
102 T
ibid
p. 80.
By "strategic" Huntington means
decisions on the overall size of the military effort, the
scope and character of military programs
the composition
of the military forces (force levels)
and the number and
nature of their weapons." See Samuel Huntington, "Strategic
Planning and the Political Process," Foreign Affairs, vol. 38
(January 1960)
p. 286.
,
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CHAPTER III
POLICY MAKING: THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH
In his study of the
Kennedy Administration's
handling

of foreign policy problems,
Roger Hilsman, who was at
that
time both a scholar and
policy-maker, bluntly assessed
the
process of foreign policy by
stating, "The process of
policy-

making is politics." 1

By this statement, Hilsman
would seem

to say that the process is
"uncomplicated," but that is far
from the picture he gives

Rather than through grand decisions
on
changes seem to come through a grand alternat-i ^<=
modifications of existing policy, with series of slicrht
the new policy
n
SlOWlY 3nd haltin 9 1 Y b Y small and
usually tentativl st
3 PrOCess of trial and error in
which policy
zigs
1
and zaci
reverses itself, and then moves forward
g
1
f
a series
r
of f'
incremental steps. Sometimes oolicies are in
dul y ratified only to be skewed to
an
rection and Purpose by those carrying
them out
sometimes issues are endlessly debated with
nothina at al l bei ng resolved until both
the problem and
Shoi K l 6
dlsa PPear under the relentless pyramiding
of events

^

^

^

^

Certainly the process described above seems
unsystematic to the point of confusion.

This state of affairs, Hilsman

believes, is created by the powerful conflicts of
special

interests in the government among the "relevant
decision-makers"
1

Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation (Garden Citv. New
York: Doubleday, 1967), p. TT.
2

Ibid

.

,

p.

5

.
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from the President's
Office

“->

.

“

*

m
“"
't-

*11=

'

to +-h^
t0
the p
Execu trve

Departments

i- .....

„

wi „,

*.

"

.

Mio

;
unawed by forma
formal structures and
functions which may
stand rn the way." And,
even though we
nature of policy-making
as "unrational
procedures such as bargainmg and power, it is
equally true that we can
understand
better than we now do how
a nation is moved"
and that better
understanding of the process
of policy-formulation
could lead
to more effective
decisions 3

process

^

.

To the extent that
national security planning
ever has
a beginning, it starts
when the President, or
his Special
Assistant for National Security
Affairs, issues a National

Security study Memorandum
(NSSM)

.

These memoranda are num-

bered, and more than 130
of them have been issued
since January 1969. Each NSSM directs
its recipients-normally
the

Secretaries of State and Defense
and the heads of other agencies involved to study a
particular problem and to respond
by a set date.
The response to the NSSM is
usually prepared
by the Interdepartmental Group
(IG) for the region concerned.
In the case of Africa, 4 the
Interdepartmental Group for Africa
3

Ibid

.

,

p.

13.

R SS K
Baker - "Towards a New Constitutency
for
A More Active
Act?,1
?
American
Foreign Policy for Africa," pacer nresented at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting
of the African Studies
Association, November 3-6, 1971, p. 14.
"The NSC in its formu ation of policy, usually deals with
a series of options
t reduces the optional range
to two or three and presents this
'

.
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is chaired by the Assistant
Secretary of state.
group of the IG drafts the

A working

response, which must always
be fQr .
mulated in options. The
significance of the options
formulatxon lies in forcing
representatives of various
departments
and agencies to agree upon
reasonable and feasible courses
of
action, regardless of their
departmental or personal preferences.
This approach apparently
contrasts with that used in
the Eisenhower Administration,
the last previous one to
make
systematic use of the National Security
Council, when
the

State and Defense Departments
often confronted each other as
straight adversaries across the
National Security Council table.
The current procedure is designed
to put all the options before
5
the President.

After the IG agrees on the response to
the NSSM, it is
sent to the White House. Where
appropriate, a meeting on the
NSSM is scheduled for one of several
committees operating
within the NSC system— in the case of African
problems, nor-

mally the Senior Review Group.

SRG meetings on African prob-

lems are normally attended by the Under-Secretary
of State,
the Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, and their
to the President for his final decision."
Mr. Baker contends
that "National Security Advisers must have sensitive antennae
to what is salable advice and what is not.
National Security
managers, in defending their recommendations or their failure
to speak up, talk about preserving their 'credit points' with
the President.
You cannot propose too many ideas that are unfamiliar or incompatible with presidential beliefs."

^Herbert J. Spiro, World Politics: The Global System
(Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1966), Chapter 3.
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counterparts from the other
agencies involved. The
discus .
sron usually explores
the various options
contained in the
response to the NSSM and
the consequences

likely to flow from

each option.

Sometimes the consensus
reached at an SRG meetinq
rs communicated to the
President for his approval,
and then
the policy is turned over
to the Under-Secretary's
committee.
chaired by the Under-.Secretarv
secretary of State, *for
implementation
and follow-up.
On some occasions, the
NSSM response will be
discussed at a meeting of the
National Security Council
itself,
presided over by the President.^
All members of the IG have
access to the same information and they all operate
within the framework of the
highly
regularized, by now almost routinized,
NSC process.
This
makes it very difficult, and very
probably counterproductive,
for any one agency or its head
to try to influence the NSC
staff or the President with claims
of special expertise, particularly when such boasts are made in
the absence of representatives of the other agencies involved. 7

A large proportion of NSC staff members
are career
Foreign Service officers on temporary duty
in the White House.
They bring with them to the White House the
working habits and
operating procedures which they applied within
the State Department, and
^

7

not by accident

Ibid

.

,

Chapter

3.

Ibid

.

,

Chapter

3.

— these

procedures are highly
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congruent with the NSC process.
ln thS relati ° n ° f
mlcroco

The two stand to
each other

->3 macrocosm.

The state Depart-

ment's internal procedures
also discourage intrigue,
and
encourage horizontal and
vertical openness. 8 These
procedures
are of particular importance
to the Bureau of African
Affairs,’
which does not always find
itself in full substantive
agreement with, for example, the
Bureau of European Affairs
or the
Bureau of Economic Affairs
.

In the many Executive Office
recommendations for

internal reform currently in the
process of implementation,
there are several suggestions to
formalize the adversary
process within the Department of
State.
To the extent that
adversary procedures are in use within
the Department, vertically between levels, horizontally
within bureaus and offices
and between the Department and embassies
abroad, this method
(adversary) is admirably suited to bring
out the advantages and
disadvantages of proposed policies in a fashion
which gives the
8 Ibid.

,

Chapter

3,

p.

11.

See also John Seiler, "The Context of
P- 12.
,f
African
Policy,
a paper presented at the Fourteenth
.q™ al Me ®ting of the African Studies Association, November 3-6,
±y/l, p, 18.
Professor Seiler contends that: "While it is a
good beginning to hypothesize a very low priority
for African
policy issues, a determination of the causes of that
status is
more difficuit.
Does low priority mean that only a few lowerechelon bureaucrats take a sustained, knowledgeable interest
in the area and give it high priority? Or conversely,
is an
informed consensus about the low priority of African problems
shared widely by participants in the policy-making system? If
the former is true a strong case can be made for supporting
prospective Presidential nominees whose own scale of priorities
puts Africa relatively high.
The consensus assessment would
n
c
U.S.
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participants equal opportunities
to persuade each
other, themselves, and their superiors.^
Professor Charles Lerche

,

Jr., in his discussion
of

coordination in the Executive
Branch defines the basic
forms
of coordination as follows:
Since policy-making is so
extensively decentra
apparatus for coordination becomes
necessity
This tlT
sk
has dimensions both horizontal
and vertical
h
a11 ^'
there must be agreemSK t at any
SvePsSS^he
S
ak 9 P ° liCy S ° that their
cumulative effort is
e!e?ted to
,
common end;
this basic harmony must be both
fa
l
departmental and interdepartmental.
Verticallv
nn^
nits lower
the hierarchy must coordinate
with
U
en thOUgh in a different department) those
OnL
if
* he
h d° ne successful
lY can excessive confusion cont
frustration be avoided and something
9 like
a siiaw'
single American foreign policy be
forged.
1

i

-7

'

•

m

(

r

.

n

'

Lerche then goes on to specify several
forms of coordination among decisional units.
(1) Vertical Coordination
This form involves those units of
coordination which are
:

responsive to the Executive Office of the White
House and
peak to a pervasive view about objective
international reality
but it would also reflect system processes by
which information
is absorbed, sorted out, transmitted, and
used to support
operational and policy decisions."
10 Ibid

.

,

p.

18

11 Charles Lerche,

Jr., The Foreign Policy of the Amer-

_can People (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1960),
Professor Huntington suggests in The Common Defense,
P
7^1
p. 147; "To the extent that there is interaction between a
Department and the Executive Office of the President to agree
on priority programs and synchronize political strategies, the
process is characterized by the term, ’Vertical Bargaining.
Horizontal Bargaining,’" in Huntington's terms, "is even more
widespread and important in the sense that there is an attempt
to balance the interests of two very powerful constituencies
’

the Joint Chiefs and the National Security Council often including interested Departments and Agencies. The chief
difference between these two processes seems to be that in
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through it to the President,
such as the National
Security
Councrl or the Bureau of
the Budget.
(2) .Single Depar
in this for, the
President often gives to
one Executive agency
central direction over a
broad sector of foreign
policy activity; for example, he
may give the State
Department direct control over the development
and monitoring of foreign
trade
Policy.
(3)
Thls closely
resembles the horizontal form
in that for numerous
special
interests throughout the Executive
Branch there are various
decisional units which use the
"special interest" as an organizmg principle. (4) S uper-board
Concept This high-level

ts,

;

:

form of coordination is meant
to coordinate the coordinators,
that is, to bring key problem
areas under the close control
of
the President and his advisors
through a high-level group of
representatives (reminiscent of the horizontal
structure) from
the various decisional units.
An example of this process would
be the Senior Inter-Departmental
Group, chaired by the Under-

Vertical Bargaining' there is more of a
tendency for the
process to be rooted
the Presidency and to emanate downward
r
hlcal y thrQugh the departmental chain of
command, while
J
the f^
horizontal
process is more 'democratic.'" Huntington's
development of these terms appears to be connected
to its use
in an earlier article when he described the
constitutional
relationship between the President as Commander in Chief
and
the military as a "vertical pattern."
See Samuel Huntington,
^Civilian Control and the Constitution," American Political
Science Review vol. L, no. 3 (September 1956)
p. 697
'

m

,

,
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Secretary of State with
representation from the
Assistant
Secretary level of various
Executive Departments
concerned
with foreign affairs 12
.

There is a central focus, as
to what all of the
foregoing authors are saying
concerning the decision-making
process. Why are certain
decisions made? How do these
decisions effect other decisions?
The raising of these
questions
brings into focus certain concepts
which have either been
neglected in the past or not thought
to apply.
Por example,
the concept of -feedback-” from
one system to another as a
result of action initiated by the first
system.
Further, by
treating decision-making as a process
rather than as a static
phenomenon "the path of action" concept is
brought into play.
Many researchers have been deceived by
looking at the international field as fixed seeing final results
and objectives,
then correlating them in a cause and effect
pattern.
By
,

recognizing the concept of "path of action" the
observer might
find that original objectives had been dropped
by policymakers and new objectives defined either as
back'
a

or on the basis of new information. 14

a

result of "feedThese, then, are

few of the concepts which the analytical scheme has made

useful
12 lbid

.

f

pp.

75 - 76

.

13 Richard C. Snyder, H.W.
Bruck, and Burton Sapin,
"Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International
Politics," Foreign Policy Decision Making edited by Richard C
Snyder (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 15-186
,

14 Ibid.

,

p.

165
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It appears that what
is most lacking in
these models
is usable typologies of
variables.
The above schemes, as

presented, can distinguish
the relative importance
of such
variables as the value orientation
of society vs. the
operation of groups within society
and their effect upon
the
decision-making process. For example,
before appraising the
impact of external variables
on the decision-maker
it is,

first, necessary to have a
fairly comprehensive understanding
Of the internal setting of the
external state under consideration.
Further, because of the fact that
no two states interin a void, it is necessary to
have a thorough knowledge
of all states operating within
any given system which might
have an effect upon the decision-maker
in operation.

Another problem arises from the fact
that, in order
to arrive at a theory, a solid mass
of data will have to be

collected concerning each state within the
international
setting and then some kind of typology so
constructed that the
data can be effectively used. Further, within
each state data
must be amassed concerning the relative significance
of vari-

ables operating on different levels of decision-making
and on

different types of decisions.

All this will then have to be

correlated with the relevant typology.

Finally, in order to

make all of this independent work relevant to each other, it
will he necessary to make sure that exact rules of methodology
are utilized by all those concerned with research.

If there

is deviation from these general rules, the chances of ultimate

success will be that much diminished.

The point is that this
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project for one or a group
of scholars, but
something
which would necessitate a
large research organization
and the
use of high-speed computers.
In fact, one would
end up constructing a decision-making
structure in order to analyze
decision-making
In describing their approach
the authors state that

one of their prime research
objectives

"

.
is to recreate
the world of the decision-maker
as the latter views it."
This,
they feel, is a much more valid
objective than to view the
.

.

world objectively and then attempt
to explain decisions.
While
admitting the general validity of
this proposition it would
seem that the authors have interjected
a near-impossibility.
The observer has a difficult enough
time in the reconstruction
of the objective world let alone
trying to recreate an objective world as seen through the eyes of
the decision-maker.
This analytical objective seems impossible
to achieve, not
only from the observer's position, but
also from the point of
view of the decision-maker himself. Anybody
would be hard-

pressed to describe in an analytically useful
manner his perception of an event which took place a number of
15
days ago.

A further problem in decision-making analysis is
that
it presupposes a highly institutionalized
governmental struc-

ture such as is found mainly in the developed nations of
the
15 Charles Hermann, "International
Crisis as a Situational Variable," International Politics an d Forei gn Policy
ed. James Rosenau
2nd ed. (New York: Collier-MacMillan 1969)
,

,

,

p.

411.
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world.

There is a real question
as to its applicability
to an
underdeveloped or semi-primitive
situation where formal
institutional behavior gives way
to informal decision-making.
ln
any event a distinction
must be made between formal
and actual
decision-makers
For example. if the actual
decision in a
foreign policy matter were
taken outside the formal
governmental structures and- then
"rubber stamped" by the relevant
official, this scheme would only
be able to inform the
observer
as to why the official acceded
to the policy, but not
of the

reason why the policy was decided
upon.

Thus, by concentrating

completely upon the official process
the actual point at issue
might be either overlooked or improperly
treated.
This con-

centration upon the official structure
has

a

further dis-

advantage in that the international system
as a system with
its own dynamic, is not taken into
consideration. 16
The planning of United States policy
toward Africa is
no different from the planning of United
States policy toward

the other major areas of the world, for which
the five regional

bureaus of the Department of State have responsibility.

Africa

competes with Europe, East Asia, Latin America, the
Near East
16 Profe ssor

David Wilkinson suggests that, "Foreign
policy decision-making may be, rather than one overt process,
a set of several overt processes.
One must ask, therefore,
if there are not different policy-making styles and processes
for global, regional, and country policies? These may be made
at different levels or in different places, and consequently
display a multitude of forms." Wilkinson goes on to say that
for national security, foreign aid, warfare, information, and
diplomacy, there are different styles. See David Wilkinson,
Comparative Foreign Relation s: Fram ework and Methods (Los
Angeles, California: Dickenson Company, 1969)
pp." 117-118.
,
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and South Asia, for personnel,
for resources, and for
the
attention and energies of those
who are involved in the
policy flow.
The chain of events which led
to the establishment
of
the Bureau of African Affairs
in the Department of State
was
set in motion in 1956 by a
recommendation to the Secretary
of
State from the Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern and South
Asian and African Affairs to make a
detailed study
of its

administration of African affairs.

The administrative changes

based on the study resulted in the
establishment of a quasimdependent, skeletal staff responsible for
Africa which
reported directly to the Secretary of State. 17
The intention
to establish a separate Department, made
known on October 11,
1956, was officially realized in January
1957 when the State
Department submitted a budget for Fiscal Year
1958 containing
a request for funds for a separate
Bureau for Africa.

In its

Budget Report to the Congress on April 12, the House
Committee
on Appropriations recommended the necessary funds for
the

establishment of the new Bureau of African Affairs. 18
Meanwhile, on March 12, 1957, Senator Theodore Green
(D-R.I.)

introduced a bill (S-1832) which would authorize an

additional Assistant Secretary to be designated for African
1

Chronology

ment, January
1

5,

— Bureau

1968, p.

1

of African Affairs

,

State Depart-

~.

House Committee on Appropriations, Report No. 351,
April 12, 1957, p. 3.
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Affaxrs.

^^

The bill passed both
houses Qf Congress
1958, and was signed into
law by the President
on July 18
The new Bureau had all of
Africa in its jurisdiction
except
Algeria, which remained in the
Bureau of European Affairs,
and Egypt and Sudan which
remained in the Bureau of
Near East
Asian Affairs. By the time
John P. Kennedy became
President,
therefore, the State Department
had acquired the institutional
structure which would be invaluable
to him in the formulation
of policy.

^

Within the Department of State,
the responsibility for
initiating action on most African
problems rests with the
Bureau of African Affairs, where
the country
"desk officer"

is the main point of contact
with the African country or

countries within his competency.

He also maintains close

relations with their embassies in Washington.

He is primarily

an operations officer who makes decisions
on routine matters.
He also participates in policy-making
by drafting proposals
for approval by the office director and
the Assistant Secre-

tary

-*-9
.

The distribution pattern for field reports (from
State, CIA, and Defense) makes clear that at least a small

proportion of the daily "traffic" goes directly to higherlevel staff in State and in the National Security Council.
The traditional hierarchical information flow from country desk
to area director to assistant secretary and higher up still
19 Walter Goldschmidt,
(New York: Praeger, 1963), p.

The United States and Africa
276.
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goes on, but it has
significantly less effect.
While desk
Officers in the African
Bureau and inr still
receive much
the total flow and still
exercise considerable
judgment about which items to
pass on to their superiors,
they no
longer have the potential
for control that they
once had. 20
The formal system of
information distribution
succeeds
in its purpose of minimizing
policy disputes based on
a

hoarding of information (this
is generally true within
State,
but less true in some aspects
of State-Defense relations)
Its thrust is augmented by
the pervasive pattern
.

of informal

lateral contacts, usually below the
assistant secretary level
(there are many contacts at that
level, but they
tend to

involve more formal resolution of
conflicts left unresolved
by lower-level informal contacts),
which cut across the formal
bureau and departmental lines within
the overall foreign
policy system, but most especially in
the case of State and
Defense.
Individuals within this network are quick
to pass
on incoming information which they feel
is relevant to common
concerns
20

Seiler, op. cit ., p. 2.
The Assistant Secretary had
an enormous responsibility for developing a
corps of capable
officers
the area of African affairs since little had been
done before him (G. Mennen Williams appointed Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs by John Kennedy) in
this regard.
Under Williams' control the whole African area was made
more attractive, especially from the standpoint of career possibilities.
Therefore, some Consulates had to be raised to
Embassy status, additional jobs had to be created where there
were already Embassies functioning, and the language and area
training of officers in the African service had to be vastly

m

improved

21 Ibid

.

,
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For Southern African
policy in general, these
links
have been re-established
substantially since the
departure of
Mennen Williams from the
23
African Bureau
Ties between
Bureau and Defense's Office
of International Security
Affairs
(ISA, had been especially
weakened, because of the
animosity
incurred within Defense by
State's victories in the
three
disputes over carrier use of
South African facilities.
Men
unhappy with the
Williams-Bowles-Fredericks style and
values
have felt increasingly comfortable
with subsequent Bureau
.

^

direction 23
.

The informal network has been
reinforced by an active
policy of cross-assignment: the
present Portuguese desk officer
of

Michigiffo^twkve'ySrs
r

aLTfl^ed

eS a the federal level of government!
Though
he brought
b?ouaht to ti
K a great deal of
the job
political
ability
he had
few political contacts in Washington,
for which he initial lv
17
style
instSfacc^^
r ° m African ieaders and helped
P an e
to compensate
ate for his
h?^ ^lack
S of
e personal
expertise on African questions
h
ne A S
ta t Secretar y generated considerable
activity.
~h
l check
Z of? iu
A
the 2
State Department Public Affairs Press Release
flle ln a two-year period (February 1961 February
?
1963) reveals
that Williams gave fifty-seven reported speeches
between trips to the African continent. He also
open door policy, receiving even such dissident adopted an
African
sentatives as the leaders of revolutionary movements in repreMozambique, Spanish Guinea, Algeria, and others.
1

P

-

*

^

^ SL'SSS*

,

23

On the advice of Chester Bowles, J. Wayne Fredericks
was brought in as Deputy Assistant Secretary to help Williams.
Fredericks was a knowledgeable assistant whose first-hand
awareness of Africa dated back to 1948, when he first served
in a managerial capacity for the overseas operations division
of the Kellogg Company in Battle Creek, Michigan.
t
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was once a consular
officer in Mozamblt
m
3 u © and then
handled
that „
„
country and Angola
for I NR; 1SA
A s Soi
Southern African desk
officer served a frustrate
rustrating two-year
assignment in the
A , ncan Bureau
during Will iams
tenure. 2 4
This informal network
thrives in the presence
of
nominal consensus
about Southern African
prospects.
It does
not depend on universal
sharing
y of deeper attitudes
attit a
or values,
' r«

“

.

,

,
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ence
The Eisenhower
Administration

President Eisenhower took
office early in i 953
in an
international atmosphere
dominated by confrontation
with the
Soviet union.
By the beginning of
his second term, however.
Profound changes had begun
to take place within
the Soviet
Onion and the Communist
world and throughout less
developed
areas, which led to the
emergence of a new and more
intricate
world balance and, in the
case of Africa, called
for
far-

reaching revisions of American
policy.
Faced with challenges abroad
and division at home,
the new administration
essentially continued the Truman
policy
of containment, changing
only some details of substance. 2 5
2

4seiler, op. cit

25

in the

could

.

,

p.

4
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e

worir:^ eLemirbur^hatt^f h systemfofco
be found,
conflict could be mitigated.

°° nf
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Merlo Pusey^for
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But the style and
emphasis with which its
approach was presented by the incoming
Secretary of statej jQhn
poster
Produced great misunderstanding.
His references to
'.liberation and "rolling back
communism" in Eastern Europe
stirred
disguiet abroad as did
his declaration of the
doctrine of
"massive retaliation" and
his avowal of the
practice of
"bnnksmanship. " To the less
developed countries, it
appeared
United States had become
even more obsessed with
the
Communist threat and less
responsive to their particular
needs
and outlook than it had
been during the terms of
President
Truman.
Dulles repeatedly indicated
his intolerance of
neutralism and "nonalignment,"
tendencies then increasingly
favored by nationalist leaders
and the heads of the various
Afro-Asian states as they
attempted to insulate themselves
from— and take advantage of— the
competition of the cold war.
From the beginning, therefore,
Afro-Asian leaders felt little

^pen^^s'Lchniquf^^an^iJg
V^n

”

In hi

ln

f?

lre
^

t0n9lY
is

his ass °ciates by his owi example
if

State of the Union address, January,
1958
h
thS United States was certainly at war,
"
"Cold Sar
"with
vicious, godless enemy, but that it was
DOS sih?p Ir, ™
^
ounter
the strength of Communism and work for
peace on the globe by the vitality of
the U.S." The Public
ggEg£S_of_t^ e Presidents of the United Stat es Dwi
ght D
Eifen^w^Twasnrngton, D. C
u.S. Government Printing Office,
.

r S

f

r

.

.

26

:

Waldemar A. Nielsen

(New York: Praeger, 1969),
p

.

The Great Powers and Africa
~
260 ^
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warmth or sympathy toward
the new group in
WashingtQn
the tact that in
earlier times both
Eisenhower and
hafl
expressed themselves clearlv
ir,
clearly rn
favor of eventual
independence
for the colonial areas. 27

^

-f

At the same time,
however, the Republican
Administration proved highly
sensitive about neutralists,
whom it judged
anti-Western in orientation.
The most open demonstration
occurred after President
Nkrumah's address to the
General
Assembly on September
23, 1960.
Nkrumah's deep anticolonialism
had prompted him to denounce
Western policy in the Congo
as
"imperialist intrigue stark and
naked/' a "policy of divide
and rule," a "desperate
attempt to create confusion,"
and a
"concealed intention" of setting
up "clientele-sovereignty,
or fake independence" in the
Congo.
When questioned about
these remarks at a press conference
the same day. Secretary
of State Christian Herter
responded that Nkrumah had "marked
himself as very definitely leaning
toward the Soviet bloc."

Nkrumah promptly expressed surprise,
saying that "Mr. Herter
was, in fact, the last person
from whom

I

would expect such a

^^

27ibid

^Despite his background in an
action-oriented
Ei
nh ° W6r S -” s t0
his approach to problems; it could
Tn'hifLprSach'tf
further be observed that
a philosophy of restraint and a
political strategy of patience
a
mP atlble " ttribUteS
Eisenhower said about the Snderd "L ?o PGd
,
ountries the y ha ve to learn that the "process
of
m n J S gradual and laborious rather than
revolutionary.
See Thp
p hr
T^Pahl,j^_Pape
rs of the Presid ents of the United States,
- ?
gwight D. Eisenhower (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government
Printing Office, 1960), p. 7.
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28 New York
Times

,

September 24, 1960.
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The incident indicated
that the Eisenhower
Mm n _
istration
tolerance of African
neutralism was not unlisted.
To the general contains
policy „ hich it inherited
the Eisenhower Administration
added certain new subsidiary
themes which, as far as
Africa was concerned, were
not helpful.
These included an attitude
of stern moralistic
disapproval of neutralism; strong,
ideological emphasis on free
enterprise and a corresponding
disapproval of socialistic
tendencies; and a pious detachment
from such matters as racial
discrimination in Southern Africa.
But in the course of President Eisenhower’s second term,
after sweeping political
changes had already begun to
occur in Africa, basic alterations in African policy were
introduced. Machinery was established for the first time in
the Executive Branch to deal
specifically and consistently with
African questions 30
.

.

„

Harper

&

Vernon McKay, Africa In World Politico (wpw vnr-u.
—
York
-;

Row, 1965), p
30
Nielsen,

op

.

-

345

cit

278.
Deputy Assistant SecrpH° lmeS
Special Assis ^nt to
rne
the secretary
Secre?arv of
orsta?e
State, were responsible for African affairs
from mid-1956 to mid-1958.
Both men stuck
conservative line, echoing the theme of the closely to the
dangers of "premature independence"
y

a

.

.

,

JUUUS

p.

C

’

'

and the need for "orderly transitions"
“dependence
s° that "moderate forces would
1
emerge"
contrast to

“

°

negative, disruptive nationalism."
(Such ‘'remarks
were made at the time the Congress was
considering the formation
se P a ate Bureau of African Affairs,
yet the flexibility
^
which a newly-mdependent
Bureau would need required a change
rom this ideology and its implications for
decision-making)
See Speech, State Department Press Release
October 16, 1957.
,
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In the final months
of resident
Presidpnf Eisenhower's
u
second
term, interest in Afrir-pi
rica shot upward under
the impact of
political events both in
Africa
= . hoi
K "e1Ca and at

Policy toward
Africa for the first
time commanded the
attention of the
highest level of American
leadership and was stated
in an
unequivocal voice, most
notably in President
Eisenhower’s
statement to the United
Nations in September
1960 on the
Congo problem, the dangers
of great power
confrontation in
Africa, and the peace-keeping
and developmental role
of the
world organization. 31
.

The deathbed conversion
of the Eisenhower administration did not greatly
alter its overall African
record,
which was one of passivity,
caution, and hesitant reaction
to
events which had already
occurred. African matters
remained
to the end systematically
subordinated to the interests
of
the European partners in
the Western alliance.
The policy
was not adventuresome; and
though it honored in studiously
modulated language the principles
of self-determination and
racial jus tice, it excluded the
taking of any significant risks 32
3

•

Nielsen, op. cit ., p. 279.

32

Although Eisenhower believed in riskincr ronf
n m
establish security one lense^thafhiT
a"
f securit
of
s
Y was functional to the extent that hp
i*?
would
not risk the disfavor of his close
anils because hi so
a Ued thalr assist ance against
the
enemy.
His remarks
M i
63 " C Ub in Januar y'
seL
to
indicate
this.
this
hI said
I!"! it
I was his
i
He
basic idea
of strong governments o r at least an that only in a coalition
association through cooperation with strong governments can we
make certain that
n0 t 1 t n h
•"
0rld
S
o p |ft .i D | I/
.

,

1
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S
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”
main

i. fh.f, behalf .

^

United States did
little during the
i
Eisenhower
4-~
vparc
Years to press the
European metropoles
to accelerate decolonization
_
° ntend
however, that such
efforts
would have made a ny
re al difference in
the generai course
events is grossly to
overstate the actual si nif
ic ance of
g
MriCan
th. time, and e ua
lly to
g
underestimate the powerful
historical forces, both
in Europe
and in Africa, which
were impelling
impellina the
-t-ho
process of decolonization then under way.
It would be naive
to think that the
United States could have
persuaded the European
powers to
alter their basic approach.
In any event, since
almost all
of the colonial structure
in most of North and
Tropical Africa
collapsed within the space
of less than five
years, such
small alterations in
European programs and
policies for the
colonies as might have
resulted from greater American
efforts
of persuasion would only
have been lost in the
onrush. 34
,

-

'

^

~
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The Kennedy Administrat ion

Beginning with President Kennedy's
Inaugural Address,
the new ad ministration
attempted a dramatic shift in
vocabulary
33 New

York Times, March 18 lQ^n ^
a
S
? iiT5 nt Eisenhower Relieves wi
thereat
!
sincerity
ceritv that
thf7S
the 'active,'? 'reformist' concept
of
the
fresidencv
has gone too far. As he told
reporters (on one occasion)
a
n
f t] ose who believes
there is too much interference
?
(bv
fj?
e federal
y the
government) in our private affairs.
a

->
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7
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34

Nielsen, op. cit
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,
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and the abandonment
of some characteristic
themes of the
Exsenhower Administration.
„ any Africans had come
tQ vlew
American policy as a kind
of pathological
anti-communism and
to interpret the
professed interest in Africa
not as an
inherent purpose but only
as a counter-move in
the cold war 35
in his Inaugural
Address, the President
took pains to dissociate himself from this
approach.
"To those people in the
huts and villages of half
the globe struggling to
break the
bonds of mass misery, we
pledge our best efforts to
help them
help themselves, for
whatever period is required-not
because
the Communists may be doing
it, not because we seek
their
votes, but because it is
36
right."
35

Ibid

.
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see how Eisenhower
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^nnedy

al so Relieved th^the ComHe viewed the contest with Communists
as a "test nf maturity"
t
? : ,for the nation, and
a challenge to
tL » Jf*+tleS n0t ln the same righteous sense of
Eisenhower
th U u u
leSS resolute
Kennedy's notion of security
was ?rulv o?oha?
33 reflected in the tone of his Januarv
J
uary, 1961, St
State
of the Union Address. He said, "Our greatest
c allenge is still the world that
lies beyond the cold war and
St C
’r
iS Sti11 the Soviet Union and Communist
°n
n
i?S ® e ffle
Public
Papers of the Presidents of th e United
T ohn
tates,
J
F.
Kennedy (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government
g
Printing Office, 1961), p. 23.
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Eschewing the moralistic
disapproval of neutralism,
ennedy was careful to
say to the new states,
"We shall not
always expect to find
them supporting our
...37
view
Kennedy came to believe
not only in the value
of genuine neutralism among
underdeveloped countries,
but also in
the principle of
self-determination, and supported
these concepts as viable cornerstones
of United states foreign
policy
toward Africa. He repudiated
apartheid and the vestiges
of
1
colonialism in Southern Africa
in favor of the black
majorities,
also, for the first time.
He developed an "open
door" policy
toward African leaders and
dignitaries at the highest
levels
of government, and in
lengthy conversations with
them displayed knowledge
of their
y
eir countries and sympathy
with their
problems 38
.
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-° reign Polic y Bulletin
March i5^ i96i p iS3‘
q ‘r
3 '. n
U S
Congress,
Senate, Committee on
Li-f
Foreirm
reign R
elati° n s, „ Nomination of Dean Rusk,
Secretary of StateDesignate, Hearings January 21,
1961, pp. 30-32.
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38
Vernon McKay says that President Kennedy's
youthful
vigor and, the image of progressiveness
which he brought to
” ere P es P° nsible f or the new rapport which
was
established between the United States Government
and
various
African countries. See, McKay, op. cit
p. 348.
,
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Kennedy^

appoints

to key foreign
policy posts
seemed to reflect a
shift in approach to
Africa.
The
new secretary of
state, Bean Kusk,
was an articulatg
a so

^

lectuai who had some
acquaintance with the
problems of new
natrons, srnce he served
the Ford Foundation
as supervisor of
programs on health ed “
'
Catlon andj technical
assistance in
underdeveloped countries.
Chester Bowles, appointed
Undersecretary of state, was
outspoken in his friendly
attitude
toward the underdeveloped
areas, Africa included. 39
A dlai
Stevenson, named to head
the U.S. delegation
to the United
Natrons, was regarded
as more liberal in
attitude than his
predecessor, Henry Cabot Lodge.
As Assistant Secretary
of state
for Afrrcan Affairs,
Kennedy turned to G. Mennen
Williams.
Early in 1961 Williams
visited sixteen nations in
Africa.
After his return he analysed
the diversity which he had
witnessed in many countries and
among the peoples of Africa
and
he drew some general
conclusions about United States
relations
with African countries. The
important change in his report
was that the old cautiousness
was gone.

sliiSilsilii:
^

U
n
r° U d
inferior officers
officers
ce
who did nott make Career Ambassador and senior FSO 1
"ho
f®
fn „
fully
thwarting this move made it possible level. Successfor President
n
® PP ° lnt
9 rou P of excellent Ambassadors to posts
?.
in Africa,
Afriea° such as Edmund Gullion
to the Congo, William Attwood
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^muf^i^i^ “T

in OUr “PPort
leaders to build
schools and get teachers^
& mUSt export
know-how to the farmers
°ur
of Afrira^and we
to help get more
food fmm ° Ur SUrpluses must be readystomachs: We must
into African
communrty development
In doing so, we
shal
the probabili ty that
American private investment
” P
Y a gr ° Wing part in
Africa's future development can^l

^
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Williams observed that
African nations would get
aid
from whatever source
they could and
that they did not come

xnto the world seeing
the struggle between
the United states
and Russia in myopic
one-sided terms. He did
not mean, however, What J ohn Roster
Dulles implied in hinting
that there
was almost a natural
relationship between nationalism
and
Communism.
Speaking in Cleveland in
November of 1958
Dulles had said: "Americans
should recognize that under
present
conditions newly-created
nations face a formidable task.

They are marked out by
international communism as special
."42
prey
.

.

25^iiSIl^®^to_Ap2£ica
0

March 24? 1961?

h

'

"

(

—

Calif ornia7universit7oF""5STIJ^rnia

~

Department Press Release

41

.

No.

156,

For a fuller development of Dulles's
speech, see
House "Briefing on Africa," Hearings
Before
the Subcommittee on Africa March
1959, p. 97“
'

,

42 Ibid.
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Williams recognized that
the new nations of
Africa
understood that they were
ere subiect
Y
subject to competitive
forces and
his own words, "they
see it whole. -« That
iSj
realize the implications
of competition from
both the East
and the West; this was
the key to their stance
on "positive
neutralism.

m

^

Nevertheless, the leadership
on African problems in
the State Department was
not naive about communist
influence
in Africa and soon
confronted it directly in
relation to the
United Nations operation
in the Congo.
In March of 1961 the
first opportunity arose for
the
new administration to support
its statements

about African

independence with specific action.

In the preceding weeks

the Angolan nationalist
uprising and India's seizure of
the
Portuguese enclave of Goa
precipitated a crisis in United

States-Portuguese relations.

During the spring of 1961

,

in

the wake of brutal repression
by Lisbon of Angolan uprisings,
the Kennedy Administration voted
for United Nations Security
Council and General Assembly resolutions
calling upon Portugal to prepare Angola for independence. 44
At the same time,
3

Speech at Lake Arrowhead, California,
State
||nt_P£fssRelease, October 9, 1958; also, analy^ cf Departhis
Y
speeches from 1958 to 1960.
John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomv
C
6
Vol I TciHbHdii^Mi^ii^H^itts
u\
nstitute of Technology,
1969) is the most authoritative
account of the revolt. On December 18, 1961
Indian troops
invaded Goa, Damao and Diu. Foreign Minister
(Portugal)
Alberto F. Nogueira flew from Lisbon to put Portugal's
case
,

.
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it sou ght unofficial
ways of helplng african
nationaiists
and refugees.
In December 1961,
the United States

voted for
Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions
calling
upon Portugal to comply
with United Nations policy
against
colonialism, and proposed
a United Nations
inquiry into the
situation in Angola.
In public statements
throughout the country.
Secretary

Williams repeatedly called
for Portugal to make
step-by-step
preparations for self-determination
in its African territories.
The American position was
welcomed enthusiastically by
AfroAsian diplomats and was
considered significant and
appreciated
the more fully because it
involved a risk of rupture in
the

impending negotiations with
Portugal for continued rights
of
U.S. access to the strategic
facilities of the Azores, which
were due to expire in 1962.^6
In a more private way, the
new administration moved

simultaneously to open lines of
communication with the
nationalist movements of the Portuguese
territories.
U

Nations.
^d ted
r aCtl ° n t0

Rebel

"Portugal was hopeful tonight
India s aggression against Goa,
Diu and Drmeo
h a spread
^ so
mao had
rapidly that the United Nations
?
roL
General? Assembly
might favor Lisbon in a vote." See New York
New_York
Times December
e

19,

,

45

1961, p. 37
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“.low,
umi i»i.
M. scniesinger,
Schlesinger, Jr.,
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Kennedy in the White House (Boston
Houghton, Mirriin & Co., 1965), pp. 23-30
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leaders were not formally
received In the State
Ueparfmenf,
Ut, nevertheless,
they were regularly
consulted on an
informal basis by high
government figures, including
the
resident s brother, then
Attorney General. 47

Lisbon’s accumulated
grievances over Kennedy’s
policy
finally erupted in early
1 962
The Portuguese Ambassador
to
the united Nations
declared in February: "Ever
since the
United States began voting
against Portugal in the
United Nations, there has been a
strong feeling among certain
3
elements
in Portugal against
renewal of concessions
granted
.
in
48
the Azores
.

.

.

.

By mid-1962 the Kennedy
Administration drew back somewhat from its role as a
United Nations critic of
Portuguese

colonialism and refused to support
escalating Afro-Asian
demands for an arms embargo or
other sanctions against Portugal
The accord under which the
United States enjoyed the use of
air and naval facilities in
the Azores was to expire on December 31 tha t year. And given both
the strategic importance of
"American^ Policy^n^hrfca^

" ^reign
Af fairs^vol
,
Afracans "°ted with appreciation
that
that“the
the new U.S.
i's ‘d
?
delegation
(United Nations) did in fact line
a ain t p °ttugal on the Angolan
issue.
But their fears that
^ GW Fron
^
r m±(3 ht after a
represent no fundamental
chana
change were fed by such things as the
Portuguese use against
an rebels of NAT0 arms supplied from
the United States,
?hf°A
the American abstention
August in the Assembly vote on
Bizerte, and by the Cuban invasion fiasco."
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48 Ministry

of Foreign Affairs (Lisbon)
Portugal
eplies in the United Nations Statement by the
Representative
of Portugal at the 1188th Plenary Meeting
of the General Assembly on February 7, 1962.
_
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the Azores in the
eventual
+-w of
~-f
entuality
a new Berlin
Crisis and
-i

a *' 1

“ PUi ““”‘

-h °-*
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«0, senate t.ttfie.t.en

United States-Soviet
nuclear test ban treaty,
the White
House was ea ger to renew
the Azores leased*
The Pentagon
and Dean Acheson
counselled rapprochement
with Portugal 59
And from the Senate, came
unsolicited advice from
Senator Allen
Ellender of Louisiana, who
argued that the United
states should
ard, not condemn,
Portuguese efforts to bring
"progress" to
its African provinces.
After all,
ail
o
Alter
the Senator
commented, the
Governor General of Angola
was correct in observing
that the
natives were "shiftless" and
"incapable of self-government." 51
But the President refused
to swing policy around
to a position
of full support for Portugal's
"civilizing mission." The
Administration maintained a limited
embargo on the sale of arms
for use in Portuguese Africa
and financed a scholarship
program
for Africa n students who
had fled Portugal or its
African ter4

50

Schlesinger
—TK
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,

Jr., op. cit
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pp.

562 and 582
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If was clear that United qfafoc
P* 562.
strategists did view the Azores as
indispensable durinq the
1963
3
13
"
Arthur Schlesinge? has
written^that^in^the ummer of
"J ?*
1961
the
"Joint Chiefs of Staff
®
l
declared the Azores
base essential to American security in uase
case
y
of trouble over Berlin."
•

'

51

U.S. Congress, Senate, A Report on
United States
Foreign Operations in Africa 88th Cong
1st sess
December 8, 1963 (Washington, D.C.
U.S. Government Printing Office,
1963)
pp. 20 and 115.
,

.

:

,

.
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ritories, which irritated
tioKa
Sb0n
According to Kennedy
aide
Th
„
heodore Sorensen, Lisbon
"tried
° every
everv fn
form °f diplomatic
blackmail " including
use of tbe expiring
Axores base contract "as a wedge" to
force change in American
policy.
But
thS final C ° Unt
“>* —ident "felt
that, if necessary,
he was prepared to
forego the base entirely
rather than permit
Portugal to dictate. his
African policy." 52
‘

^

“

’

In the end, the
Portuguese chose not to
sign a new
contract but rather to
permit continued American
use of
Azores facilities on an
ad hoc Dasis
basis
in this manner,
In
Lisbon

——

retained a strong leverage.

months

-

^

3

It could threaten to
give six

notice anytime that
Washington's anti-colonial
tendencies should again give
rise to serious concern. 53
In conclusion, the
Kennedy Administration
responded
to the Ang olan situation
with a complex mixture of
rhetoric
'

h

sow,

1965K
a

r^8n?n

U

^
STSaS^ ibstaf^
“ “"^as"^'

member states to refr!in
n fa

,

±

p

rones

m

froftheTf'

Africa.

C° UnC

t^ortugu™*

In abstaining, the UnitPd

E

encourage

lowed a policy of providing nf
^ms^r^lllt^yhequlpmel^lo^
See

“S^tmen^oo^

08
53 Marcum,

aollnli
against

op. cit

.

,

pp.

272-274.

"...

the United

ly voted against Portugal and South
Africa on
11 9 enerall y voted against boycotts and
;
111 mandatory measures."
all
See Nielsen, op. cit ., p.

ah

302
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and diplomacy.

At the United Nations
it supported the
principle of self-determination
for Africans but defended
the
legal authority of the
Portuguese government to
implement
this principle or not,
when and as it saw fit.
As insurgency
persisted, Washington essayed
the role of conciliator:
it

lobbied vainly for the
injection of a moderating
international
presence" into Angola and
Mozambique in the form of a
United
Nations visiting mission: it
labored to help arrange a "dialogue" between Portuguese and
African diplomats; and it sent
a presidential envoy, George
Ball, to Lisbon to persuade
Dr.
Salazar of the need for a
"reasonable time schedule" for the
implementation of self-determination. 54
But all of its
attempts at mediation proved futile.

Throughout, Portugal was not prepared
to make the
slightest concession to African nationalism.
Precisely because it was a small, pre-industrial
state, too weak to exit
politically and yet remain in a privileged
position economically, it was not willing to bow like
the British and
French to the dictates of short term
cost-benefit logic. The

ofa>
1968)

^W. Ball, T he Discipline of Power:
Essentials
Wor
Structure (Boston: Little-Brown and
pp. 245-252

^

,

54 George

ern

M

55 Nielsen,

m

.

,

op. cit
p. 303.
"If any specific failures
of policy could be attributed to the Kennedy
Administration—
that is, failure to take feasible action on problems
which it
might have significantly inf luenced— these would probably
relate
to the Portuguese territories and to (Rhodesia).
Particularly in 1961, more determined action by the United States
could
have been taken to try to get Portugal to budge.
It might not
have succeeded, but an opportunity to try harder was lost."
.

,

.

.

.
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government of the fate
Premier Antonio Salazar
was neither
accountable to an informed
electorate nor prepared
to tolerate public criticism
of its colonial
policies.
It was
therefore immune to the
sort of domestic political
pressure
that Played so central
a role in inducing
Prance’s departure
from Algeria.
And above all, Portugal,
through its ruling
elite, was committed to
the pursuit of a Eurafrican
mission
which alone gave it the
status of something more
than a minor
Iberian power.
Over time Washington became
convinced of Portuguese
resolve and concomitantly
revised downward its initial
assess
ment of African strength.
Following the first months of
fierce but chaotic upheaval in
Angola it became evident to
outside observers that African
nationalists had found it
nearly impossible to organize,
recruit and politicize under
the constraints of policed colonial
rule.
Because Portugal
had not permitted, let alone
encouraged, the development of
mass education or the pursuit of
collective political and cultural activity in its African
territories, social mobilization
and cohesion in all of them was low.
This, of course, handicapped and enfeebled nationalist efforts
to mount an immediate
and potent military challenge to Portuguese
rule.
Nevertheless, it remained the judgment of key
American officials such
as Under-Secretary of State George Ball
that Portugal was

pursuing an ultimately "dead end" course in Africa,
one which
would lead to "continued disorder and disturbance, noisy

107

disruption in the United
Nations and an embarrassing
awkwardness in the Western
56
."
alliance
As 1962 drew to a close,
it became evident
that any
active support for
self-determination in the Portuguese
colonies had to be weighed
against the strategic
importance of
Azores base and u.s.
commitments to NATO. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff considered
the base essential to
American
security; the U.S. delegation
to the United Nations argued
that the political costs of
concessions to Portugal because
of the base were excessive
and might cost equally important
military rights in other parts
of Africa.
The Africa Bureau
within the State Department was
locked in a prolonged wrangle
with the European Bureau on
the same issue.

During the Kennedy Administration
the Bureau of
African Affairs within the Department
exhibited

a level of

vitality which became an exception to
the seeming lethargy of
the State Department.
But the African Bureau
was in no way

exempt from the competition of other
African issues. The
evidence in the Congo and Algerian cases,
and to a lesser
extent Portuguese Africa and South Africa,
confirms such

competition between these issues, both within and
without the
56

See Ba H' op. cit
pp. 245-252.
Professor Nielsen
The Great Powers, p. 302, states: "Thus the United
States
returned essentially to the line of policy followed in
the
latter months of the Eisenhower Administration--namely
to
court the favor of the newly independent states, but not to
the point of endangering existing security commitments and
European relationships."

m

.

,

,
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Department.

Time and experience
brought about an
increased
thS MriCan
°ther agencies such
as the
Africa Desk of the Bureau
of International
Organizational
Affairs, and so on, to
manipulate the policy
process, but it
was in no way immune
to the currents of
world events which
also influenced the
place of African issues
on
scale Qf
governmental priorities facing
the Kennedy Administration 57

"

^

.

The Johnson Administration

Lyndon B. Johnson assumed
the American presidency
in
November 1963, and held
power during one of the most
troubled
periods in U.S. history. His
five years in the White
House
were a time of increasing
racial strain and violence in
American cities, mounting
economic problems of domestic
inflation
and, above all, deepening
division and dissent caused by
the
war in Viet Nam.
Only in relation to these
overpowering trends can the
evolution of U.S. policy toward
Africa during the period from
late 1963 onward be understood.
Although Johnson's immediate
predecessors had not found it easy to
give attention to African
needs in the face of competing foreign
policy demands, his
administration found itself mired in a set
of crises of such
intractability that they threatened to absorb
virtually
all

57 See Spiro,
op.

cit

.

,

pp.

8-10.
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ailable resources,
paralyzing the capacity
for ma neuver
Y tor
in ifiafj, S
and res P°nse in
secondary areas 58
-t all of President dohnson-s
probes were inherited
PaS " bUt
S Pecif ically
he assu ed
'

^

-

ssor Nielsen

*
,

—

—
—
-

“

,

—t.

Accordlng to
"His predecessor
had been a man of
grace

and glowing style,
which had produced
much good
expectations in A frica-and
had also

^

win

^

and

^

Which his major pledges
had gone unfulfilled.
He had died at
a moment when
African disenchantment
with American policy
had
lust begun to crystallise
and when a wave of
grave political
and economic difficulties
had i9 ncst k
begun to sweep across
the
newly independent African
states.
the circumstances it
was
virtually inevitable that
the policies of President
Johnson
suffer by comparison
and seem disappointing." 59
+-

m

Initially, Johnson's
course was to leave intact
the
Kennedy team, the Kennedy
programs, and the elements
of what
was probably the essential
Kennedy strategy, namely,
to keep
on the issues of Southern
Africa (especially Por-

~tments
58

See Nielsen, op. cit

.

,

p.

305.

59
1

PP^113-lf^^

nofT^anua^y !^}?

^
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Johnson Administration to
reverse the^ownwardipirarof
In Washin 9 to "
Africa
now has the°lowest pri^ity°o?
P rior yy of any area.
This has always been
more or less stateS
decis ions t ^o^i t ha s ^become^^ma
t ter °of National ^ policy
'

'
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^

guose Africa, to a
minimum, to try to
maintain rapport
the -dependent African
states by utiu2ing
instrument
economic assistance, and
otherwise to deal with
problems as
they arose pragmatically
rather than on the basis
of broad
concepts or rigid principle. 60

^

^

Thus, on November
30, 1963, as one of his
first acts
as President, Johnson,
in a message to President
Nkrumah of
Ghana, stated that his
administration would continue
active
efforts in behalf of African
61
independence
Iater on
September 7, 1964, Johnson's
Under-Secretary of State Harriman
stated that "the Johnson
Administration intended to seek
good
relations with the African
nations in the very same manner
as
we seek to maintain them
with Asian and European nations
and
with our neighboring American
62
.

,

Republics."

Expressing an attitude of cautious
approach to African
problems, Harriman went on to
state that: "The African nations,
60 Ibid
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Rivkin points out that- "StafP n^poli
appears
be reverting
baIk t0
9
traa Pje-Kennedy
orfK
period.
For
the
most
part,
maior
o
ecisions
of African policy are determined
not in the African
ureau of the State Department, but
in the European Bureau."

m

.

,

p.

Ce “5

P

^^

WeUaS

^

^

6

Speech, Associated Press in New York,
State DenartApril 20, 1964. Johnson staf f
^tet
ere
our intention to win the war against
poverty
at home and
d 1
h
e bS n ° mistake ab °ut our intention
to
fLh?
r
W ° rld
We be 9 an a revolt from
colonial1
h °h is now reshaping
which
continents.
Having
a create
l
elped
hopes we must now help satisfy them or we
will
witness a rising discontent which may ultimately
menace our

M

^

*

*

*

S

‘

.

.

.

,

United States Policy and Africa," Department of
State Bulletin
(September 7, 1964), vol. 51, no. 1315,
pp. 530-333
,

Ill

as the youngest members
of the international
community are
confrontea with some special
problems. A natural
guality of
youth is impatience, a
quality which we ourselves
still
founded in revolt against
colonialism. American
sympathies have consistently
been with the desire of
people
to throw off similar
bonds.
"On the other hand, our
successful experience in
granting independence to the
Philippines has led us to
under-

stand the time and sound
planning that is needed to
achieve a
viable political and economic
life."* 4 Under the Johnson
Administration, "we are embarking
on a bold new program for
making the benefits of our
scientific advances and industrial
progress available for the
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.
."65
.

.

A month after Harriman issued
his statement, Holden
66
Roberto
announced that he had abandoned hope
that Western
countries would press Portugal to
negotiate with him.
"while
paying lip service to self-determination,"
he
said,

63 Ibid

.

,

p.

331.

64 Ibid

.

,

p.

332.

Ibid.

,

p.

332.

6
6

"the

See Holden Roberto (Chairman of the Uniao
das
Populacoes de Angola (UPA)
in an address to the All-African
People's Congress in Accra, October 17,
1974, pp. 1-20.
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^

SUPPliSS itS NOrth AtlantiC
y
Portugal,
w h arms that ate use,
to kill us." 6 7
Horeover
e ha, reluctantly
conclude, that Africa's
newly independent
states were incapable
of providing arms an,
finance sufficient
to hasten victory in
a war that might
otherwise last twenty
years and decimate the
country. 69
an action that he
described as a "radical
change in policy," he
declared his
readiness to accept aid
from Communist countries
and disclosed
plans to send an Angolan
delegation to Peking. 69
,

^

^^

m

African attitudes toward
the United states took
a sudden and pa lpable change
for the worse following
United states
67

Ibid

.

p.

,

10.

68

h
eVOlution f °r Angola," the
Charleston" (South Carol^2?
N<3WS and Courier of
December 19, 1963, had rcporLcJ^-TL?
classic
pattern of a
New York Times build-nn
revolutionar
was displayed December^ in^fo^r"
y movement
0
Serra d^ LLda^ountlins^of
Angola
ar ticle deals with a
terrorist movement in Portucral^s oianfSs°arti?X
African
g
province, Angola.
The New York Times'
_^
u

^

*

-p

H

f

4.

4

Garrison.

Nowhere in the New York^imeflrticles^oes^.ie
find
bac
^°und,
or
of
the
uibelievaSle savaglry^f
about the article is^ot that the
^im^s ‘o^Sooks^Angolan^troc 9
S
VS
a helpi "9 hand to the terrorists,
9
but
that the U.S.
u S
Co
Government has done nothing to stop the the fact
attacks
against Portugal, a NATO ally of the Uniled
States?"
?he
Courier goes on to state that: "Portugal,
a Christian
anticou " br i'' allows u s military planes
to
land'on
her
airfields
ld
t e Az res
This means that the national security
fn-r™ e iu
the ^
Unlted5 States are an<3 long have been assisted
by
the
Port ?Ue e
h
Vernm nt by allowin g outside forces to conduct
?
? war
we? againstf iH°
a
the province of Angola," the Courier concluded,
the United States has allowed a reliable
friend to be stabbed
in the back
-

-

*

.

69 Roberto,

op, cit ., p.

18.
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„

„.

u „

loned.

Most of all, Africans
sensed that a chill
of indiference had begun to
settle over African
P oli cy
wherever
ey looked they began
to find evidence
to support their
suspicions that, at the
moment when their
problem were
growing more disquieting,
the United states was
pulling back
and, in many cases,
out.
.

Especially, signs seemed
tQ point discQurag
ngly
toward an immobilisation
of American policy
on the key political issues of
Southern Africa
Portuguese repression of
black rebellions in Angola
and Mozambique was
becoming more
effective, but American
pressures on Lisbon for
political
advancement in the colonies
had apparently diminished,
not
^0
increased
.

.

.

American foreign policy toward
Southern Africa under
the Johnson Administration
could then be described as
a contradictory tandem of lamentation
and laissez-faire.
The
Administration officially proclaimed
American support for the
principles of self-determination,
including the right of
Africans to govern themselves
through institutions
of their

own choice.

Johnson, therefore, lamented
apartheid as a
denial of the principle of
government by the consent of the
governed.
He lamented the refusal of
Portugal to admit the
principle of self-determination for
the same reason,
with
70 Ibid

.

,

p.

18.
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re gard to the

Portugese Monies, the
then Assistant Secre .

State for African Affairs
G. Mennen Willi
ams said
that our policy seeks
"to impose no special
formula" hut at
the same time contemplated
"an immediate recognition
of the
People's timely right to
choose independence or
other forms
of association or
dissociation" and recognises
the necessity of "steps being
taken to prepare the
people for selfgovernment as rapidly as
possible " 71 cConcerning
possible.
Portuguese
Africa, Governor Williams
said that U.s. policy
recognises
the necessity of convincing
Portugal that suppression
of
colonial aims contained
"the seeds of destruction
for Portugal, as well as trouble
for the rest of Africa
and the world.
Acting upon these basic
assumptions, the American
government
had sought to persuade Lisbon
"by every diplomatic means"
to
engage in a "dialogue" with
the Africans concerned. 72
Y

G

W
a '” S
1
m
1"
lege, w illiamstown, Mass!,
Marlh i8, 1965
Later in i966
n

Af^^uSco^t?^
whatever its impact on the Congress

ISSm; “ v;r£" lST

Committee;
"i?

*

South African racial policy^nd
reaf f
Y
statements on the ban of the sale of imerLrlier^licy
P
P
a1
Concedin 9 th at the United States had
signif leant military
milit
interests at stake, he asserted that this
V ri e the American Political
objective of seeing
.
an end to ?h
^
Africa." Quoted in
Nielsen op cit
•

'

.

^p!

72 Ibid

.

,

p.

312

115

What was the resuit
of the Johnson
Administration's
importuning? Our advice
was ignored.
Our diplomatic pressure
Proved almost totally
ineffectual. Yet we chose
to ignore
the forum of the United
Nations we declared our
abhorrence of apartheid and
colonialism but then
justified
inaction by asserting that
these blights constituted
no threat
to peace.
We expressed earnest
hope that conditions
would

improve while almost all
indicators pointed to further
deterioration. state Department
spokesmen argued against a
cessation of American investment
in Portuguese Africa
because it
"could seriously handicap
our ability to carry on
a dialogue
with Portugal" yet admitted
that Portugal's suppression
of
rebellions in Angola and Mozambique
"have worsened despite
the efforts of the outside
world, whether of persuasion,
condemnation, or pressure. "73 0ur
highest officials admitted
that African nationalists in
fact "feel increasingly frustrated
in their efforts to achieve
political expression;" 74 yet with
the notable exception of an arms
embargo on Portugal we
remained content to lament injustice
and colonialism and
label as extremist those who advocate
that we face up to the
implications of the failure of moral
suasion.
73

Statement of Hon. G. Mennen Williams, Fourth
Annual
Leadership Institute, Collegiate Council
for the United Nations, Chicago, April 18, 1966.
,

74 Ibid
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As if all this did
not suffice
ce

the Pn
tne
Portuguese Forergn Minister, Alberto
Franco Nogueira illustrated
the contradictory and self-defeating
duality of the Johnson
admin _
istration
foreign policy when he
described the American
doctrine of legitimate
retaliation in Viet Nam"
as a justification Of Portuguese
retaliation against "dangerous
communist elements in Angola
7
and Mozambique.
5
"
By choosing
a NATO special meeting
as the occasion for
this veiled threat
to bomb north of the
Ruvuma, by drawing a
parallel with the
Vietnamese war in which African
sympathies lie overwhelmingly
with the Viet Cong, and by
defining the threat to Angola
and
Mozambique as communist, not
nationalist, Nogueira has neatly
spun a web in which Portuguese
and American policy would
appear identical.
He has made certain that
if his country
should ever make good on its
threat, all Africa would assume
it was with American
permission
75 Washington

Post

.

May 11

,

'

1965, p.

3

.

^$£^bicari Revolution (New York: n.p

iQ£/n

t

1962)
attempts^ drive home this point
wE
wnen
en°he
ne states'
states. "£eF
Let us recall a fundamental text of
Lenina
a
nal bour eoisie of an oppressed
nation
?
truggles against the
strugqlls
th° oppressing
nation, we are on its side.
As lon 9 as the bourgeoisie of an
oppressed
ourgeois nationalism, we are against it. nation favors
We fight
against the privileges and violence of
the oppressing nationwe have no tolerance for a war of
privilege on the pLt of the
oppressed nation.
See Lenin, "Du droit des nations a
disposer d elles-memes " From Oeuvres Choisie
s I, 2nd part
(Moscow, n.p., 1953).
Moreira continues: "As clearly foreshadowed by Lenin, the encouragement of a
revolutionary nationality as a disintegrating process in an enemy
state is a preliminary Soviet step in all territories allied
with the West,
o the Soviets, nationalism in these
territories is the
'

*

:

*

,

.
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Washington has never publiclv
pupiiciy Hio
disassociated itself
from such embraces.
In fact, it sent
Ambassador Admiral
George Anderson on a well
advertised trip to Angola
and
Mozambique in March, 1964.
The Ambassador reported
how
"tremendously impressed” he
was by the progress
and wellbeing that he found in
those territories, which
served to
identify us solidly behind
the Portuguese military

campaign.
All this irritated African
nationalist leaders. Dr
Eduardo
Mondlane president of the
Mozambique Liberation Front,
concluded that Admiral Anderson's
statements were evidence that
the United States of America
cannot identify itself with
our
ideals for self-determination
and independence.” Noting
that
the American diplomat's
visit was followed shortly by
that
of a South African military
diplomat. Dr. Mondlane said he
expected that the United States
"like the Republic of South
Africa will intervene against us
in the forthcoming conflict
with Portugal.
.

,

Dr.

Mondlane, a native of the south of
Mozambique,
was dedicated to the overthrow of
Portuguese rule up to the
year of his death in 1971. While
directing the guerrilla war
from Dar-es -Salaam, Tanzania, Mondlane
had often boasted that
he could get all the weapons he needed
from the Communist

vanguard of revolution, because then, in internal
affairs,
the opportunity to seize power will come
to the Communist
party.
See Moreira, Portugal's Stand p. 7.
,

77

Mozambican Revolution

,

p.

30.
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countries.

Mondlane had stated
ated that he
h
received adequate
funds from the
Organization of African Unit
,
to remove the last
..vest-1963 ° f "
hlte rUle ln Africa
and f rom
private organizations
in Britain, the
United States, Sweden
and the Netherlands
«
-riands
Mondlane pledged
to t:L
finhe
y u ro
gnt a. guerrilla
war or twenty years,
if he had to
tQ force
78
a veiled -condemnation
of the United States,
Mondlane once said:
"Obviously, our struggle
against Portuguese
colonialism is also directed
against the imperialist
forces
that support it.
This also applies to
our international position, where we stand
shoulder to shoulder with
all peoples
fighting for freedom and
independence ." 79
'

.

^

,

m

Together the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations
largely spanned the
post-independence era in Africa.
The
contrasts of manner and
political fortune of the two
Presidents are of course many and
obvious: Kennedy reached
office
by a razor-thin majority,
having been the object of
much suspicion and prejudice as a
candidate.
His successor was swept
into office by a massive
majority in 1964 in a political
atmosphere of national consensus.
Four years later the country had been torn into more
dangerous division than at any
time in a century, and unlike
his predecessor, Johnson had
become the least revered President
in generations.
78 New York
Times, November 21,

1966, pp.

52-54

"
“°" dlana
T h e Liberation Struggle In Mozam" Review^f
bique
qU
ggYi£g_gf. International Affairs (February 1968),
pp |: 7
!
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Even When regarded
fro, the special
angle of Africa
and African policy,
their contrasting fortunes
are apparentWith his inaugural
Address, Kennedy launched
a courtship of
the Third world, and
the affection thereby
aroused in Africa
survived all subseguent
disappointments with his
perforce,
resident Johnson’s first
major decision on Africa
after his
election in 1964, the
Stanleyville airdrop, backfired
excessively, and the doubts
and resentments it
produced in Africa
80
persisted for years.
The Administration
(Johnson) seemed
to have accepted as
applicable to Africa the
Kennan-Lippmann
thesis on the limitations
of U.S. capacity to
influence the
direction of affairs in distant
areas of the world. Yet,
with
the exception of the Congo
crisis, and, remote as it is
from
Communist China and the Soviet
Union, Africa did not, and
does
not now, present the
geopolitical difficulties we find
in

dealing with crises in Southeast
Asia, the Middle East and
Eastern Europe. We are not
limited by regional (and related
teral) military alliances
comparable to NATO, CENTO, SEATO,
ANZUS and the O.A.S. defense
systems.
In Africa, also, we
should be comparatively free from
pressures arising out of

commercial interests; Africa accounts
for less than six percent
of our total foreign trade and
investment.
80_
,

.

Nl(plsen,

.

1

op. cit
p. 331.
in the spring of 1964
U d r the leaders hip of Christopher
Gbenye
? f
Popular Liberation
Front in Stanleyville (Conqo)
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,

established ^?
en
USed t0 release American and Belgian hostages,
the United States prepared to execute
"Operation Dragon Rouge,"
a drop from U.S. transport planes
of 545 Belgian paratroopers
to rescue the white civilians. Although
U.S. officials siught

nni^%r
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Lastly, United States
policy under the Johnson
Administration offers a clear
example of allowing
African policymakmg to be shaped and
controlled by events
outside of
Africa, including
developments within the
United States,
rather than the creation
of policy tailored
to events within
tself
i n the late
1940s and early 195Qs
such little
interest as Washington
displayed in Africa arose
largely out
of cold-war anxieties,
and American policy was
strictly guided
by the requirement not
to undermine the
Atlantic Alliance.
From 1958 to 1961 the
dramatic surge of independence
in Africa
made the continent the
object of serious policy
interest
partly because of continuing
preoccupation with the Communist
confrontation.
In more recent years and
particularly since
1965, urban and social troubles
at home, a continuing
trade
deficit, and above all, Viet
Nam, with all its
repercussions,
not only pushed Africa once
again into the shadows but
brought
about a new atmosphere of
hesitancy and reluctance in facing
African problems.
.

The Nixon Administration

A tentative assessment of United
States policy toward
Africa during President Richard
Nixon’s Administration may be
to justify the operation not only
on the United Nations mananY
Africans who had approved of the suppression
of Katanga
Kata
were outraged at Operation Dragon Rouge
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hazarded on the basis of
public government documents
and newspaper accounts.
Its s ingle feature appears
to be a shift from
the initial, tentative
inclination to continue policies
defined
by preceding administrations
to a subtle but unmistakable
"New
realism 81 Some of the more
significant events included Mrs
Richard Nixon’s symbolic visit
to four West African
ii

states in

January 1972, the award of nearly
half a billion dollars in
economic assistance to Portugal,
the breach of the United
Nations embargo against Rhodesia,
the increasing American dependence on Africa— illustrated by
the need for Nigerian oil,
and by agreements between Ford and
General Motors and South
African companies for the purchase of
platinum to be used in
pollution-control devices— and the rising
concern of black
Americans for this country's Africa policy.
The Nixon Doctrine summarized United
States objectives
in Africa as follows:
(a)

Peace— To keep Africa free of great power rivalries
and conflict as well as to respect their
national
integrity and to support the inviolability of African
borders

(b)

Eco nomic Development To assist Africans in the development of their human resources through education, and
to assist them in dealing with their agricultural,
health and population problems.

—

8

The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States, Richard M« Nixon (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1971), p. 280.
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(c)

Justice
United

To assist Africans in their
search for

^thern^rica The
tf?n Po^ugueL^LSan^errUorLsts"

Sat^sha

of arms for

Additionally, Assistant Secretary
of state David Newsom articulated Nixon's
orientation in a speech delivered
in
Altanta in October 1971, but aimed,
he said, "at a wider
audience in Africa." Secretary
Newsom expressed the belief
that change will come in Southern
Africa.
"Economic
and

demographic pressures make this
inevitable.
itself there is a lessening of
rigidity.

In South Africa

Change is a central

theme of discussion; there is
psychological and intellectual
ferment within the Afrikaner community
there is a growing
realism among businessmen that Africans are
important to them
.

.

.

Ibid., pp. 282 283.
See U.S. Government: White House
and. Sta te Department Press Release titled
"U.S. and~Africa in
5
aa earlier poiliy statfmen?
"P
signed by both^Secretary
of State Rogers and President Nixon
stating that: As for the Portuguese territories,
we shall
continue to believe that their peoples should have
the right
of self-determination.
We will encourage peaceful progress
toward that goal ..." For comment on this policy
statement
see The Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), April
4, 1970, p
20
which states: "President Nixon's declaration ... of a
pragmatic and peaceful American policy is, in particular, a diplomatic victory for Lisbon, which has for nine years been
fighting not only African rebels but international censure for
holding on to these territories. The benign tone of the Nixon
statement is not new.
It echoes a constant U.S. theme of the
last fifteen years that the Portuguese are making progress,
however slow, toward fundamental and peaceful change in
Africa.
See Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique
(Baltimore: Penguin African Library, 1968), pp 117-118.
^In
fact the myth of Portuguese non-racism and reasonableness had
been clearly shattered a decade ago when the peaceful demands
of the people for basic economic and political rights the
vote, the right to form trade unions, more education were met
with bloody repression while most of Africa moved toward political independence.
In Mozambique more than five hundred
unarmed people were mowed down as they demonstrated for more

™'

.

—
—

.

.

.

'
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as skilled workers
and as a market

change to cone quickly
or easily.
come peacefully." 83
However,

.

.

.

„ e cannot expect

0ur hope is that it
will

series of agreements
reached with Portugal
in December 1971
provided an example of an a
apparent wholesale
American insensitivity to
a world commitment for
selfdetermination. The Azores
agreements provided for
continued
use by American forces
of the Lajes Air Base in
the Azores in
exchange for an unprecedented
American economic aid package
of
nearly half a billion dollars.
The package included:
(1) the
free loan of an oceanographic
ship worth $8 million;
(2) a
$l-million grant for educational
projects in metropolitan
Portugal to be financed by the
Defense Department; (3) another
grant of a minimum $5 million
representing "initial acquisition cost, not current value,"
which the Defense Department says
includes "road building machinery,
cranes, hospitals, port and
harbor equipment, soil testing
equipment
"
i n other
words, precisely the kind of material
needed to build hydroa

.

.

,

.

m

nd “ ore pay at Mueda in 1960 •"
Guinea-Bissau in
rkerS at Pld919uiti "began a strike for
higher
w ® re ® hot b Y the police before the strike
was
"
broken.
broken
See Man chester Guardian March 14,
1959,
18.
p.
In
the face of thirreaTHyT "U S insistence
in peaceful change
Ry lnnocence and acquires sinister
implications
mh e n c
a PP e ars to be shaping its policy
primarily in response
to a concern for stability.
A stable Portugal in Europe, where
as part of NATO it is seen as part of
the so-called 'free world'
alliance against Communism ..." See Jennifer
Davis, "U.S.hern African Relations: Some Strategic Considerations,"
for
14?l!j
th annual meeting, African Studies Association,
Denver
Colorado, November 3-6, 1971, p. 10
?

fm
cLT

,

.

.

.

*

.

.

*

(

-|

Affairs
1971.

83 David Newsom,
Assistant Secretary of State for African
Speech, State Department Press Release October 15,
,
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electric dams in Angola
and Mozambique;
4
access to a $ 15 million loan to purchase
surplus United States
agricultural
commodities; and , 5 access
to Export-Import Bant
loans
totaling 5400 million to
buy American goods for
development
projects in Portugal 84
(

)

,

.

The new American-Portuguese
Azores agreement became
an unexpected element
in Lisbon's favor.
Prior to this
executive agreement the
United States operated air
and naval
facilities on the mid-Atlantic
islands for a nine-year
period
on an ad hoc basis without
a lease.
Unlike the previous
arrangement. President Nixon's
accord renders substantial
development aid to Portugal for
only a 25-month lease. 85

grams," with the money to
come^rom the

10

U^S^n

^

reform pro "

sidering the appropriation bill
for the Deoartm^ of
3 or Men,b ® rs of the
Congress know we are nSiT
Ippropriatin^mo
re: ° rm the educational system
of Portugal ” s
see
®e
u s
Congress, Senate, Hearings before the
ComRelations 92nd CongTT^n d sess. February 1-3
3
° C
U S
Gove mment Printing Office, 1972),
n
49
p
1 151
Caetano (in a press interview in Lisbon
held before^he
before the Agreement
?
on March 30, 1971) stated: "that the
U.S must sign a new formal agreement
on the use of the Lajes
Az ° res -"
He added
"that in exchange for
the renewal'of
1
f Ih
the Azores P act (which expired in 1962),
Portua3l
a ?
laterest loan to develop education. The late
fL
q
Dr. Salazar
balked at renewing the agreement on the base
eg tar anno ance at u s unwillingness
to support Portu^-|T
f 1 C n p° ^
llcles against colonialist charges at the United
L;!n ^ Manchester
5
Nations.
Guardian March 31, 1971, pp 34 - 35
-

^
-

w

.

-

,

,

’

’

^

:

'

*

.

^

'

,

.

^

-

.

-

,

.

.

85 T he new
five-year agreement was made retroactive to

January, 1969, when Lisbon requested the opening
of negotiations,
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Washington official
professed
agreement represente,
change"

^^_

in and had „ no
to the longstanding
American policy of
support fQr , elf _
determination in the
Portuguese colonies. B6
Neit her the

Azores summitry nor base
agreement was accompanied
by reference to any understanding
over the colonial i
ssue let alone by
any pro forma reaffirmation
of America
American adherence to the
principle of self-determination. 87
There seems little doubt
that in addition to bailing
Portugal out of war-born
financial distress-apparently
without -en^n effort to
extract promises of
political reform and
S r

lorh°?fmes :

jSy

ide-Ht-S^TFo Agnew, on the'last
world tour visited Portuaal

T

W

See the New
States Vice
country diplomatic
° f the talks with
W
S
One
0
1*

a

Premier Gaetano was not
lishosed*

other^s

U

Portuguese Guinea?^
86

and

-Sf^.®?

& ^sh^or"
r

u

^

?r^fC-

mf

Mo^i^, ^d^

UeSe

„
11

Africa^ (Syr^/'Eastern

No. V, March 1972)

d

ii

•

.

°f
^^ 03
rican

^

Indi ?^rence: Portugal
Studies Monograph
erly J°
f

^

87

Ibid., p. 13.
Marcum points out that- "The
3
0 1 ® 1356
un P ublished 'Background
tharrenewafof
! zores contract had been impossible Paper'
in 1962
because of 'Pnrf
Portuguese dissatisfaction with U.S.
policies
d Por :uguese Africa,' from
which one could only infer that
?
Lish^
sbon no longer had any grounds
for dissatisfaction." Premier
At quite clear that he
least perceived a
chanae°f
P ° llCy When he n° ted that
h * d been past
" internal
nternal difficulties
dilf !p"u
North American politics that had
3
U te
an Sarl ier ^dord." See Tad Szulc
of tee New York
m
f
_imes
writing
the New Yorker, January 1. 1977
Pr
cited
issues, IbidTT p. 13.
Szulc states that: ? in 1962

^

^

^

m

•

^

.°.

m

m

,

r
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self-government

f°r

MriCanS

6 AmeriCan g ° Vernment

<3S

—

dlStinCt

settlers,

‘he sheer magnitude
of this
new agreement, has
gone far toward assuaging
Pressures that had been
building up in Portugal
tinuation of the colonial
wars. According to
one writer
The manner in which
Washington's assistance
was welcomed
Lisbon is revealing.
a fireside chat on
December 18
Prime Minister Marcello
Caetano told his domestic
audience:
The treaty is a political
act in which the solidarity
'

^

m

^

m

of

interests between the two
countries is recognised and
it is
in the name of that
solidarity that we put an
instrument of
action at the disposal of
our American friends, who
are also
88
now allies
.

'

Caetano declared that "internal
difficulties in North
American politics" had obstructed
an earlier accord: the
Portuguese government leader said
that American aid in the
resolution of Portugal's economic
and social problems constituted not "payment" for the
Azores bases but rather "reciproc"
ity
.

policy? "ts
U

would he sign°anoth

V6r
n

0t

^ngton.'s

x P el
|

outspokenly anti-colonial

American^f^t^Azorerneither

^riur^r^f^f^^ation

^“folLir

The Depa rtment of State Bulletin
(January 10,
1972?
1972)
vo?
vol. ffi
6 6, no. 1698, pp. 25-30;
Noticias
de
Portuoa,
rortugai
(LislLls
g_
bon), December 18, 1971, no. 1285.
.

,

vol

^Gil Fernandes
"The Azores over Africa
4
(October 1971), pp. 34-36.
,

18,

no.
89

1285.

"

Africa Today

Noticias de Portugal (Lisbon)
December
Noticias reported that: "Lisbon's thinking 18, 1971, no
had long
,

,
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P ° rtU9al S
'

PrSSent and fUture

-lue

th

to the defense of

experts; even granting
that it would be worth
this invests
thS P ° int
consideration, there
regains
the not inconsiderable
guestion of the wisdom of
suddenly
showering such wealth on
Portugal, given the
political contexts
of her colonial wars
in

^

r

Africa."

Whether the Azores were
worth even the operational
$20 million a year was
a notion that was
being challenged throughout me
91
the 19
1960
60s.
Long range aircraft
reduced
the value of Laies
Fielri
id as a «+.
J
=;

stagmg-refueling base.

The

United States airbase at
Rota, Spain, developed
as a more
effectively located installation
for monitoring the passage
of
submarines through the Straits
of Gibraltar. And space
satellites with comprehensive
range could do much of the

to"the United°Nations s^res^d

1

in 1966 that when Britain nnH +h
r
' 1 ^' 5
»considered it conve

t Sr t0 the
? ^

New York Times

^ Second^orirwar^o^

3'

6"

•

°f
"I^P^^has'been Tconli stent
de^e^e^ofHportugal^s
record and rationale for remaining in
9
Africa
r

ra*
AfH
PP

L

V

eor ge Kennan, "Hazardous Courses in
Southern
AffairS Vo1 49 no. 2 (January 1971),
g236- 2 |gT
*

w

90

The New

? 9n
•

-

’

'

.

Noticias de Portugal

,

op.

cit.

David on '" Nixon Underwrites Portugal's
Empire,"
f
tgtesman vol.
83, no. 2132 (January 28,
,

1972), p. 103.
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T^Hnntic wide

.

.

•

trafH
tracking previously
assigned to aircraft. 92

es Reston concluded
that the base was no
longer needed 93
and a Rational Policy
Panel of the United
Nations Association
of the USA found it to b^ " 4 Q „t
technologically dispensable
and
politically costly." 94 Sen^-t-or- p h
Senator Fulbright
.

.

,

asked why Portugal,

as a member of NATO
a not
NATO, non
could
itself assume responsibility
for the "very minor,
•

i

i_

activity ' conducted from
95
it.
Even accepting the contention
3
that the base had
residual importance within
the framework of NATO
defense, was
there no alternative to
this totally unexpected
American
largesse to the Portuguese?
In late March 1971,
Premier
caetano delivered what the
press described as an
"ultimatum."
"American use of the Azores base
in the absence of a formal
agreement," he declared, "cannot
continue.
Either the agreement will be renewed or the
base at Lajes will be restricted
to the objectives of the
alliance and to nothing else." 96

m

92

Bahrain,"
Cong., 2nd
a
February
1972 P*
n
9
y 17
2.
See testimony of Professor
,
_
_
Hard R. Johnson of Massachusetts Institute
of Technoloav in
SSnate ggMl^bef ore the Committee
on Foreign Rel^ions?^.
sess.

f

,

•

,

^

93

New York Times

5,

1969, pp. 23-25.

..

9
,

March

Africa: Proposals for Americans (New
York:
Nations Association of USA, 1971),
p. 22.

n-ji-.j
United

1972

,

p

S

^2

*

Congress

*

6

'

Senate, Hearings

,

op.

cit

,

February 1-

Davidson op. cit., p. 103. See statement
to Mims
Thomason, President of United Press
International, The Guardian
(Manchester, U.K.), March 31, 1971, p. 7.
,
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fact, the original
agreement of 1951 provided
for American use
of facilities in the
Azores "in case of war in
which they are

involved during the life of
the North Atlantic
Treaty pursuant
to technical arrangements
concluded between American
and Portuguese defense ministers:
and the use of the base
facilities
was at all times placed
officially within the framework
of the

Atlantic Treaty

.

97

Commenting on the contrast
between Lisbon's past
criticism of American "decadence"
and "democracy" and its
postagreement praise for America's
"greatness," Basil Davidson
wrote: "There's nothing like
a sack of dollars,
apparently,
for giving one confidence in
'America's moral
'"98
strength.

How then does one explain the
quantum leap into Portugal's arms? The Azores fit nicely
in the Nixon Doctrine,"
a policy of strategic
retrenchment into detached or insular
bases that still preserves a potent
military outreach. And by
shoring up Portuguese financial and
military capacity the Administration may hope to help Portugal cope with
African guerrilla
movements that are perceived in Washington as
dependent upon
Soviet assistance and therefore as Soviet
"Stooges" the old

—

anti-communist fixation of Dulles days. 100

Given the fact that

Department of State, Defense Use of Facilities in
the Azores.
Agreement between the United States of America
and Portugal (September 6, 1950), Publication 5716
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951),
1
:

article

p

1.

98 Davidson,
99 See

op. cit ., p.

Presidential Papers

100 Marcum,

Issue

,

104.
,

Nixon, op. cit ., pp. 280-281.

op. cit ., p.

15.
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over time the nationalist
movements of Portuguese
Africa, with
a disenchanted eye upon
American assistance to Portugal,
have
increasingly committed themselves
to working for postindependence structural change
along socialist
lines, the fol-

wing warning by Henry Kissinger
may offer some relevant insight into American motivation.
"a national Communist
regime
in Eastern Europe," he has
written, "is an improvement
over
the previous condition of
absolute Soviet control. A similar
regime in Latin America or Africa
would inevitably become a
center of anti-Western policy." 101
UnleS s the Administration
did make a simplistic and negative
assessment of the nationalist
alternative as "communist" oriented, it
is difficult to understand why it made no apparent effort
during the Azores negotiations to pressure Portugal to reform
its colonial rule so as
to bring about meaningful African
participation in the political, educational and economic life of
Angola, Mozambique and
Guinea (Bissau)
Discussions with the National Security Council
late 1969, in fact, concluded that only such
participa.

m

_bld

See Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled
P* 15.
Reappraisal
of the Atlantic Allian ce (New York:
h
McGraw Hill, 1965) p^ 20 5
See Boubaker Adjali, "An Interview with Marcelino dos Santos," Frelimo's Vice President,
who
spoke at the International Conference of Solidarity with
the
People of the Portuguese Colonies, (Rome, June 1970).
In this
interview Santos responded to one of Adjali's questions in the
following manner: "But let me repeat, what is essential in all
this (Frelimo's struggle) is that Frelimo has always taken the
correct position, basing its decisions on the genuine interests
of the whole Mozambican people.
Our goal from the beginning
has been to achieve victory in the struggle for national liberation
this means that we have to fight against Portuguese
capitalist exploitation and imperialism, but that we also have
to fight those Mozambicans who want to maintain the same system
based on man’s exploitation of man. ..."
•

,

.

.

.
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tion might prevent
increase(J autQnomy

^

^^

resulting in the solidification
of white settler
rule 102
But as Portugal moved
to delegate more
self-government to
er controlled governments
in Luanda and Lourenco
Marques 103
Washington chose to pretend
that the Azores accord
had no
bearing on Portugal's
capacity for colonial
"mission." 104
It should come as no
surprise that these
agreements
were interpreted as a
"rescue operation" for
economically
underdeveloped Portugal and as
indirect support for her
anachronistic Africa policy.
The agreements tended to
make
a hollow mockery of
President Nixon's lofty statement

that
share the conviction that the
United States cannot be indifferent to racial policies
which violate our national
ideals
and constitute a direct
affront to American citizens." 105
Dean Acheson, an outspoken
partisan of white rule throughout
Southern Africa, 106 was a major
influence on White House
thinking until his death in October,
1971.
vice President
Spiro Agnew has also contributed
a significant pro-Portuguese
input.
In mid-1971 shortly after the
Vice President, on a
"I

102 Discussed

103 I bid

in Marcum,

Issues, p. 15

.

p. 15
see also United Nations General
_
Sm lY
eg__on_D ecolonization
Document A/8423,
Add 44, September
q
Add.
28, 1971, pp. 23-24 and 57-58.
_

.

,

.

,

,

104 See Marcum,
op. cit ., p. 16.

105 presidential

Papers

,

Nixon, op. cit ., p. 16.

Apr
21
1971 P- 37
See, Jennifer
Davis
-Snnthe*
Relations pp. 14-15.
"In contrast
tn South
g
to
Africa, racial discrimination is not enforced by
law

uT

'

/

'

'

,

.
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world tour of "conservative''
states, conferred with
Premier
Caetano on the progress
of the Azores
negotiations 107 Rent
Bruce Krane, one of
AgneWs principal advisors,
visited Mozambique and issued enthusiaqf^
tnusiastic statements about
the Cabora
Bassa hydroelectric
I°B
proiect
project.
tk
The anti-communism of
Acheson
and Agnew blended nicelv
nicely wii-h
with the pro-colonialism
of southern
senators such as Thurmond
and Byrd. 109
,

.

It is plausible to
suggest that the United
States

government does not intentionally
contribute to continued
minority rule by foreigners
in Africa.
The

fact remains, however, that an indirect
connection between American
security
and economic interests
and Portuguese rule in
Africa is being
perceived in this country as
well as in Africa.
In conclusion, American
presidents have had great difficulty^ the formulation of policy

toward Portuguese Africa.

9

6
aVe Set a P attern similar
Af ter^fo^V
!?
^
Ur hondred
Years of Portugal's
'civilizing 'mission *
f?
ntlre
*
frloan
Population less
than five percent in Guinea-R?
3
fifteen percent in Mozambique
have'managertracqCire^are
m
S le * rneA t0
during their
labor s?i n rin

in^raltice

1

^

sSuth“ca?"

107 Ne

w York Times

108ni

,

^

July 27, 1971, p. 10.

•

(Lisbon), September 1, 1971,
arll ® r ln July, 1971, Noticias had
reported that:
ugal was the only NATO country
visited by the Vice Presij
er c ° nse f vative regimes welcomed him."
bee
See D
iario de Noticias
Diario°de
No^
(Lisbon)
July 26, 1971.

Dn

'
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In April 1971 Senator Byrd inserted
a speech
U?al S Pollc Y in s£rica " by Portugal's
Minister
of Foreian
Aff
n
f
9
R 1 Patricio
int ° the Congressional
Record
’f
See Con gressional
Record vol. 117, no. 52, 92nd
Cong., 1st sess., April 15, 1971,
pp. S4944-S4949.
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Port. 9 uese African
area, presidents
have been
3 dlfflCUlt
-e facts amid a wetter
Of co„f licting claims
and assertionSi
ciarifying the iegai
tssoes involved responding
to new world conditions
and polecat trends, fulfilling, as they
see it, their (U.S.,
obligations to an allied
country, and at the
same time serving
the United states'
own short- and long-term
national interests.
This has not been an
easy combination of
requirements to satisfy simultaneously.
For example, in our
concern

“

,

^

States foreign policy toward
Africa, OU r policy actions
are
mainly concerned with the
interests of the colonial
power and
not the colonized at all.
For instance, the North
Atlantic
Treaty Organization plays
no small part in the
interests of
the United States as well
as the colonial powers
in seeing to
it that there were
favorable outcomes for their
mutual policies
toward Africa because of a
perceived necessity to outflank
the
Communist powers strategically 110
.
Also, the real dynamics of
the politics of international
relations between the United
States and Portugal over Portuguese
Africa may be seen in the
need for strategic outposts,
NATO solidarity, and markets for

no,

r
U
e
lnf0rI"? ti0n ° n policy formulation
and
the realities of ^he
(ed-)
"United States Policy Toward
thrLwirindlp^den^Itatef''
African_l ndependence (New York:
Dell,
pp 451-453
Always an excellent source for gaining 1964
insight into the "deciPrOCeS
See James
g
led.). Domestic
2 Foreign S\
So urces of
Policy cited earlier in this^Tii^Ftation.

L

)

So°“i L
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American investment 3 i
311 aSSUmed to b
'
* critical to
the contj
„ prosperity
of developed
HI
countries
But there is a
profound inconsistency
in an
1

——
.

r

-

•

fl

<•«.—«..

poiAng ° la and Moza
"*ique, and at the
same
time allows Portugal
the benefit
f
off ,subs
h „tantial
American fi n a„
ncral, and military
aid enabling
her to
*
g ner
tom'
maintain
physical
control of those areas.
Unless and until eff
f measures
effective
can be a
devised to prevent
any
y further
K Portugal
ther „«
use by
of NATO
and American arms in
Africa, all u
U.S.
s
din
diplomatic
efforts of
persuasion will be deeply
undercut.
SS1 ° nS

“

.

u

.

As to the facts
pertaining to the situation
in Portuguese Angola and
Mozambique, American
presidents appear to
have accepted the
findings of a number
of u.N. reports and

independent investigations
indicating that Portuguese
administration of the territories
has been a clear
failure in human
Despite Portuguese aims
and contentions, the
people in
the colonies are notably
backward, ignorant, and
oppressed.
Similarly, on the legal
issues which Portugal has
raised, the United States
seems to concur with the
United
Nations that developments
within the areas are not
purely a
6r
domestic jurisdiction and
that Portugal's inter111

*

e
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national responsibilities
include an obligation
not onl y to
report on conditions in
the territories but
also to g rant selfdetermination which in the
course of time probably
means
independence
,

Despite the fact that
the struggle has now
become
primarily a test of strength
between the antagonists,
the
United states should,
first of all continue
to attempt to influence both Portugal and
the nationalist
movements toward
change through persuasion
and communication,
refraining
from direct economic or
military help to either
side.
Also,
as part of the effort
to exercise its
influence, the United
States should eliminate
certain inconsistencies which
now
becloud its position and which
weaken and confuse its efforts.
The statements of American
diplomatic representatives
in

Lisbon, for example, have
sometimes served to disquiet
and
dismay the African states as
well as some Europeans.
Similarly,
programs relating to Angola or
Mozambique have sometimes been
undertaken by one arm of the U.S.
government only to be
countermanded by another. An excellent
illustration of the
confusion and inaction within the
Executive Department is
evidenced by the fact that the National
Security Council
African staff takes its essential
role to be one of keeping
African issues from reaching the
President's desk rather than
to pose them with alternative
perspectives clearly presented.
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Alexander

George suggests~»this
is a crucial me
measure of
the low priority given
112
the area.”
L.

For Southern African
policy, there appear to
have been
only two basic NSC
reviews since the early
1960s.
The first
began in 1962, after the
brief j-iurry
flurry of n
q
U.S.
activity in that
area, and continued until
the end of the Johnson
Administration.
While its basic argument
was for disengagement
from both Portugal and South Africa,
it was never generally
accepted within
the National Security
Council. Even with a
Democratic victory
in the 1968 Presidential
election, the National Security
Council recommendation would
have been set aside.
But with Nixon's
victory, the traditional
instinct to begin policy
appraisals
from scratch took hold. A
new policy review was begun
in
early 1969 and completed
cci uy
-w a+
bv rne
^
the end
enri of
o-f that
year.
NSC Study
Memorandum (NSSM) 39^3 was the
initiating document fQr
review.
It has been argued that the
Bureau resisted the underlying thrust of NSSM 39: a key
example cited is Assistant
Secretary Newsom's South African
visit at the end of 1970 with
a black deputy and his
subsequent testimony in December of
1970
to Congressman Diggs' subcommittee
that the appointment of a
.

4

.

^

112 S

X

—

Advocacy in ML?ng ?SreIgn‘policr"
I^per^resLted^tte
POlitlCal ScLn
cLSL,

-

Ch^ago^t ££
113

han eSb Urg Sla s Washington Bureau has
covered
g
f,'
especially
Ken
Owen’s
"Nixon
Plumped
oSil
Feb
15, 1971.
Under this Memorandum various
faenciis hhad A
agencies
opportunities to present their preferences for
y Ptl0 S
ThlS lnltiat ive, perhaps more for its implicat in^ f°
?
tions
for policy
control than for its substance, engendered
considerable ill will within the African Bureau.
this

w

proces^ fe l ?

'

^ry

J
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Black Foreign Service
Officer to tho
he d
Pretoria embassy was
being given serious
attention.
The Department has since
backed away from this
position, which was taken
without prior
consultation with tho South
c nil 4-u A4:
African Government-in
contradiction
of a key aspect of the
dialogue approach.
+.

this point, the National
Policy Panel of the United
114
Nations Association
recommended creation of an
Interdepartmental Task Force on
Southern Africa '.which would
include
representatives of the Departments
of state. Defense, Conferee,
Labor, Treasury and the White
House." Such a task force
could
assume responsibility for an
"on-going and comprehensive
analysis of U.S. involvement in,
and relations with. Southern
Africa (including Portuguese
territories) with a view toward
recommending and coordinating U.S.
policy." 115

_
114 See,

York

:

Southern Africa: Proposals for
Americans (New
United Nations Association ox USA,
1971)
p7 22,
,

ll5 Ibid.

/

p.

79.

79.
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CHAPTER

iv

POLICY MAKING: THE
CONGRESS
Before 1958, African
problems were generally
called
attention of Congress by
an enterprising member
who
felt strongly enough about
an issue to bring

it to the floor. 1

in 1958, however.
Congress felt that, with
the impending addition of the new Bureau of
African Affairs to the State
Department with its own Assistant
Secretary,

African problems war-

ranted the creation of
special subcommittees both
in the House
and Senate under the Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Relations
Committee respectively.
Actually, the establishment of
the two Subcommittees
on Africa in 1958 was the
fruition of a movement which had
been a focal point of concern
on the part of some Congressmen
since 1955. Active in the effort
to secure special policyformulating bodies, both in the
Congress and in the State
Department, were Senators Theodore
Green (D-R.I.) and Mike
Mansfield (D-Mont.), and Congresswoman
Frances Bolton (R-Ohio).

A

eXample

KennedVs
?i
floor
Y
ifs?

co

this polic y was demonstrated by John
F.
and resolution on the African War in
ReC °
V01 103 n °‘ 28 85th Co

s P e ® °u
ch
.

Is^esf^fpHo^!

2

—

'

'

'

2

^--

COng
S
Hoase
"Report of the Study Mission to
H:?;,
r*
efore th S ubcommittee on the Near East and
-r.t
f
he Committee on Foreign
Affairs 84th Cong., 2nd sess.,
5
996 ' P
5
S earlY as 1955 when Congresswoman
Bolton
returnedj ifrom ?
her trip to Africa, her report of the
Study Misn
U
d
h ° Ught that ther e be a '’Division for
Africa"
headed
»
ed hv
by ?^
its own Assistant
Secretary in the State Department.
Afri(,,

'

..

'

,

I

'
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Senate Subcommittee
on Africa
the Senate, the
Subcommittee on Africa
is a consultative ad hoc bod
Y that has no reai identity
apart from
that of the full
committee on Foreign
Relations. 3 The chair
“•
*
*
». ....
responsible to it
until 1965,
iacc
the Subcommittee had
two

*— —

-“

-

-

Chairmen who were not very
active in developing
the Subcommittee into a forceful
instrument.
The Senate Subcommittee
on
African Affairs generated
a good deal of
publicity during the
four years that its
Chairman was Senator John
F. Kennedy
especially in the last two
years when Kennedy was a
candidate
for President.
Although the Subcommittee
met infrequently in
1959 and 1960, Kennedy
repeatedly stressed his
Chairmanship
and his interest in Africa.
While on the rear platform
of a
train in Tulare, California,
on September
9,

he told a crowd:

1960,

for example,

am the chairman of the
Subcommittee on
Africa of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
"I

I

can tell

you that in Africa, leaders
twenty years ago quoted Jefferson
and Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson
and Franklin Roosevelt.
Today
many cases those leaders look
east to Peking and Moscow.
They have lost their confidence
in us.
They don't see the
United States as a great revolutionary
country which is on
the move

m

3

4

Ibid.

,

p.

16.

See Africa Report, vol

.

9,

no.

9

(August 1964), p.

4.
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Immediately after
President

Kennedy election, three
Senators embarked on
a st„a„
study *tour of Africa.
Only one
Senator Prank Church,
Democrat from Idaho
daho was a member
of
he committee on
Porei g n Relations;
his two companions
were
enators Gale W. McGee,
Democrat of Wyoming,
and Frank Moss
Democrat of Utah.
x» little more
than a month, they
visited
sixteen African countries,
joined halfway through
their trip
hy Edward Kennedy,
the President-elect
s brother and the
future
Democratic Senator from
Massachusetts. When they
returned
the Senators issued
a fifty-five page
report on the trip.®
The Congressmen were
not of a single mind
to develop a policy
prescription or any overall
U.S. strategy, but
the Study Misexpress the feeling that
the consequences of
"extreme"
African nationalism contained
many negative implications
for
United States objectives.
First, its members were
concerned
with the possibility that
if nationalist sentiment
took the
form of "a plague on both
your houses" (East and West),
resulting in rigid forms of
neutralism and non-alignment,
African countries would avoid
the kinds of value
judgments on the
Cold War" which the Senators
thought were necessary. Second,
the Study M ission observed
that "extreme nationalism"
could
'

,

•

'

Africa

COng e
S ?

Office, I960), p. 38.

S/

Senate
9

'

"United States Foreign Policv—

'

D C
'

*'
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'

*

Governmen t Printing

itS6lf
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of viability.
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self-determination among

***

would have no hope

What had become clear
by the start of the
19 60 s was
that those African
nations acquiring their
independence in
the space of a relatively
short time would embrace
various
types of nationalism,
some of which could
be offensive to the
United States.
Under Senator Albert Gore
of Tennessee, the
Subcomheld an active lif ^
y_
o
S
In Member
1961, he led a month
long Study tour of
sixteen African countries.
Once again the
mission included only one
member of the Foreign
Halations Committee; senator Gore was
accompanied by Senators Philip
a. Hart
of Michigan and Maureen
B. Newberger of
Oregon. Upon their
return, they issued a
seventeen page report.
7

.

-

The substance of Senator
Gore's report reflected a
concern among the group that
the Communists, both European
and Asian, were making
inroads into Africa. Because
of its
own strategic concerns,
therefore, the United States
was inin keeping African states
free of Communist influence
as was suggested by Senator
Gore who saw the following indications
(a)

e

non
tion sclnf
scene at
at^h
the
Philip

mac* ines dominating the construeAswan Dam in Egypt;

^

3

^Hart^an^Maureen ^?' Newberger '^on^hehst^^kr
to^frica.^Hearings^e
the Subconmuttee og

'^ G° re

1

'

'
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™^nSK^.

<b)

“2*
<C)

~ffiSg

a

&S

a

d

S. |Si^

Soviet propaganda,
<d)

coverage"^ than
(e)

i

S

9 th - Ghana airways
b °° kS
.

and^re^JechnicLns?^

'

£ £& 3?™-^ -tter
'

atXfir b traU ?: b S ^ati^H
African leaders, many of
foreign travel
Peiping;

on

numbe^'in^

administrators

'

3 po Pnf

“^:

missions

h aS Somalla
h^° a penchant ' and
have
for

whom
ln vitations to
Moscow and
.

n<^

'" plo

.

’

sSSa^'hfpslo'cL^a^nd^oSow;

9

and"

(9>

levement rn
industry and science by
the Communists?*

Far from keeping the
"cold war" out of Africa,
then, the United
States and the Communists,
from the perception of
these Senators, found themselves
locked in an increasingly
volatile
struggle for the favor of the
newly-independent African countries

Where economic and technical
assistance was concerned,
the earlier Church study
mission of I960 noted the imbalance
between the aid given to north
Africa and to "black" Africa,
and recommended balancing the
amounts.
The Congressmen discovered the ineptness of Public Law
480, Surplus Food Program
in sub-Saharan Africa, because
Africa did not have the necessary materials for economic
development, which was the real aim
of the food program.
But the most important long-range
problem
7

Ibid

.

,

p.

15

.
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was the question of
multil
^lateral versus bilateral
assistance.
Sena , ors connected
wrth both study
missions generally
felt
that both approaches
should be maintained,
that the United
States should give aid
in order to bolster
the viability of
regional financial
agencies
u
es, and, at the
g
same time, should
continue to use bilai-pr^i
bilateral assistance as
a weapon against
Commumst expansion.
1

+.

4_

It is important to
recognise that such
debates over

the technical and economic
assistance extended to
Africa were
going on in Congress at
this early date in the
development of
United States foreign
policy options toward
Africa. This has
been one of the continuing
issues through the decade
and extending into the seventies.
It is also important
to notice
that even in the 1950s
Congressmen had ideas concerning
the

strategy of aid-giving,
since obviously they would
be faced
with some legislative
responsibility
in this regard.

In 1962, Gore's Subcommittee
met regularly with state

Department of facials for six
months to receive information
about the Congo crisis.
These closed hearings, which were
extremely detailed, have never
been published.
The Subcommittee did perform an important
service in this delicate period
of U.S. policy; it kept the
full Committee informed about
the events and the United States'
role in them. 9
8

Study Mi ssion to Africa, op. cit
., I960, p.

9.

1
t
S Peri ° d the Subcommi ttee
had exclusive
iurisdio-Hon ?;!
ai
Durisdic-tion
for Africa,
paralleling the creation of the Bureau
Affa s in thS State apartment.
Correspondence
Staff^t
*J
m
UbCOmmlttee
Committee
on Foreign
affairs, july' 26 ,“ 972 !
-

.

'

144

By 1963 no Senator
wanted to assume the
chairmanship
of the Subcommittee
following Albert Gore's
resignation. By
thxs time. Church had
risen to chairman of
the Subco^ittee on
International Organization
Affairs
rairs and
anH was
„
content with that
post.
Senator Mike Mansfield
lanst ield
n
the Democratic
leader of the
Senate was finally
persuaded to
° acce
u
accent
the chairmanship
Pt th
of
the subcommittee on
.African Affairs.
But he did so merely
to
avoid the diplomatic
embarrassment of having no
one head the
Subcommittee. While
xe Mansfield
Mansf > oia s- name seemed
to lend prestige
to the chairmanship,
his appointment actually
left the Subcommittee ineffective; as
leader of the majority
party,
Mansfield did not have the
spare time to work on the
Subcom,

•

mittee
It wasn't until 1971
that the Senate Subcommittee
on
Africa, under its new energetic
chairman. Gale McGee, began

onductmg hearings on questions
dealing with

U.S. relations

with Southern Africa.
Southern African concerns were
raised over the enactment of the Azores Agreement
without its submission to the
Senate for its advice and consent.
In objecting to this action
conservative and liberal support coalesced.
Senate Resolution
214, the Case Resolution, called
for this agreement
to be sub-

10 Roger
-

Hilsman in his book. The Politics of
Policv
ng in Defense and Fo reign Affairs
~lNew York: hTt^tn
PoTnts out: "Any discussion of the role
of Congress
r<~ 1 9 n affairs must begin
with an acknowledgement of the
,
load of work carried by most Congressmen,
and their business
.

^^
'

* <
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,
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tted to the Senate
for approval as a
treaty, since it
pros f ° r a military
base **
io „ ing of ....
troops

7

measure

—

'

the Senate Foreign
Aid Bill, „ hich did
not pass
would have prohibited
assistance to Portugal
if the Adminlstratxon did not comply
with the Case Resolution. 11
Perhaps the most important
action by the Senate Subcommittee, at this time,
with respect to Southern
Africa, involved the heated debate
and eventual passage
of the Byrd
Amendment, Section 503 of
the Military Procurement
Act of l 97 i.
Under this Act the Nixon
Administration has acted to
resume
mportation of chrome and certain
other materials from
Southern Rhodesia, an action
which some critics have
charged
ds
direct "violation" °f
v n
nf U,S
tt
q
i
i
le
9 al obligations under the
United Nations Charter.
,

•

*

up to this point, the policy
of the U.S. on the issues

of Rhodesian independence
has been one of following
the lead
of Great B ritain and the U.N.
in their policies of sanctions
1

The Case Resoiution

Relations

raS

"

Senate ' The u - s Azores Agreementn'
Hearings b efore the Committee on
Foreign
-

resolution by the method of cutting
of? ?pprop??atio??
C ngreSS/

e

ate

"

*

u s
Sanctions Against Rhothe Committee on Foreign Relay2nd Jong., 1st sess., July 7 and
'
8, 1971;
Thi
Congressional Record, September 23,
1971, Doc. 81493^814947
See also. New York Times October
7, 1971, p. l

desia— Chro^',, -S^ a ln<3 before
2
B_
t on S
q
^
r;

i

,

'

-
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and embargo against
the

..

illegal regime „

tlmS SUPPOrtin9 BritiSh

-

whUe

^

the same

settle the dispute
through
negotiation.
The U.S. supported
the United Nafcions
Councii Resolution of
November 12, 1965,
condemning the lan
Smith government.
In December, 1966,
the United states
voted
for a second Security
Council Resolution enjoining
selective
mandatory sanctions and the
1968 resolution making
these sanctions comprehensive.
The votes on these
resolutions were
reinforced by two executive
orders by President Johnson
in
13
1967 and 1968.
On March
Mar-r-h 17, the r.
Department of state ordered
the U.S. Consulate in
Salisbury, Rhodesia closed.

^

n

At the time the ban was
instituted and despite the
government's policy of disposal
of excess stocks, two American corporations. Union
Carbide and Foote Mineral
Company,
had made sizable purchases
of Rhodesian chrome.
The two companies asked for a variance from
the ban in order to import
the chrome that they had already
purchased.
This issue was
debated for some time until early
1971, when the Nixon Administration permitted Union Carbide
and Foote Mineral to import
the chrome which had been paid
for before the U.N. sanctions
(to which the U.S. had adhered)
went into effect.^" 4
3

Ross K. Baker
"Towards A New
for a
More Active American Foreign Policy for Constituency
Africa " Pacer orethe Fourt eenth Annual Meeting of the
African Studies
AssoM t*
Association,
Denver, November 3-6, 1971, pp. 19-20.
,

14

Ibid

.

,

p.

20
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Having won this skirmi Qh
irmish, however,
powerful interests
(private and public)
favorable to the Smith
q m i ev, regime
then
shifted the focus of their infi
influence in order to
further widen
,
the „
hole in the embargo.
This was accomplished
throu g h a
legislative operation
involving an amendment
to the defense
procurement bill which called
for an amendment
tor
*
of the United
Nations Participation Act
of 1^45.
1945
Aa companion bill was
introduced on the subject caliinrr
allmg for an exemption
for Rhodesian
chrome from the U.N.
boycott.
This House version was
appended
to H.H. 8637 by
Congressman Collins from
Texas.
Hearings on
the amendment were held
on July 7 and 8,
1971, in the Subcommittee on African Affairs
of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
These public hearings
served to highlight what
was
clearly an area of intense
interest tor
for the business
k
community
and the "friends of Rhodesia"
as their "big guns" were
wheeled
in to do battle.
Speaking for the Byrd Amendment
were Senator
Byrd himself, 15 Dean Acheson,
E.F. Andrews, Chairman of
the
tical Minerals Committee of the
American Iron and Steel
Institute, L.G. Bliss, Chairman
of the Board of Foote Mineral
Company, Richard S. Warren, general
counsel of the "right-wing"
Liberty Lobby, and F.F. Andrews,
vice president-purchases,
.

^

—

-f

prominent among those profoundly
'opposId^United State^and
United Nations policy toward Southern
Rhodesia
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Allegheny Ludlum Industries
ustries

T
n~
Inc.

Arrayed against this
con0. Newsom, Assistant
Secretary of state
for African Affairs,
and Congressman Charles
c. Diggs
Jr
of Michigan.
The subcommittee
chairman. Senator Sale
McGee
of Wyoming and a majority
of the subcommittee
were in opposithe Byrd Amendmentt-»Amendment.
it was not reported
out of subcommittee and thee Foreinn
Q ,4.
Foreign pRelations
Committee seemed inclined
to defer action. 16
,

stituency were David

i

On August 6, the day
before Congress adjourned,
Harry
Byrd circumvented both
the Subcommittee on
African Affairs and
the Foreign Relations
Committee by going to the
Senate Armed
Services Committee and adding
the amendment to the
Military
Procurement Bill as section
503 of that bill, thereby
removing
it from the purview of
the Foreign Relations
Committee.
It
was reported out and got
to the floor of the Senate.
The ensuing fight on the
question of striking section
503 from the bill was a bitter
one.
"Uncharacteristic rancor
clouded the more normal senatorial
civility." 17 when the final

vote was tallied those voting to
retain 503 triumphed by a
vote of 46 to 36.
There were two subsequent reconsiderations
of the controversial section.

retain the provision.

October

6,

17

The final vote occurred on Wednesday,

1971, with the final consideration of the
Military

Procurement Bill.
1

In both cases the vote was to

The result was favorable for the Byrd
amend-

See New York Times

,

op. cit

Baker, op. cit .. p. 21.

.

,

p.

1
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ment on the final vote
and the bill was sent
to conference. 18
The House Subcommittee

other side of the Capitol,
the House Subcommittee on Africa has shown
far more interest
The Senate Foreign Relations
Conrtittee has long savored
a reputatron for knowledge,
sensitivity, and influence
concerning
ergn affairs and, for
this reason, has attracted
the most
intelligent and influential
Senators.
The House Committee
has traditionally had less
influence; thus attracting
mainly
Representatives unable to acquire
their first choice of committee assignments. This
situation has prevailed from
earlier
days when foreign policy was
the sole province of the
Senate.
In the last two decades,
however, foreign policy has
become so enmeshed in all other
aspects of government policy
and so dependent on heavy
appropriations that the House has
found itself increasingly involved
in foreign affairs.
Throughout the 1960s the House discovered
that it could make a greater
impact on foreign policy by slashing
the foreign aid bill than
the Senate can by ratifying a
treaty 19

^

^

'

18.,

op-

U.S Sanctions Against Rhodesia—
Chrome
cit ., p. 14.

,

"

Hearings,

lsman
p. 78.
"The role that Congress
olavPd ln
in
orei 9 n Policy was almost never direct or
initiative
T f is
taking.
It
certainly true of the continuing problems of
oreign policy.
it is very rare that Congress takes the
atlVe ln forei g n aid, for example. Usually
congressional
action is to cut, not add."

HIV

^i^

^
,

'

.
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°» Africa has
more ac tive than
its counterpart
in the genate is
because of the interest-^ nf
rS SUCh aS Charles
(D
(DM'
h
Mich.),
Frances Bolton
nv,
ton (v>
(R-ohio)
Barrett O'Hara D -ni >
a
others, and partly
because of the
th
money-appropriating function
of the f,, Committee
Some of the testimony
before the House
Sub

been

\

,

(

•

.

.

utin g the appropriation

COmmittee

^

hearing

which occur annually.

lnTOlVed Wi th Africa

Th us,

and that involvement often triggers
some action on the
part of the
th
c k
Subcommittee.
other times the
Subcommittee may schedule
meetings at the
request of its Chairman
exercising his own
initiative or upon
the request of the
Chairman of the full
Committee.
The impression one may
quickly gain from a
perusal of
the record of the
infrequent meetings held by
both the Senate
and House Subcommittees
the few Congressmen
or Senators who
have participated in study
missions to Africa, and the
small
number of reports issued by
the Subcommittees relative
to the
impact of Africa on the
international system
,

,

at the time, is
one of ineffectiveness of
formal agencies of Congress
on the
active policy formulation
process during the period 1958-64. 20
20

the United States (August
15, 1972)!

Udent Programs in
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During the early period
of Congressional
one
way that Congressmen
learned about Africa
was through various
subcommittees that held hearing
Sarings on special
projects or
received briefings by
governmental uinciais
officials who might
deliver
general status reports
to info™ or relate
specific reports on
a specific problem.
For example, ln 1959
196o
hearings, held under the
e title,
title
"R
rn 0 f
Briefings
on Africa," were
concerned with the nolitn^i
„
ltical and
P
economic aspects of United
States relations with
Africa, sponsored by the
House Conunittee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Africa. Also,
in 1960,
a hearing sponsored
by the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations was held pursuant
to the publication of
the Northwestern
University study on Africa.
The Northwestern group
published
a pamphlet in February
1960 entitled, "A New Policy
Toward
Africa," which suggested that
policy for Africa be formulated
in the light of African
interest and in concert with
United
States democratic values.
Beyond that is urged: "support
for
non-self-governing nations in the
United Nations: support for
regional and continental African
unity; opposition to all
forms of racial discrimination:
support for bilateral and multilateral assistance programs; and
support for programs aimed at
improving health, education and
welfare in Africa ." 21

_

^

-

.

It is possible, of course,

for members of Congress to

use other committees than Foreign
Affairs (House) and Foreign

•

Frederick Wickert, "American Universities
and Africa

M^£^L-^.pdies_B ulletin (December 1960),
Northwestern

p. 25.
See also
University Study, United States Foreign Policy The
Y
Towards Africa (June 18, 1964),
pp. 1-15

"
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(Senate)

as a base to explore
Africa.

in

19 63

senator Dodd, the lowest
ranking Democrat on
the Subco
on African Affairs,
used his vice chairmanship

,

J

ttae

of the Senate
internal Security
Subcommittee to spread
his view that - Gh ana
has become the first
Soviet satellite in
Africa...
senator
Mien d. E ender of Louisiana
made hi£ famou£
thro h
1962 as a member of
the Senate Appropriations
Committee. At the same time.
Senator Vance Hartke of
Indiana
was making an extensive
trip
P for th
Senate Commerce Commit22
tee

n

^

+.

.

There are not many organised
pressure groups that
attempt to influence Congress
about Africa.
The American Committee on Africa, the most
articulate and informed champion
of
African freedom from colonial
rule, regularly brings
mattersof-conscience, especially relating
to U.S. policy toward
Southern Africa, to the attention
of the African Subcommittee. 23
At the other end of the
spectrum, Katangan, South African,
and
Portuguese interests, both
governmental and private, have
mounted spot campaigns in efforts
to weaken Congressional
sympathy for Congo unity and to
build up sympathy for continued
Portuguese rule in Angola and
Mozambique. 24
22

23

•

Hilsman, op. cit ., p. 80.
Ibid

.

,

p.

24 Wickert,

80.

op.

cit ., p. 25.
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The Portuguese campaign
has been fully documented
in
continuous sessions of both
the Senate and House
African Com-

mittees.

Selvage

Lee, a public relations
firm serving as
the foreign agent for
some Portuguese business
interests since
1962 visited many Congressmen,
leaving most of them under
the
impression that the firm was
representing a
&

constituent group
of Portuguese Americans and
not a pressure group of
Portuguese
business interests. As a result,
several Congressmen have
responded by delivering speeches
in the House defending
Portuguese policy in Africa.

Senator Carl Mundt 's speech on
the Senate floor on
April 24, 1964 chided the United
Nations for constantly criticizing Portuguese policies in
Angola and Mozambique. Senator
Mundt stated the processes of
independence in underdeveloped
countries are usually much slower
than desired and often new
countries fail to improve conditions
for their citizens
or to

operate democratic procedures appropriately
because they are
"put on their own before they are duly
prepared for selfgovernment and independence."^^
Mundt criticized the United States for
supporting

United Nations resolutions which have
interfered with the
relationship between Portugal and Angola and Mozambique.
U. S
Congress Senate, 88th Cong., 1st sess. April
24,
,
1964, Con gressional Record 108:8933.
Senator Mundt concluded
his remarks by stating: ^Tn the highly significant
business of
making freedom function for the people generally that
the educational processes of 'learning to do by doing' have great
and
enduring values. This is what it appears is now taking place
la
an<3 Mozambique.
I join many other Americans in wishing
the best for the continued development of these procedures
"
.

,

.

.

.
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"Since the Portuguese are
old and honored friends
of the
United states and have been
of great assistance in
our defense
effort, the United States
should refrain from supporting
abortive United Nations resolutions.'' 26

Congressman John Rarick (D-La.)
delivered a speech in
the House of Representatives
on May 15, 1965, in which
he
emphasized that the Cape of Good
Hope, ''the one great strategic
gate of our enemies," still remains
"in our hands."
"Without
the Cape," the Congressman
continued, "the United States cannot survive." If the United
States were to oppose all who
would destroy the peace of Southern
Africa, "whether
by war,

sanctions, or other moves to overthrow
the governments of those
countries of Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia
and South Africa,
we could not survive. Militarily these
countries are essential
to us.
Financially they are important to us.
On March 22, 1967, Congressman John Ashbrook
(D-Minn.)

inserted into the Congressional Record a special
dispatch to
the New York Times by correspondent Drew
Middleton which stated
in part: "The Portuguese believe that the
rebellion in Angola
can be ended it is very near defeat now, according
to foreign

diplomats--and that Angola can move forward economically and
26 Ibid.

27 U.S.

,

p.

8933

Congress, House, 88th Cong., 1st sess., May 15,
1965, Congressional Record 108:12674.
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socially if only the
rest of the world
a will
Wl11 kke ep its hands
,,28
,
BY the
° f thS W ° rld the
Portuguese meant Black
,
f
aCt1 " 9 thr ° Ugh the
U " ited Nations
'

““

with, at times, the

support of the United
States.

Middleton argues that:
"The Portuguese continue
to
maintain that the situation
in Angola is a
domestic matter
because the overseas
territor-ioc
itones are considered
under Portu9 uese law an integral part
of the nation.-”
According to
Middleton, "Let it be
remembered that the citizens
of Mozambxque, as much a part
of Portugal as Alaska
and Hawaii are of
the united States, are
under attack by Communist
terrorists
using the similar weapons
and strategy employed
by the Vietcong in South Vietnam.
Once again Congressman
John R. Rarick in a speech
before the House of
Representatives on March 14,
1968, took
up the cud gel for the
Portuguese government when he
stated
28

sess., March 22,
Congressional^e^rf ^^vg^ Ts%LllT
A
Salazar
has maintained
constantly the object of PorhmaTc'n
^
11

1967,

creation of a

mul^irac^^^ii^r^ci^r

"

29

^

M d
S
i
Seeme< t0
imply thatTEf insurrIcIion
in A ngolI a r?hat t
n ° \l0nger
presented a military danger to
Portugal?
‘

•

Mini s ter 'saXa^ar Lllvertd

attitudes

on^vlmb^O Tst?
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that:

The integrate

remarks of vice President
served only to undermine
moderate stable African
leaders
seeking reconciliation
with Southern Africa. -31
Rarick
accused Humphrey of unwittingly
assisting such Communist
nationalists as Eduardo
Mondlane, and Holden Roberto
who
according to the Congressman,
..are set on overthrowing
ail
responsible government in
Africa.
So instead of helping
Africa toward stability,.
said Rarick, The vice
President’s
policy pronouncements have
contributed to perpetuating
the
turmoil in Africa while throwing
U.S. prestige behind the
terrorists— terrorists of the same
Communist school and operation as the Vietcong tearing
out the hearts of American
boys
in South Vietnam.
Rarick- s argument that the
Portuguese colonies were
being threatened by Communist-led
insurgents has been a consistent belief of some Congressmen
from the time of his first
speech on the floor of the House
in 1965
In his speeches before the House, Rarick expressed
what also were to be recurrent
aspects of his and others' opinions
that the Portuguese government is fighting Communist-led rebellions
in Angola, Mozambique,
.

U -S.

Congress, House, 90th Cong., 2nd sess.
March 14,
114 6873-6876
1
These
2
remarks
were
prompted
promptir BplT^I
by Vice President Humphrey's attack on
the whitedominated governments of Rhodesia and South
Africa.
1

Q6H

^

32

^

,

:

.

Ibid., p. 6621.
Rarick maintained that Rhodesia.
South Africa and the Portuguese provinces
are daily threatened
e
iSt
Communists trained in "Moscow, Havana, and Peking
„l
h the implied
?
with
approval of our U.S. foreign policy." See
Congressional Record House, March 14, 1968,
p. 6621.

r

,

;

,
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“ **»

... ..... to
........ ........
.........
t „ r.,„ i0
9
Portugal.
There were thoqp
those who supported
and continue to support Rarick's position
both in
n the House
Re
in the Senate
such as Senators
Richard Russell (D-Ga
Ga *)^ p
Roman Hruska (R-Neb
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.),
Karl
ri Hundt
Mundt (R.-S.D.),
(R
s n
John Sherman
CP.. (H-Ky
...
iB ... „„„„
>r>
...... (D-1.X,
....
JoBn ^
(R Calif.), and
Frances Bolton (R-ohio)
'

)

,

S t cl
1 W3. IT t" ^ o
F
aiwarts
of

^

l
the "liberal
establishment" as

+*

it

l-i

•

)

i

Senator Edward Brooke
<R-Mass.) have lent support
to theories
of "communist conspiracies."
Senator Brooke remarked
that in
conversations with the leaders
of the "freedom movements"
in
Angola, Mozambique and
Guinea, they admitted
receiving weapons
and other support for
their liberation
organizations from Communist sources.
Senator Brooke was careful
to point
,

out, however, that these leaders
do not expect that they
or their
people will turn to communism
as a way of life.
"
The y do not
use the rhetoric of communism,
and they do not view the
conflict with Portugal in Marxist
terms.
But they are using
Communist weapons, and have
Communist advisors. Some of their
officers are being trained in
Communist countries, and many
of their students are studying
there.
In the long run, while

Southern Africa may not go Communist,
it may turn out to be
very pro- Communist 33
.

S

sess.

'

ADrii
^

C
;c,

SS
Senate S Res
°?Q^
A
1^68, Congressional
-

:

'

H8, 90th Cong., 2nd
Record 114:10839-10852.
-
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A s further
evidence

o-f

Congressional dependence
on
other sources for theirinformation about Sirica
Africa Congressman
Par
introduced the following
remarks by one Lord
Kilbracken
Writ1
.

.

•

.

,

,

.

" 9 f ° r the

(London) , Rarick
quotea
Kilbracken as saying:
"a cmerri
guerrilla= operation,
smaller and
younger than that of the
Viet Cong but operating
on the same
general principles, has
established a f irm base
in the Portuguese East African colony
of Mozambique.
it is being led by
a Mozambican
professor on leave from
New York's Syracuse
Oniversity."
Rarick s source off n fn
information maintained that
Mondlane spent his time in
the United States
seeking backing
licity for his cause but
P
encountered general apathy.
Mondlane was supposed to
have made a trip to Peking
seeking
aid from the Chinese-and
it was only then that
his true
motives were revealed. ^5
1

'

1

i

,

On another occasion Senator
Strom Thurmond (R-S.c.)
introduced into the Cor
H ressi^nal_Je^ an article on Spain
and Portugal written by
Mr. Thomas Waring, editor
of the News
£id_Courier,
2
Charleston, S.c. Mr. Waring had
recently returned
from a visit to Spain and
Portugal where, he claimed, he
obtained first-hand knowledge
"for in-depth reporting."
34,

U.S. Congress, House, 91st Cong.
1st sess., March 25
Congressional Record 115:7536-7544.
Rarick
quoted Kilbracken who said that while in
Mozambique- "I saw much captured
equipment— mortars, grenades,
high explosives
and^mmes certainly identifiedmachine-guns
as Chinese
and Russian-made.
.Q
lqy69.
“

_

.

35

Ibid

.

,

p.

7537.

/
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Senator Thurmond read
portions of the article
that
maintained there has been
much improvement in
the Portuguese
African provinces.
"The terrorists have
no hope of success..' 36
according to Portuguese
Foreign Minister Dr.
Franco Nogueira
"They lack support of
the masses and some
have joined the
Portuguese authorities in
Mozambique and Angola." it
was Dr.
Nogueira' s feeling that many
of the terrorists now
realize that
Portuguese policies in Africa
are more realistic, and
thay they
can meet the problems of
37
their people.
The foreign minister was
asked to comment on his country's relations with the United
states after his return from
a trip to Washington.
He declined to elaborate
on expectations
from the Nixon Administration
for the future of PortugueseAmerican relations. He did state,
however, "that there has
been strain and many difficulties
in past years.
We believe,
with a change in views toward
Africa and the reasons behind
Portuguese policies which are in the
long-range interest of
the West, we can expect better
understanding from U.S. public
opinion " °
.

3 6 U.S.

Congress, Senate, S. Res. 114, 91st Cona
sess., May 20, 1969, Congressional
Record 115:13211-13213.
37

Ibid

.

,

p.

13211.

38 Ibid

.

,

p.

13211.
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Some members of
Congress opposed the
pro-Portugal
P0S ti0n
SPeakin9 f ° r ^
American dipiomatio
PS ; ure toward the independence
movements in Angola and
MozamCongressman Abner d. Mikva
(D . 111
submitted
tlQn int ° ^e
^n2£^^i^^al__Record an article b
y John A.
Marcum on Eduardo Mondlane
from the ndrcn/April
March/Aori 1 issue of
Africa
port Mr Marcum maintains
that in the he
mat
beginning, Eduardo
Mondlane was regarded by
the Portuguese as
non-Communist and
pro-west, but since
1965, he was slowly
drifting toward communist control. The
Portuguese have charged
his second in
command, the Reverend
Uriah Simango and his
third-ranking aide,
Marcelmos dos Santos, with
influencing Mondlane in this
direction

—

-

.

^

. )

—

^

i

:

m

-

•

In response to one of
Marcum's questions, Mondlane

responded by saying that:

"Everytime

go to the United States,
m asked again and again
whether FRELIMO is 'pro-East'
or 'proWest', 'pro-communist' or
'pro-capitalist'. My answer as
president of FRELIMO is that
FRELIMO is 'pro-Mozambican,
principally, primarily, and finally.'" 39
Mondlane went on to chide
the Western powers, including
the United States, for equivocating on support for the liberation
movements in Portuguese
40
Africa
I

I

39
U.S. Congress, House, 91st Cong.,
qcq
1st sess.
1969, ^
Congressional Record 115:54327
1

40

'

Julv
^

a

’

Mr Mondlane assured Mr. Marcum
P :. 54327
that if th liberation
struggle is successful Mozambique "will
bp pa democratic, modern,
be
unitary, single-party state."
-

-
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As indicated earlier,
one way that
Congressmen learned
about Africa was th rou
gh various subcommittee
hearings hela on
special subjects concerned
with the political
and economic
United States relations
with Africa. Organizations
and individuals interested
in Africa are called
upon to testif
y

“

COT9reSSi °- 1 hearings
periodical!,
x„ the 1970 hearings
before the House of
Representatives, the participants
included
Mr. Amilcar Cabral,
Secretary-General of the African
Party for
the independence of Guinea
and the Cape Verde
Islands, and
Prime Minister Marcello
Caetano of Port.mai
h
ortugal, whose
statements
were submitted for inclusion
in the Record
.

,

.

Mr. Cabral was questioned
by Congressman Charles
Diggs,

Jr.,

(D-Mich

Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Africa of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs
in the House of Representatives.
Mr. Cabral was asked to
respond to a portion of a speech
by the Prime Minister of
Portugal Marcello Caetano in
which the
Prime Minister boasted that the
great majority of the population of Guinea was fighting
side by side with the regular
Portuguese forces against the terrorists.
"Yet, in this province,
the terrorist movement appears
to be far more extensively and
effectively supported by the socialist
powers, especially
. )

,

the

U.S.S.R.

,

than in the other provinces." 4 !

"The reason for this

special Soviet interest," Caetano
continued, "is not hard to
U.S. Congress, House, "Portuguese
Guinea and The
Liberation Movement," Hearings before the
Subcommitt ee on
—nca 91st Cong., 1st sess. February 26, 1970,
19.
,

,

p.
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fmd.

No one hldes the fact
that Portuguese Gu nea
s a
necessary base for an
attack on the Cape Verde
archipelago. "43
The impression that
the Prime Minister
makes is a
portentous one especially
at a time when the
Soviet fleet grows
from day to day in the
Mediterranean; and while Russia
seeks to
set up military bases and
firm alliances in the
Middle East
and North Africa, the
great importance of the
Cape Verde Islands
is evident. 4
.

.

Mr. Cabral exclaimed that
for the Portuguese government "we are all Communists.
All people supporting the

liberation movement in the
Portuguese colonies are Communists.” 45
Mr. Cabral accused the
Portuguese of using scare tactics
in
order to get more support from
the NATO powers, "because of
the situation they have in
Guinea, and they tell if we take
Guinea, we will assault Cape Verde
Islands and make the islands
a base for the Communists." 46
The Guinea rebel leader assured
Congressman Diggs that the condition for
the help they received
from any nation is that there must
be no conditions at
all.

And we have a fundamental principle:
people fighting for independence, must be independent in the mind
and in the action." 47
42

Ibid

.

P-

19.

Ibid

.

P-

19.

Ibid

.

P-

19.

45 Ibid

.

P.

19.

P-

19.

P-

19.

42
44

46
4

Ibid.

^Ibid

.

,

In anSWer t0 a
query by

^
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Diggs as to the role
the United States
should play with regard
to the liberaion movement in
Portuguese Guinea, Mr
u.
canral stated
Cabral
a that
"it
would be a very good
idea if the U.S.
„ h at

v

'

r

"

«.

discontinued military

POrtU9al Unt11

******

to respect international
law, and if they
declined to respect the
peoples, rights to

self-determination and
independence in the Portuguese
colo"
nies
.

The rebel leader was
certain that: "day by
day the
majority, the large majority
of the American nation,
according
the principles, the
fundamental principles of
this country, are with us in our
fight.
Morally they support us." 49
Mr. Cabral went on to
express regret that the
weapons received
by Portugal in the
framework of NATO are used by
Portugal
against the insurgents in the
Portuguese colonies. 50
The "special study mission"
and its reports to the
subcommittee on Africa both in
the Senate and in the House
have
served to provide useful information
to the committees in
their deliberations on legislation
and policy considerations
48

^

"Sf

sources
source s°be
Desides
sides the communist countries."
49

inincHrp —

'

P

*

and tyranny
50 Ibid

20

tyranny

.

,

p.

'

20

"

*

£her

If y° u are against-opposed-to
we are als ° fighting against injustice
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as they relate to
the
«-ne

Afri^n
Arncan

area.

One
ne of
0:t the critical
problem areas served
through these '.reports'.
i ncludes the
need for decolonisation
in the minority-ruled
areas of Africa
The report of the
special study missions
to Africa
conducted on February 7
to March 7, 1971,
and to West, South
and North Africa,
August 5 to September
8, 1871 and danuary
i25, 1972, discovered that nn
..
on a „
continent where all but
Liberia
were at ons time
pa Kt,
me rul
ruled
by colonial powers,
there then were
forty-three independent
countries
Trsdit;
n American
Traditionally
foreign policy toward
colonial1 Atrica
Afrirn v™
k
h as been
stated to be in
support of anticolonialism.
However, at times a wide
gulf has
ked our actions from our
verbal pronouncements.
At
present, a conscientious
effort to deal with the
problem of
continued colonial rule in
the Portuguese territories
of Angola,
Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau
demands that policy pronouncements be supported by firm
actions.
In the past U.S. statements
on Portuguese colonial rule
in Africa have revealed a
policy
which is essentially supportive
of the status quo. For example, Secretary of state William
Rogers declared
=,

.

<-><-,1

•

n

•

,

in 1971 in

his message on Africa that:
t
<?UeSe t® rrit °ries, we shall
continue to
bllieve
ieve that
that°the
their people should have the right
of self'" 11 encou rage peaceful progress toward
that
at goai.
goal
?he
The declared Portuguese policy
of racial tol5
lm P° rtant ^ctor in this equation?
We think
th^Tna
this holds genuine hope for the
future.

^

T

.

*

5

51 U.S.
Congress, House, "Report of Special Studv Miqsions^to Africa," Hea rings before the
Subcommittee on Africa.
7-March 7, 197i r^ItSd^-'

P

3,

Ma^h
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Chairman Charles Diggs
of the House
Subcommittee on
Afrrca finds the above
position to be unacceptable
to the peoPl6S ° f thSSe
their "brothers in the
independent natrons of Africa."
Although the United States
has supported some United Nations
resolutions which urge the
Portuguese to grant self-determination
to the people of her
African
colonies, the United States
has continued economic
and military
support of Portugal. 52
Congressman Diggs feels that
American
military and economic assistance
has acted as a psychological
lf n0t 3 PhYSiCal Ufe
economy weighed down by the
expenditure of approximately
one-half of its national
budget
on defense.
Portugal's major military
expenditures relate to
the defense of its African
territories.
Under the U.S. arms
embargo policy, Portugal is
required to give assurance that
American equipment transferred
to Portugal through NATO

-

rangements or the military assistance
program or sold to Portuguese buyers will not be used in
Africa.
However, reports
persist that liberation groups are
being suppressed by weapons
of American origin found in
Portuguese Africa. Congressman
Diggs notes that the Canadian
government (also a NATO ally of
Portugal) has been unwilling to take
the chance that the Portu-

guese might violate their pledge not
to use NATO supplied equipment in Africa and consequently has
terminated military assistance to Portugal. 53
52 Ibid

.

53 Ibid.

,

p.

5

p. 5.
Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr.,
chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa has
led the fight
Congress to support the decolonization of the
African Continent.
,

,

m
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Diggs argued that there
was little on the public
record which indicated that
the United States has
ever made
conscientious use of its power
and influence to bring an
end
to the colonial era in
Angola, Mozambique, and
Guinea-Bissau.
During the Subcommittee's
hearings on "U.S. Policy Toward
Africa in the 1970s," a number
of witnesses made worthwhile
proposals for new policy positions
toward Portugal and its
African territories. Diggs felt
that the adoption of any one
of the following policy options
would add credibility to the
U.S. claim to support of
anti-colonism:
(1)

Develop a program of educational
assistance to
Africans in the Portuguese territories
in order to
increase their readiness for independence.

<2)

P ° S ?- tricter .controls over the export to
Portugal
ot
of military equipment or equipment
which could be
used for military purposes.

(3)

Encourage the United Nations Secretary-General
and
high administration officials to visit the
Portuguese African territories as part of a campaign
to
increase international pressure of Portugal
to
relinquish its colonies...
D4

Diggs' report concluded by casting out the
challenge

that if the American policy in Africa truly
is supportive of
the final eradication of colonialism from that
continent, the

United States, then, cannot "engage in the wishful thinking
that independence will eventually come to the Portuguese
ter-

ritories via the slow passage of

time."~*~’

As a sequel to the earlier trip, and again in his

capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Congress54 Ibid

.

,

p.

6

55 Ibid.

,

p.

6
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1,130

Di

August

"S
5

C ° ndUCted *

to September 8,

Mission during the
perio<J Qf
1971 to South Africa,
Gu inea-Bissau

Cape Verde, Mauritania,
the Gambia, Algeria
and to several
European countries (L i sbon
Paris the Hague>
to discuss their African
policy, with particular
emphasis on
policy towards South Africa. 56
,

^

,

The basic fact found by
this study mission-especially
ismg out of its visit to Lisbon,
to Guinea-Bissau, Cape
Verde, South Africa, and the
conversations with the President
of the Organization of
African Unity-is that the
territories
in Africa which still
remain under colonial and
minority control are not isolated from
the forces of self-determination
and majority rule which
have revolutionized the world
in the
middle half of this century,
and which have made self-

determination and human rights the
legal obligations of all
members of the United Nations.
Prior to Congressman Diggs' visit
to Guinea-Bissau and
Cape Verde the Congressional
delegation stopped
in Lisbon,

where the Portuguese Overseas Minister
discussed with them the
policies of the Portuguese government
toward the territories.
Diggs commented that the minister
emphasized that the last
fifty years have been an evolution toward
increased local

autonomy in the Overseas Territories

5^

U.S. Congress, House, "Report of Special
sions to Africa," Hearings befor e the Subcommittee Study Mison Africa.
„
92nd Cong.
2nd sess
August 5 - Sep t emb e r
T9 7 1
,

.

,

5 7 Ibid.,
p. 66.
The Portuguese Minister stressed that
the autonomy of the Overseas Provinces will
not affect the
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The delegation
report founrfd it nearly
impossible to
1
thS SXtent ° f
MrlCan
in the government
Guinea-Bissau.
The report went on
say

u

"

IT

—nation
^

^^^

over twenty-one years
of age who could
read and write Pottuguese or non-literates
who dre
are heads
neads of families
*
under Portuguese civil law, have
the ricrhf
n vote
ght fto
The vast majority of
African adults are
Uliter.te, and a larg e
portion of them lie
under customary rather
than Portuguese civil
law, so it appears
that most Africans do
not even participate
in the election of
the three Legislative
Council members who are
chosen by direct
election.
since Africans hold few
administrative posts, and
few are wealthy, they do
not participate
substantially in the
"organic vote" either. 59
,

•

-

While visiting Guinea-Bissau
Congressman Diggs' delegation was told by Portuguese
officials that they were
making
considerable progress in providing
education for the people of
Guinea-Bis sau. They emphasized
particularly that enrollment in

^^
natiVor^L^nteghtfand'so
integrity and sovereignty
9

311 parts of the
of the State."

58

r
P01
r SentatiVeS t0 national
Political and
advisory bodies
Gui^ea
|
Guinea-Bissau
and the other smaller Overseas
e
Territories wer^ f
glVSn the Privilege of Legislative
Councilsin
k
had
?hem
a
dlcade
earlier
All Council
9 Slatl ° n mUSt Ultimatel * ** -Proved
by

m

ih^overseas Mnister
59 Ibid.,

p.

31

66.

?™

The membership of the Council is
°f
irect election, local authorities,
?
ln keeplng
with the Portuguese notion

"social inter
ot an organic, corporate state.
of
and*"
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primary schools had
increased greatly i„
recent years .60
delegation discovered one
secondary school and a
technical
school, but no university.

^

While no accurate literacy
figures were made available
to the Congressional
delegation, it was clear
to them that the
Portuguese have made little
procuress
progress in improving
education
for the Africans of
Guinea-Bissau. Estimates
showed that 80
to 90 percent of the
Africans in Portuguese
Africa are functionally illiterate. 61
Th e fact that as much
as 40 percent
of the population in
Portugal itself may be
illiterate should
be taken into account when
considering educational figures
in
Portuguese territories.)

m

(

The delegation found that
the army was heavily involved
in the building of new
schools and in teaching. Many
of the
new schools are called military
school posts, which are run by
the military in areas where
the resources and teachers
are not

available to establish a normal
school.

According to the

Government's development plan, thirty-one
school posts and
fourteen regular primary schools
were to be built during 1971. 62
60

Ibid.

61 Ibid
62

Ibid

P.

71
i

,

P-

r-

.

.

,

P-

71.

—

neaj rn situation due to its climate
mu e r,
and terrain
U
te<3 Nation
estimates life expectancy from birth to be
?
33 5 ve
e 0 ''eSt figures on the continent of
A rnca
r
See United Nations Demographic Year book,
1971.
-
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.
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T he Congressional
Study „ ission to
Guinea _ Bissau came

up with these findings:
(1)

The visit confirmed
that thprp to n °
substi tute for
direct observation- a whni^
W Understandin both
the rudimentary
g
of
development of
lne
SSaU Under the
Portuguese and of the
*
extent to 2h
are embattled wL
Portuguese

r^

(2)

As emphasized bv the
graphical and physical
the task of defending facts o?
it mo^t

Guinea-Bissau*!

present?

^

^
“
difficult"^
e ninent '
f

the geoke

hard " pressed to keep
control of

1SSaU 1S a " armed cam wi
th the military everP

<5>

edLa^^irSvelS^nt^L^rr 0
(

6

)

'

S ° Cia1

'

a"d

**
briefi "9. it is
clear'that^the
Pe ° P
°f
Bissar^ouS?
Africa n
^t
Ve 9r6atly Wlth the attainment
of seif-determinat ion^e
3

poIi^T^

When the NATO Council of
Ministers met in Lisbon on
the 3rd and 4th of June,
1971, a major, though "off the
recorddiscussion was conducted centering
on the need to contain the
growing movement for African
liberation in Southern Africa and
the future role of Southern
Africa within the defense structure
of the Western bloc 64 This
discussion had to
.

be "off the

record" because the official sphere
of operation of the fifteen
63

Ibid.

,

p.

73.

4 U.S.
Congress, House, "U.S. Business Involvement
in
Southern Africa," Heari ngs before the
Subcommittee
on
Africa,
92nd Cong., 1st seis
June 2 I 9 71 p 286:
.

,

".

,

,
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nation alliance extends
only as far south as
the Tropic of
Cancer, excluding all
the Portuguese-controlled
territories
f Africa (Angola,
Guinea, and Mozambique),
Rhodesia and
the Republic of South
Africa. 65
The American Conmittee
on Africa 66 prepared a
fact
sheet for release at the
time of the NATO meeting
in Europe
June which dealt in some
detail with the two issues
of NATO
and U.S. relationships
with and support of Portugal
in Africa
Subcommittee Chairman Charles
Diggs allowed the report
to be
inserted
the Record as part of the
testimony of Mrs. Jennifer Davis, South African
economist representing the
American
Committee on Africa

m

m

.

Mrs. Davis' report elaborated
on the various pressures
being exerted, in and outside
the NATO alliance, to extend
the
NATO zone as far south as the
Cape of Good Hope.
In 1970 Por-

tugal's Defense Minister Rebelo
offered NATO defense chiefs the
territories and bases outside the
NATO zone" which would help

based

in^it Si
6

Ibid.

,

S^es^lf
286

p.

™Lng

the decolo^i-

.

67

Ibid.
p. 286.
Mrs. Davis commented on the qrowina
knit
a
lanCe ° f Portu 9 uese Africa, Rhodesia, and
Y
South
Afr^c 3 toward
a ii
Africa
the creation of a solid Southern Bloc.
This
involves, according to Mrs. Davis, a tremendous
economic
even m ° r important a high degree of military cooper
cooper
f
accordln
to
M
rs.
Davis,
top-level
security
chiefs
?
l rom the three
countries are known to meet regularly in plannin
sessions
,
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,

.
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control the vast area
of the whole Atlantic. 60
The report
found so. significance
in the fact that
the new SecretaryGeneral of NATO, former
Dutch Min±ster Qf
poreign
Joseph Luns, had always
been synthetic to
the Portuguese
position in Africa and was
reportPd
eported =asc commenting
that in the
colonial wars* "
Portugal sacrifices its
blood for our
freedom.
The committee views
Luns as a strong
conservative
force in favor of continuing
NATO support to Portugal
without
any criticism of the
colonial war in Africa. 69
•

•

•

On August 10, 1971, Diggs’
Congressional delegation
visited the Portuguese-administered
islands of Cape Verde.
Portuguese officials here often
n stress the strategic
=t
„
importance
Of the islands as a
transportation and communications
center.
An air base at Sal provides
landing and refueling facilities
for European planes going
to and from South Africa,
Angola,
and Mozambique.

Europeans have often warned that
the most serious
threat to the security of the Cape
route lies in the Western
Afncan-Atlantic Ocean area of ’’Portuguese"
Guinea and the Cape
Verde Islands. 70 Diggs recalled
that in earlier discussions
of

,
68T
Ibid.
,

.

Ibid

.
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286

P*

286.
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70

Ibid.
P* 237.
cum cue irencn at the NATO meeting in
December iQ 7 n
f nSG
ed
thi- Ume puAs to
intensify"
fY the p
French presence
the Mozambique channel and
Jhe ? a
o
T iS nSed t0 defend the Sea rOUtes
became
onl
one of the ?nst?l
e
justifications
most often heard among French military circles for hugh French arms sales
to Southern Africa.
See
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m
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Portugal's membership into
NATO that Portugal was
originally
admitted, in 1949, at the
proposal of the United
States; and,
that the motivation was
not primarily the
geographical positron of Portugal itself,
but Portugal's colonial
possessions
such as the Azores, the
Cape Verde Islands as
well as the
three major African colonies." 7 *
chairman Diggs read into the
Record an article in- Pgreign
_Af fairs written in 1952
which
stated in part:
0
^' 116Whl
^°° res
emphlsLf^^fcapeTerde^s!
P
h h

the southern par? of the
A^lanttc'
SeS ' lY
th Y d ° ° ff th4

rr
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coasf

a

iine
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?

hardl Y needs
ld the
to

Wes?
lth 1816 kil

n

T»' b

SSLfto^hfiSand

°™s o? ™
vlltl

1

If the role that NATO will
play in the future with
relation to formal alliances involving
Southern Africa is still

somewhat speculative, there is no
doubt about the invaluable
support that has flowed from individual
NATO members to Portu
gal in its fight to hold on to its
African Empire in the face
James Hoagland, "White Elite Rules
ington Post April 18, 1971, p. 3 Portuguese Africa
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Wash-
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The art icle cited was entitled "PorTerritories," Foreign Affairs, vol. 34
*

*

(April 1952), p. 321.
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Of a decade of determined
armed struggle by the
people of
Angola, Mozambique and
Guinea-Bissau 73
.

On December 14, 1971,
Chairman Diggs issued the
following 'Action Manif
rt
Manifesto with recommendations
to Secretary of
State Rogers and to Dr.
Kissinger
obinger tor
for n
q
U.S.
government action.
The Manifesto was based,
for the most part, on
the Subcommittee s fact-finding mission
to several African
countries,
including Guinea-Bissau, Cape
Verde, and South Africa.
11

•

According to the chairman of
the delegation, the visit
to Guinea-Bissau and Cape
Verde was
•'extremely informative,

particularly with respect to the
stark racism of the Portuguese government and the tenuous
position of the Portuguese in
Guinea-Bissau."™ The delegation
discovered Guinea-Bissau

to
be an "armed camp," and the
Portuguese there were beleaguered.

It was evident that a consideration
of the effect of the PAIGC

must include not only its military
gains and efforts to improve
conditions in the liberated areas, but
also the housing, health
and educational programs then
operating in the Portuguese-held
areas in Guinea and on Cape Verde. 73
73u -S. Congress House, "Text of the First
Press Conference in Africa," Hearings Congressional
before the
Subcommittee on Africa, 92nd Cong., 1st seiFTT
January 18 19 7 2.
~
R1iaclcjaiicus
i

,

,

74
p.

Study Mission, op. cit
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75ibid.
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p.

177.
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August

5

to September 8,

1971,
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176

itS obstruc tion of
efforts ly other NATO^ountrieff n
6
0
”
e agenda an item
to reconsider NATO assistance
pnvi^
,
Por tu?al.and
that the U.S.
Government use every effo^ to £
ltSm
placed
on the
agenda for the next NATO Council
meeting.

“

L

8.

That the United States take
whatever steoq 3r p

S.S“

^opl^f^inea-

iiLau^nfcfpe

6

1 ?*
That the united States either bilaterally
..
or
through the urn ted Nations, give
humanitarian aiTto the PAIGC
and other liberation movements.
(The feasibility of such aid
is attested by the program of the
Swedish government which has
an on-going assistance program to
liberation movements and in
1972 Wl11 contribute to the PAIGC
1,750,000 kroner
in kindTfo^h
kind for humanitarian or educational
purposes.)
,

m

.

11
7 hat the United States government
welcome the
i
leaders
of the PAIGC and other liberation movements
for visits
C ° Untry and that United States officials
meet with such
leaders
’

'

That the United States support multilateral and/or
bilateral programs of humanitarian support to the
liberation
movements, through the provision of educational and
reading
materials, as well as medical supplies, to people in
the
liberated areas and to refugees.
13.
That all investment-incentive programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in, and for, the
Portuguese territories be terminated and that the United States
Government adopt an affirmative policy proscribing OPIC programs for the minority-ruled areas of Africa.
14.
That the United States government must be required
and is herein called upon, to explain the enormous, unprecedented and anomalous commitments which the United States is
making to Portugal in connection with the Azores Agreement.
(The Agreement expires on February 3, 1974.

76

On February 18, 1972, the State Department replied to

the Action Manifesto by first recognizing that Portugal and
76

Ibid., pp. 177-179.
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its African territories
represented a classic case
of conflicting U.S. interests
and the problems and
limitations
lmposed^on the U.S. government
by the policies of
another
State.
The State Department
contended that all military
assistance to Portugal, about
$1 million a year, is
designed
to enable Portugal to
fulfill its responsibilities
under NATO.
(Point 1 of the Manifesto)
"The use of the Azores
base is
indispensable to U.S. security
interests, not only for antisubmarine warfare in the North
Atlantic, but also to enhance
this Nation's ability to deal
with crises in the Mediterranean
and the Near Eastern areas." 78
As to the economic assistance
the United States has provided
Portugal, the State Department
.

did not view this aid to be
military in nature. Whatever
little assistance the U.S. has
provided is exclusively in
grant money.
"The $400 million figure for
Ex-Im Bank credits
represents the global value of a number
of development projects
the Portuguese government has under
consideration for construction of bridges, railroad facilities,
roads, schools, et
cetera, in Metropolitan Portugal." 79
The Secretary argued that
7D V d
Ab ® hlr ®' Assistant Secretary for
Congressional
Relations,
RelationI UnJLSg ._Pepartment
nl
of State
(February
,

18,

1972), p. 184

78

Secretary Abshire's reply carried an
*i? id ' P- 184
lt ntentl0n °n the Part of the state
to study
^nc ?lY -Hhe po lnts ln the Action Manifesto. Department
The
Secretary
found
-*
e S
Manifesto
to be a comprehensive document which provided
,r
ought-provoking ideas regarding virtually all aspects of U.S.
-

.

1

^

4

-

relations with Southern Africa.
79

Ibid
p. 184.
The State Department claimed there
was no evidence to support allegations that U.S. arms supplied
since 1961 have been used by Portugal in her African
territories
The State Department was convinced that suspension of
military
.

,

an m-a.

^
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Ban* financing is
intended to help us
and
compete for contracts and
as such is designed
to
improve the U.S. balance-of-p
ayitl ents situation
by fostering
U.S. exports. 80 Apparently,
a key criteriQn
_

^

of such export loans
involves the ability of
the foreign state
to repay.
Portugal's credit rating was
estimated as good.
The State Department reply
ended with the U.S. Government's reiteration that with
regard to U.S. policy on
Portugal's African territories it
has been made clear that
the time
colonialism is past and that
self-determination holds the
only hope for a viable long-range
Portuguese relationship
with these territories.
"We have repeatedly urged
the need
for peaceful negotiations to
explore ways in which progress
can be made toward this goal
and toward the economic, social,
and political advancement of the
peoples of the African ter8
ritories
ii

On March 20, 22, and April

6,

1973, hearings were held

by the House Subcommittee on Africa
concerning the "Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo against
Portugal and South
Africa." Mr. Bruce J. Oudes, a freelance
journalist who has

written extensively and authoritatively on
U.S. foreign policy
sales to Portugal would degrade the Portuguese
ability to carry
into NATO responsibilities but would have little
effect on
U9 eS
llCieS ln Africa
See Hea rings op. cit
June 2,
1971 p 427°
’

80
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81 Ibid.

,

p.

184.

,

.

,

179

testimony

d,.U

.ttt

». „i„ a

Portugal and South Africa.
It was Mr.

st

„„

—„

go

^

Oudes

contention that there is
not the same
political will under the
Nixon Administration to
enforce these
embargoes as there was under
the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations.
Yet, it is also true,
according to Mr. Oudes,
that these embargoes have
become firmly established
in the
Popular mind as the cornerstones
of ,s. policy toward
Portugal and South Africa.
Mr. Oudes expressed his
suspicion that
after a long gestation period,
”„e are now getting near
the
point where the narrowing of
the arms embargoes is reaching
significant dimension. " 83 it was
at this point that Mr. Oudes
asked for both Congressional
support for and administrative
cooperation in making available to
the American public the
guidelines and the precedents that
the United States follows
in determining what can and
what cannot be exported to South
Africa and to Portugal for use in
Africa. 84
Mr. Oudes argued that in numerous
policy statements

at the United Nations Security
Council, the Nixon administration
82

u s

Congress, House, "Implementation of the
U.S.
Portugal and South Africa and Related
S
eari ni3 s before the Su bcommittee on
Africa 93rd
^
i
Cong., 1st
sess.
MaTch zu 22; April 6, '1973, p. 5.
-
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ones

° PSrative definition
of

Portugal remains the
Qniy noncontiguQus
sQvere
entity in the world
which claims fcQ span
if one defines civil
confi
conflxct as not constituting
war, as the
ministration has done, then
one can make statements
to the
affect that there ar.e
no more wars in the
world; which is ju8t
what the Administration
has done in the wake
of the Vietnam
Once you do that in an
era in which the emphases is on exports,
you can promote exports
to places like Portuguese Africa even though
this constitutes what
independent
observers would have to call
tt
c
call u.S. commercial
participation in
the Portuguese pacification
program." 86

^

_

Mr. Oudes went on to
show that in the 1960s,
including

the first year of the
Nixon Administration, the
United States
refused to permit the
Export-Import Ban k to bac k the
bids of

American firms which sought
to participate in the
construction
and equipping of the Cabora
Bassa Dam. Although American
firms
were not denied permission
to bid, without the baching
of U.S.
Government credit facilities they
had no chance of winning,
since firms in several European
countries had government
backing for their bids. 87
85

Ibid

.

,

P.

5.

86 Ibid.
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Ibid
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On

^irican Affairs, testified before the Afrio iT
can Subcommittee
that: "The Export-Import Ban k advises
that a
y
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The apparent premise
behind U.S. Government
policy
that it should not,
any way, assist Portugal
to make
internal role in Africa
a reality.
This situataon, according to Mr.
Oudes, soon changed.
The state Department declassified from its
munitions controls two
varieties of
herbicides with potential
military application, and
U.S. herexports to South Africa and
Portuguese Africa rose
matically.
T h e Cabora Bassa Dam
administration was permitted to buy two small U.S.
-~
helicoDt^r-Q
neiicopters to
improve transportation between the dam site
and coastal towns. 89

m

4

:

Then in the fall of 1973,
through the Portuguese press
and Marches^rropi^, a
French publication specialising
in

economic questions in Africa,
Mr. Oudes discovered that
the
United States was permitting the
sale of aircraft, (AeroCommanders) manufactured by Rockwell
International to Portugal
for use in Mozambique.
The first sale included three
eightseaters, called the Shrike-Commander,
and one
turboprop,

pressurized version capable of easy
adaptation to precision
aerial photography.
Rockwell officials were quoted as saying
that they are negotiating for the sale
90
of
four more.

search of its records since 1964 does not
reveal any support
of aircraft sales to Mozambique prior
to 1972."
See Hearings
155
p
.

88

Ibid

.

,

p.

7.

89 Ibid

.

,

p.

7.

90

Ibid., p. 28.
Mr. Oudes informed the Committee that
beginning of 1973, he learned from the same Portuguese
and French media of the sale of a dozen Bell
helicopters to
a

V^

e
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Mr. Oudes then reported
about a trip made by Mr.
Clark
MacGregor, who headed the
President's re-election
campaign to

northern Mozambique right
after the Presidential
election for
What Mr. MacGregor described
in a Beira press conference
as
an "agreeable and different"
91
holiday.
Mr. MacGregor met the
Portuguese commander. General
Arriage, and toured, by
aircraft
presumably, »me of the Portuguese-held
contnunities in northern
Mozambique.
Mr. MacGregor, according
to Mr. Oudes,
had

become a vice president (at this
time) of United Aircraft.
"That firm produces Sikorsky
helicopters, and it is only natural
to assume United Aircraft has
its eyes on doing business in
Portuguese Africa." 93
Basing his information on Pentagon
sources, Mr. Oudes
noted that the Pentagon budget for
United States training of
Portuguese military personnel had doubled
during the Nixon
years.
Oudes pointed out that: "Pentagon sources
disclosed
Mozambique. Mr. Rauer H. Meyer, Director of
the Office of
tro1 Department of Commerce, appearing as
a witness
r??
efore this
committee stated: "Our licensing policy is to
approve export licenses for aircraft to civil end
civii end use in either Portugal or South Africa. users for
Our policy
is to deny exports of most U.S. civil aircraft
destined to
military consignees for both areas. This applies also
to
exports of U.S. components for use in foreign-made aircraft
for military use."
<

'

Ibid
p. 28.
Diario de Noticias (Portugal)
November 10, 1972, p. 10, reported that "Minister Caetano as an
admirer and a friend" congratulated President Nixon on his
re-election and expressed the desire to Mr. MacGregor that the
relations between our two countries remain as cordial as they
have during the last few years."
.

,

,

92 Ibid
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United States trained a
total of eighty-three
Portuguese Air Force officers
during fiscal years
1971 and i 972
a tenfold jump over
the average of the
previous seven years.
Pentagon sources disclosed
that among the training
being
offered Portuguese military
personnel in the United
States was
precision photography. Chairman
Diggs raised the question
of
"whether these Portuguese
personnel received their
training in
U.S. Aero-Commanders ’ "
MrMr
0udes responded that "he
had no
hard information on that." 95
,

'

*

Mrs. Jennifer Davis, an
economist and the research
director of the American Committee
on Africa, in a prepared

statement delivered before the
committee (subcommittee)
stated: "That there are innumerable
areas in which the U.S.
supply of equipment might be
interpreted as contributing toward
strengthening military capabilities
in Portuguese Africa." 96
Mrs. Davis claimed that on the
basis of investigative
research conducted by her committee
it was discovered
that

94 Ibid

.

95 Ibid.
96

Ibid

.

P.

9.

P.

9.

P.

9.

«

comml ee and quoting from the same
stated -"Our cnmmhi
committee investigations have revealed some sources
light
aircraft- -one equipped for photo reconnaissance—
and
a
helicopter
were sold by North American Rockwell to a
private airline company based
Northern Mozambique." See Hearings March
29,
/3, p. 79.
Company representatives, when approached by Mrs.
committee, said that the sale had been to Transportas
C °^ e ClaS/ a Moz ambican private company.
Mrs. Davis
? .
5
stated:
This
is a company of which no previous trace
can be
found, and given the nature of northern Mozambique
it is most
likely that this company's best customer will
be the Portuguese
military

m

,
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various U.S. corporations
have been heavily
involved in supPlying computers to the
minority white regimes
of Southern
IBM in particular was
cited as being a major
contributor to the military in
Portugal. Honeywell has
reportedly
equipped the "Portuguese Air
Force" and the Portuguese
"General
Aeronautical Workshops" with
computers.
ITT operating both
in South Africa and in
Portuguese controlled Africa
as well
as in Portugal has
provided both equipment and
expert knowledge
for the stabilization of
complex and sophisticated
communications systems "which are
essential for the maintenance
of these
white regimes.
The major thrust of Mrs. Daviscomments centered on
the growing awareness of South
Africa and Portugal on the
importance not only of local and
regional alliances but of

increasingly close international
alliances which, in the end,
will link them to the interests
of the Western Powers.
Elaborating on the already existing relation
of Portugal with NATO
Mrs. Davis noted the significance
of the links between Portugal and Brazil which have involved
incipient steps towards
building a new regional alliance in Southern
Africa. 98
97 Ibid.
98

,

p.

83.

-i

84
Expanding on what she considered to be
p
complicity
Portuguese colonialism, Mrs. Davis pointed
to an event
the autumn of 1972 in which NATO parliamentarians
meeting
Bonn, Germany approved a report emphasizing the
need
to protect "the shipping lanes between the
Indian Ocean and the
Southern Atlantic, vital to the European NATO countries."
The
report stated that: "Portugal, as a member of NATO,
should be
in a position to make available its facilities
on the Azores,
the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira and the Cape
route, if NATO
should request it."
'
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Mrs. Davis concluded by
calling upon the
subcommittee
"to move the Foreign
Affairs Committee and
Congress to see to
it that the United States
Government and its people
do not
provide military planes and
other military know-how
to these

Southern African apartheid
nations; that foreign capital
which
goes into south Africa or
Portuguese Africa's arms industry
should be cut off. " 9 9 a good
place for the United States
to
start would be: "that special
training should not be offered
to military and police
officers from Portugal and South

Africa;
and that spare parts and
repairs should not be supplied
to

maintain equipment sent prior to
the embargo; all items suitable for both military and civilian
use should be embargoed,
and rn particular motor vehicles
and light aircraft should be
included
Mr.

Diggs as chairman of the subcommittee
summarized
the findings of the committee's
hearings by noting,
first,

"a great unwillingness on the part
of all Government agencies

to admit responsibility for foreign
policy."

Congressman

Diggs charged each of these agencies with
"buck-passing,"
saying, in effect, that:

"it is not and should not be necessary

for the committee to emphasize the gravity of
what we consider
to be an evasion of responsibility by agencies
that are con-

cerned with this issue, especially in the question of
the arms

embargo and various military contracts with the minority
regimes

"ibid.
100 Ibid
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in Southern Africa

...
c
Secondly,

the committee considers
to De
be a

the chairman found
what

massxve" erosion of the
..

Principles established during
the 1960s, with
significant
sales of equipment
aircraft, herbicides,
even crop-spraying
aircraft, "to the South
African and/or Portuguese
military,
especially in an emergency
.v
gency
Pl
Furthermore,
the committee
was informed that "the
United states is spending
,

.

no less than
a million dollars every
year on training Portuguese
military
personnel, and that
at there is
iq not
no+ ^
even a
-

formal restriction on
these personnel using their
training in the African „ars." 10 3
Chairman Diggs explicated on
the persistent reports of
our
Government "exchanging intelligence
information with the
minority regimes in Southern
Africa." He spoke of "contacts"
between U.S. counter-insurgency
instructors and the Portuguese

-^H earings
1

2

,

April

6

,

1973, p. 137

.

,

I bid
p. 147.
Assistant Secretary of stat-p
a-f
^
African
Affairs,
David Newsom expressed his concern
before
is committee, of the tendency
throughout the hearinqs to
e
U S
9®5
p ° licies ha ve taken place
wi?h respect to
to^h/ar"
the arms embargo
k”
and to suggest a level of
support to the military efforts of
South Af?!ca and Portugal
1
News ° m 's VleW: " are n0t suba tantia?ed
uy
by tne
the tacts.
"?
!^p
facts "
I believe,"
stated the Secretary "it is deer
rom the statements of witnesses to
date that the'united States
as not supplied since the
imposition of these embargoes
any
9
Y
arms or equipment of a strictly military
character
i£ is
also pertinent to point out that the
arms and
^ipth<
depend are su PP lied not from this
country but from Europe ..."
.

.

,

•

'
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ry,

calls by U.S. vessels
at Mozambique and
Angolan
ports, a visit to
Mozambique by a group
from the U.S. War
College, and numerous
official visits of u.s.
diplomatic personnel to the war zones
of Mozambique
" 104
yue
r
n order
o a
In
to parry
any criticism of
conjecture on his part,
the chairman emphasised that all of the
above ..have been reported
officially
whrle many other contacts
are alleged to be taking
‘

place./

Conclusion
On December 17, 1972,
Congressman Diggs resigned

from the United States
delegation to the United
Nations to
protest the United States
policy toward Black Africa.
The

Michigan Democrat became the
first member of an American
delegation ever to resign in such
protest and, not surprisingly,
was subject to both rounds
of criticism and praise
for his
action.
Diggs had objected to a series
of United Nations
votes in which the United States
opposed resolutions critical
of South Africa's apartheid
policy, or abstained
from the

voting, and to the Nixon
Administration's policy decisions
concerning Portuguese Africa. The
turning point for Diggs
came when the United States
announced some $436 million in
economic credits to Portugal in return
for continued use of
bases in the Azores.
Diggs felt that this money would be
used
by Portugal to wage war against
the Black peoples of her
104 Ibid

.

,

p.

138.
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colonies

^

^

More than for its
dramatic first>
Diggs
nation is noteworthy
because of his positions
as ex-chairman
of the Congressional
Black Caucus and of the
House Foreign
Affairs Committee's
subcommittee on Africa.
But at present there
are growing signs in
the United
thcit the i"h
tii
thrust of concerned attention
to Africa is about
to take a dramatic
upturn in the latter
1970s.
Africa's
emergence as an important
political issue in the United
States,
beyond the superficial
manifestation of Afro-hairdos
and
dashikis, is already apparent.
.

One of the most significant
indicators of this new
thrust of concern for Africa
is in the United States
Congress,
where the Black Caucus, comprised
of the thirteen Black members of the House of
Representatives, has begun to move
on
African affairs as well as on
issues of domestic significance.
When the Caucus met with President
Nixon in March 1972 and
presented him with a sixty-point
program on behalf of the
nation's twenty-four million Blacks,
a vital but generally
less publicized segment of that
program dealt with foreign
affairs; and it was Africa that
dominated the Caucus' foreign
policy discussions.

Among the Caucus recommendations to President
Nixon
were aid programs comparable to the Marshall
Plan that provided
massive assistance to Europe following World War
II, a review
of all U.S. policies in regard to Africa,
and lastly, the

recommendation that the United States direct at least
one

189

percent of its annual
gross national product
for international
ard, with priority
attention to Black African
nations
.

It is Significant
that such proposals
were made by

Black members of Congress
wielding influence among
Blacks not
only in their local
districts, but throughout
the nation as
well.
Also, these proposals
may possibly reflect
the views
Of more than three-hundred
million Blacks in Africa
north
and south of the Sahara
and have the support
of others who also
feel strongly that Africa's
turn is long overdue.
There is another equally,
if not more
important
factor: for the first time
the House Foreign Affairs
Committee's subcommittee on Africa
is chaired by a Black,
Representative Diggs, and has other
Blacks among its membership:
,

Ron

Dell ums

(D-Calif.), Robert Nix (D-Pa.,.

However, Diggs is

the key person.

At forty-nine, he has been in
Congress longer
than any other Black currently
serving.
Elected in 1954 at
the age of thirty-two, he is
dean of the Michigan delegation,
has been a member of the House
Foreign Affairs Democratic Committee since 1959 and chairman of
its subcommittee on Africa
since 1970.

Representative Diggs feels that Africa has
been at the

bottom of the list with respect to the
strategic interests of
the United States.
For this reason he finds it difficult
to
talk about priorities for Africa in
concrete terms. Above all,
he very much wants to see those members
of Congress who have
developed reputations for their civil rights
activities also
become activists in the area of African interests.
Unfortunately,
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past, this interest
has not been transferred
to African
problems
one reason ma y be that
the men who respond
to domes _
trc crvrl rxghts issues
do so beoause they
have a large Black
constituency who pressure
them in these matters,
but not in
respect to Africa.
.

other hand. Congressional
documents do indicate
that Congressmen are t
attendina
cenamg an increasing number
of conferences on Africa, and the
larger group of Black
members are
obviously focusing their
attention on African affairs.
As an
example. Senator Edward
Brooke (R-Mass.) went to
Africa
(southern, in 1969, and, on
his return, delivered a
scathing
attack on racism in Southern
Africa.
Representatives John
Conyers (D-Mich.) and Louis
Stokes (D-Ohio) also went
to
Mozambique and Angola and later
to Nigeria (at the same
time
as Muskie and the late Whitney
M. Young, Jr.) to attend
the
African-American Dialogues sponsored
by the African-American
Institute and the Ford Foundation.
.

Throughout the 1970s Portugal will be,
by any yardstick, the keystone in a credible
United States policy in
Southern Africa. Chairman Diggs' Black
Congressional Caucus
has recommended policies that would
in effect
impose an

escalating quarantine of Portugal until the
time the Lisbon
government negotiates a settlement with the
African insurgents.
If need be,

the Black Caucus would call for suspension
of

Portugal's membership in NATO.
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Less extreme Congressional
spokesmen maintain that
indeed the United States
has a duty to itself
as a nation
committed to the principle
of self-determination
to make our
views known to the Portuguese
government in no uncertain
terms.
However, as a friend of
African independence and
peaceful development, and as
an ally of Portugal,
these Congressmen feel that all diplomatic
efforts must be made to
persuade Portugal to change her
colonial policies.
If Portugal refuses to
end her colonial policies
in
Africa, the Congress, and
especially the Executive Branch,
may be confronted with a hard
choice between our treaty with
Portugal and our interests in the
peaceful development of
nations bent on self-determination
in Africa.
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chapter

v

EXTRA-GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS

AFRO-AMERICAN PRESSURES

A definite link exists
between domestic and
foreign
policies

Since part of the process
of foreign policy formu1
lation is the consideration
of the perspectives
and interests
of significant groups
within American society,
the examination of Afro-American
views on United States
foreign policy
towards Africa becomes an
important area of concern.
.

To

analyze Afro-American
perspectives of United States
foreign
policy towards Africa, one
should examine the realities
of

Afro-American existence in the
United States.
The question of powerlessness
is reflected in the
paucity of Afro-Americans in
positions of power and influence

m

American society in spite of their
large number.
A state
of negative racial attitudes
exists within interpersonal,
intergroup and interstate relations
on the domestic front.
This attitude is reflected in
foreign
policy; therefore, it

is logical to conclude that
Afro-Americans without power to

effect change within race-conscious
American society, are
also without power to effect change
in international race
relations
.

1

Gerald Pomper

_

iif^P iess?^
2

,

"Afro-American and U.S. Government,"

OTl Tli r

Ibid

•

r

p.

5

8
-

Checks^nd^inu^

(Glencoe: The
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In recent years
some Blacks have
come to a clear

understanding of the nature
of racial politics
and its implicatrons for domestic
and international
relationships between
^ ^
s o.ric3. Whit^c; ^
a+At
lnterna tional level,
the realization is only incipient.
Until recent] Y
v the
u,
role American
Blacks have played,
although slight, in the
formulation of
American foreign policy,
has revealed little
appreciation of
the racial factor.
Professors Edward Browne
and Henry Clarke
have noted that much
Black involvement has
represented an
unconscious support of
continued white dominance
at the expense
of black and brown
peoples, particularly in
Africa and the
Caribbean.
In general, "concerned
Blacks outside of the formal processes of O.S.
foreign policy have had only
a slight
awareness of the meaning of
U.S. foreign policy for
black and
brown peoples of the world."

^

+- i_

.

'

As a result of persistent
racial discrimination in
education and housing patterns,
Afro-Americans are prevented
from receiving quality education
and acquiring skills that
are necessary to success
in a modern technological
society.
The limite d access to education
explains, partially, the
3

(January

Negro’s
p_

!^)!
P

'

Mli^Regort,

vol. 14, no.

1

Browne and Henry Clarke, "The American
vol. 14, no. 1 (January 1967),

fnca Today

,
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exclusion of Afro-Americans

"

thS Vari ° US

f rom si g „i ficant

participation

in the public and
p rivate sectors .5

This fact is important
when realizing how
influential certain
professions are in government
policy-making.
i„ particular,

the legal profession has
historically provided access
to
government leaders and
governmental processes. Of
the 300,000
lawyers in the United States,
only 3,000 are Black.*
There _
fore. Blacks lack the
experience as lawyers and
lobbyists
that is essential in
formulating governmental policy.
7
The
few that are employed by the
State Department concentrate
on
implementation of existing policies
in Africa, rather than in
formulation of new ones
.

How, then, do Black Americans
gain access to foreign

policy-making?

Black Americans recognize that
they cannot
fully entrust their interests
to white policy-makers.
However, because the United States
operates as a power-broker
system, it is the white affluent
broker who is recognized in
circles of power that influence policy
decisions. Therefore,
violence and political disruption 9 on
the part of the Afro5

Ibid.

,

p.

18.

.

,

p.

58

Ibid.

,

p.

58.

6 Ibid

9

.

g

^ oss
Baker, "Toward a New Constituency For A More
Active American Foreign Policy for Africa,"
presented at the
ourteenth Annual Meeting of the African Studies
Association,
Denver, November 3-6, 1971, p. 17.
See also Gerald Pomper,
^
op. cit
p. 7.
'

.

,

9

There are those who argue that in order to gain access
to domestic policy processes. Black America had
to resort to
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American would only alienate
non . Black constituencies
which
otherwise would support
Black participation in
foreign policymaking.
Blacks are very much
aware that 'white
hyphenated
Americans" came to wield
great influence with
respect to their
mother countries
.

Another set of factors which
must be taken into consideration when discussing
Afro-American and United States
foreign policy towards Africa
is the historical
concern that
Afro-Americans have demonstrated
for Africa.
To ignore this
interest is to conclude
incorrectlv
uLuirectiy that +-u
the concern of AfroAmericans with Africa is rpppnf
recent and transitory. The
relationShip IS "new" only in the
sense that increasing numbers
+.

of

Afro-Americans have the opportunity
to express their true
feelings to the vast majority of
American society. The danger
Of ignoring the historical
importance of this concern is that
policy-makers may miscalculate the
domestic impact of policies
toward Africa.
A brief overview of the historical
interest of AfroAmericans in Africa includes the following
points: (1) The
debates surrounding proposals to colonize
parts of Africa
with free men of color during the
19th century represented
one of the first attempts of African
slaves to resolve their
open conflict, civil disobedience and street
violence
Tilden
L< Me
e s article, "Race, International
f
Relations, U.S
oreign p °li C y and The African Liberation
of Black Studies, vol 3, no. 1 (September Struggle," Journal
1972), pp.
95-98,
^
deals with this theme.
*

H

,

.
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sense of dual identity;

(2)

Thg doctring

^

design" represents a
second aspect of
historical concern
This doctrine maintained
that God in his wisdom
had permitted
a number of Africans
to be enslaved so
that they might be
brought to the New World
to be Christianised
and civilised
and once having received
the blessings of the
New World, these
Africans would then return
to redeem Africa,
it is important
to note that such a
doctrine was one of the
pillars upon which
the African Methodist
Episcopal Zion Church, the
African
Methodist Episcopal Church,
and the Negro Baptist
Church built
their missionary movements
and activities on the
continent.
The founding of schools and
churches in Africa were examples
of the implementation of
providential design; 10 3 Paralleling
the concept of providential
design was a secular version
which
attempted to find a more constructive
and pragmatic relationship between Africans and
Afro-Americans. The Hampton-Tuskegee
approach, best expressed by Booker T.
Washington, provided the
basis for new contacts with Africa. 1 !
The underlying assumptions were that a program of practical
education, Christian
ethics and accommodative race relations
would be the most
(

)

1

S ^* clair Drake, "Negro Americans
and the Africa
Interest, ^ The_American Negro Reference
Book ed. John P.
V1
eW°° d CllffS New Jerse Y Prentice-Hall,
1966),
Pp 101-108
.

,

'

^August

:

Meier, Negro T hought in America, 1880-191
Ideolo gie s in the^ge of Booker T. Washing ton (Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1963),
p. 38
„

.

,

g a cial

St

a

"
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eff6CtiVe W

--

civili

ao t ri n eS ° f Pan MriCaniS "

“

«rica;

(4)

The

emphasizing the solidarity
gnd
freed ° m ° f MrlCanS
SVeryWhere
another
contact and concern
between Africans and
AfroAmericans
The necessity of
Africans
ew World to develop
trade and cooperation
to fight racial
discrimination and the
denigration of the African
heritage
-re the maj or components or
ob.ectives of this po i icy
during
e
atter part of the
19th century and the
first part of the
century; (5, The
Universal N egro improvement
Association
founded by Marcus Garvey
during the 19 20s
represents perhaps
the most ambitious and
expensive effort to connect
the
aspirations and future of
Afro-Americans with Africans.
The
widespread support of the
Garvey movement and the
call for
immigration indicate the
depth
nff the c °ncern of
°
P
Afro-Americans
for Africa during this
12
period.

rr

^

.

^^

^

There are, then, sufficient
historical data to illustrate that substantial
common interest has existed
for some
time between Afro-Americans
and Africa.
The following comments made in 1896 by Bishop
H. M. Turner of the
A.M.E. Church
about the relationships of
Blacks in North America to
Africa

Sent

(

Calif ornia^Ramparts'piefb^

1°^

and The BI,rw V "*™-.
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demonstrate the deep feelinoq o-f
P
ngs of some American
Blacks even
at that time:
-

Relieve two or three mi l i
„.c
to the land of our
ancestors and
1

l

eaLblishV^™

6
^r^rieh^^Xn^L^of
but build up social

conditions

^°^ her

peL^f^^

;

.13

It was a result of
Turner’s interest that
contact was

established with South Africa.

After maintaining correspon-

dence with members of the
Ethiopian Church and facilitating
its incorporation into
the A.M.E. Church in
1896, Turner went
to South Africa in 1898 to
consummate the union 14
Other instances of American
Blacks living and working
in Southern Africa during
this period could be
.

cited.

Even
more significant than the actual
presence of Black Americans
in various parts of Southern
Africa is the impact which the
existence of Blacks in North America
has had on the history of
that area.
The presence of a large number
of their brothers
in the United States was well-known,
even in the rural villages.
Information disseminated was that: "It
was popularly
believed at various times and in various
places that Blacks in
America were going to organize themselves
to come and drive
*-3h. m. Turner
"The American Negro and the Fatherland," Africa and the American Negro ed.
J.W.E. Bowen
(Atlanta': n.p., 18 96), p. 10
,

,

.

14

Ibid.

,

p.

12.
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out the Europeans.

In at least one
instance it was even
preached that everybody in
America was Black." 15

It must be remembered,
however, that Black
American

interest and concern with
Africa has never been as
strong as
that displayed by other
American ethnic and racial
groups
towards their native
countries.
Even the nationalist
fervor
of American peoples for
Black independence after
the Second
World War failed to arouse
much general sympathy among
Black
Americans. Blacks, however,
who did express sympathy
for

African nationalists became
a pivotal group within
the African
foreign policy constituency.
Prominent in this constituency
were religious groups, which
have long maintained an
interest
Africa beyond missionary work
and relief. 16 Both the
United Church of Christ and the
World Council of Churches
have taken strong stands on
African questions generally, but
most notably are those dealing
with South Africa and Portuguese Africa.
Professor Eric Lincoln feels that, "If
this

m

essentially humanitarian concern were
politicized even marginally, a numerical ly-significant group
would be created
which might have the power to alter
significantly the substance
of American foreign policy toward
Africa.
15 L.

j

-

Cappin, Unwritten Historv (New York:

University Press, 1968)

,

p.

Norrr-n

136.

1

Eric C. Lincoln, op cit
p. 57.
These associations contain member churches who have traditionally
missionary efforts, medical missions, famine relief, supported
hospitals
and other charitable institutions.
.

.

.

17

.

,

These sentiments also resulted in the establishment
of organizations such as the American Society for
African
.
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Although the growth
potential
F xx-ntiai of m,this group of concerned Black Americans
is great,
u
if C heretofore
qreat its
low level of
influence has been linked
to its social, economic
and political exclusiveness.
Nowhere can the 1±nk
between
profile of a domestic groU
p and the degree of influence
of
policy be seen as clearly
as in the case of
American Blacks
and the United States,
policy toward Africa.

^

The majority of
organisations, schools of thought
and
activities focusing on the
relationship of Afro-Americans
and
Africa and U.S. foreign policy
toward Africa, have their
roots
in these historical
factors.
indeed many of the most
effective
lobbies trace their activity
directly to the positions outlined above.

Until 1970, the only organizational
effort by Black
Americans to influence U.S. policy
toward Africa was evident
in the American Negro Leadership
Conference (ANLC) on Africa. 18
A federation of largely Black
American civil rights, religious
and fraternal organizations,
the Conference never went beyond
two national meetings (1962 and
1964), which produced statements of concern about U.S. policy in
18
Africa.
The ANLC
r

AC

iCh al owed for literary exchange among
i
in the
U.S., Africa, and Europe.
See
se, op. cit., for a full treatment
of this subject.

”^
Sack int^?
l
™ llectua:
is
18

Policy,

„

P

lden J LeMel l e "Black Americans and Foreign
Africa Today vol. 18, no. 4 (October
1971), p. 20.
‘

/

,

19 Ibid

.

,

p.

20.
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attempted to speak for
a concerned
uncerned Blank
a
Black American
community
but, according to
critics, with the
exception of Keverend
Martrn L. Krng, its
membership was hardly
one with which the
masses of Blacks could
easily identify.After the assassinatron of President John
F. Kennedy, who
had established the
organization the potential
of ANLC faded, becoming
merely a
paper organization. As
Professor LeMelle writes,
'

,

"its

failure was grounded in
an assumption on the
part of
its members that they
could wield influence in
foreign policy
by virtue of their own
national prestige. But they
had no
real power in American
21
society."

Although the ANLC failed,
its critics within the
post-1966 Black Power Movement
were not effective in influencing United States policy
toward Africa either. To be
sure, the Black Power Movement
has created a greater Black
awareness of Africa, but it has
yet to mobilize the Black

American masses around foreign
policy issues. 22 its greatest
achievement has been to bring some
of the old Black leadership and younger Blacks concerned
with Africa to a common
understanding that new approaches must
be sought to change
the course of U.S. relations with
Africa. The Black Power
Movement has united Black citizens of all
classes
and

20 Ibid

.

P-

(N

21 Ibid

.

P.

21.

22 Ibid

.

P*

21.

o

•
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ideological persuasions
in the thought
tnat
y
that a powerful
now e i and
continued endeavor
or is the n
ni,
only
solution for involvement
of
Black Americans in
United States policy
towards Africa.
The Washington Task
Force on African Affairs,
a predominantly Black organization
situated in Washington,
o.c.,
essentially a local structure
purporting to make South
Africa its primary area
of concern.
The Task Force, since
its founding in November,
1969, aims to assist in
the development Of a broadly-based
constituency for Africa in the
United
States, and to ensure
prominent roles for Black
leaders in
participating in that organization.
^

A volunteer group, the Task
Force was intended to
function chiefly as a broad-based
organization within the
District of Columbia. The Task
Force embraced individuals
and groups having an active
interest in Africa and U.S.
foreign policy towards Africa.”
Prior to the November, 1972
elections, the Task Force worked
with Congress and other
organizations to include African issues
in respective party
platforms.
The first African-American National
Conference
on Africa held at Howard University
on May
25-26, 1972,

sponsored by the Congressional Black
Caucus under the leadership of Representative Charles Diggs,
was part of this under-

t issue
vol

III, no.

4

,

A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion,
(Winter 1973), p. 43
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taking.

In addition, the
Task Forcee has be
h en conducting
monthly panel discussions
with
ltn to
tonic,
P lcs ranging from the
emergence of Black Studies
65 to
tn the relevance
of mass communications to African
Affairs, 25 aS^ wen
well as U.S.
e
U q
foreign
policy

_^^

regarding Africa.

^

Although Africa has been
ization
main focal points, the
Task Force has actually
extended beyond Southern
African issues.
it feels that it is
important in terms of
constituency development to
broaden out
because if there is going
to be any meaningful
constituency
developed concerning Southern
Africa, it must
first be con-

cerned with general interest
in Africa.

Another mainly Black American
organisation concerned
with U.S. foreign relations
with Southern Africa is
the

Madison Area Committee on
Southern Africa. A number of
graduate students and faculty
interested in Southern Africa
organized at the University of
Wisconsin in 1970. Their first
step was to begin with an
attempt to elect political change
in
the Wisconsin area, then to
gain an impact on the political
processes within the United States
and Africa, and finally
center on the politics of Southern
Africa. 26
24 Ibid

.

P-

44.

25 Ibid

.

P-

44.

26 Ibid

.

P-

46.
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A basic assumption of
Committee members was
that to
effect change in Southern
Africa, they must rely
on the u S
congress because it is the
branch of government with
the
least amount of pressure
from economic interests. 2 ’
They
felt that the Executive
departments, especially state
and
Commerce, were more receptive
to pressure from powerful
economic groups with interests
in Southern Africa.
I„ order
to influence Congress,
it was important to
focus on community
leaders and congressmen to
articulate the desires of the
Zo
_
group
,

The Committee claims that
one of its more important
activities is fund-raising.
It uses the money mainly
to support liberation movements, and
secondly to perpetuate the
organization itself. it boasts of
raising considerable sums
for FRELIMO s Mozambique
Institute and its educational and
refugee work. The Committee is
satisfied that these activities
demonstrate the value and sincerity
of the movement. 29
The Committee for a Free Mozambique
(CFM) was organized in 1970 in New York City with
the twin goal of providing
1

material support to FRELIMO (the Mozambique
Liberation Front)
2

Ibid.

,

p.

46.

28

46
The anti “corporate and the information
nc of the S'
campaigns
Committee did not seek to change the policy
of corporations but to educate the leaders
of the community
who have some influence, some power to exert
vis-a-vis the
Congress
*

2

Ibid.

,

p.

46.
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and opposing u.S.
government and corporate
backing for „ Por _
tuguese colonialism...
The Comrnittee has no
8taff and
relies on a volunteer
working coaanittee to
carry out its
0
programs.

^

The committee's first
priority is to raise funds
to
assist the representative
of FRELIMO to the United
Nations.
In addition, the Committee
makes available pamphlets
on
FRELIMO and the liberation
struggle in Mozambique.
Besides
engaging in periodic
demonstrations at the Portuguese
tourist
office in New York and the
U.S. mission to the United
Nations,
the Committee's impact on
government policies toward
Portuguese Africa have been negligible.

Perhaps the most vital Afro-American
pressure group
operating in the United States
today is the Black Radical
Caucus, a spinoff from the highly
prestigious, but white
dominated, African Studies Association.
The Black Radical
Caucus claims the support of a
majority of Black scholars and
other Blacks in openly opposing what
they refer
to as "U.S.

imperialism, colonialism, and
neo-colonialism.
30 Ibid

.

,

p.

31

The

46.

At the 197 0 ASA meeting in Los Ancreles
P* 47.
Johnson, a black candidate for a position
on the ASA
eCt ° r S challe ed the Association to
take
up poli?ical°actin
cal action in ,the
n
struggle to liberate South Africa and
Portuguese Africa.
Declaring that the ASA record was "dismal
to the rea lities of imperialism, foreign
intrusion
d military suppression ..."
See an address by Willard R.
Johnson before the ASA Convention in Los Angeles,
California,
*

Hard^

'

in
R

^
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Radical Caucus also insists
on a legitimate study
of policy
questions and a firmer stand
on South Africa and
Portuguese
Africa, which they claim the
ASA had neglected in the
past.
The argument most loudly
propounded against the ASA
by the Black caucus still
remains the political one: As
an

academic organization, ASA should
not take sides on political
issues.
The political issues referred
to, of course, are the
ones raised at ASA conventions
since 1970 relating to D.s.
foreign relations with the "white
supremacy regimes in Southern
Africa and to the struggle for
independence, on the part of
colonials, in Portuguese Africa."
The Black Caucus charges
that "Aside from the fact that
some leading members of ASA
(undoubtedly with the knowledge of the
ASA leadership) have
contracted with U.S. government agencies
to do classified and
publicly restricted research in Africa,
the political argument
is refuted by the very nature of ASA. "
One does not have to be in total agreement
with the

statement above to understand that the ASA is
not just a professional association.
Its leaders perform other functions
that directly or indirectly affect the lives and
livelihood of
Africans and Afro-American scholars and students. Its
annual

meeting serves to bring together government officials, journalists, publishers, foundation representatives, businessmen,
32 LeMelle

,

op. cit

.

,

p.

20.
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scho lars

,

students and members
of voluntary
associatiQns

- -Hatton

6 DObS
'

r

ate reviewed
Its members are scholars v.
whose research not
only determines or
influences the image of
Africa in America
but also reveals the
kind and scope of much
of the written
and exchanged.

documentation available about
the continent.
fls Professor
Hercheile Challenor has
observed: "Research
completed by the
members of the ASA has
provided background material
for United
States foreign policy
decisions in Africa." 33
One positive result of
the controversy concerning
the
role of the African Studies
Association has been the
formation
of the Committee on Current
Issues, by the Board of
Directors
of the ASA.
as an attempt at compromise
between the ASA and
the Radical Black Caucus,
the Committee decided that
its purpose should be to promote
public awareness and discussion
of

issues that involve the role
and responsibilities of the
United States in regard to
Africa.
In other words, the Committee hoped to bring scholarship
and public opinion on Africa
to bear more directly upon
the formation of public policies.
To this end, the Committee
created a number of panels
to investigate the role and
responsibilities of the United
States in relation to Rhodesia,
South Africa and Portuguese
33 Herchelle

Toda^, vol. 16, nos.

-

Challenor, "No Longer At Ease," Africa
ca
5 and 6
p. 5.
,
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Africa.

At the same time, the
Committee would provide
for
increased participation of
Blacks on each of the
panels. 34
in addition to the
organization of panels, the
Committee on current Issues
decided upon several
educational and
informational activities: two
in particular 35
First, the
Committee would establish
a program for the
-retrieval and
republication" of materials
which involve current issues.
These materials would be
inexpensive and available in
bulk
for classroom and other
public uses. Also, the
Committee would
establish a subcommittee to
take responsibility for informing
.

members of the ASA about upcoming
governmental activities,
hearings in Congress, hearings
at the U.N. and other
pertinent
36
action.
The committee worked at
establishing a mechanism
for transmitting any information
that may affect decisions at
the Congressional level.
In 1971, for example, a task
force

was set up calling for Congressional
investigations of such
matters as the alleged use of American
supplied weapons by
Portugal against insurgents in Angola,
Mozambique and Guinea37
Bissau.
Mr. Richard Sklar, Chairman of
the Committee,

Richard Sklar, Chairman of the Committee
on Current
eetln g of the African Studies Associatio
*!' ^n,
l ^
November 4, f1971,
Annual Meeting Papers, pp. 5-8.
T

nu

35

Ibid

.

P.

5.

Ibid

.

P-

5.

37 Ibid

.

P*

8.
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reminded the membership
that: "The involvement
of a few
Africanists in executive
branch deliberations
in the past has
not brought about the v-i^a
f 3°vernmental
policies concerning
rica that an informed
public would demand." 38
.

Professor Goler

T.

Butcher, a member of the
Committee
on Current Issues,
expressed his pleasure at
being part of a
Committee "designed to
identif y current issues
retiring publlC n ° tlCe
and t0 k " ow
different approaches to
American policies are being
examined publicly and that
various positions are being
disseminated." 39
•

•

•

Mr.

Butcher alluded to the time
he accompanied
Congressman Diggs (identified
earlier) on a fact-finding
mission to Portuguese Africa
and South Africa: "This trip
demonstrated the need for a complete
revamping of the foreign

policy of the United States
toward these areas. u.S.
policy
pronouncements of abhorrence of
apartheid and colonialism are

accompanied by too many actions of
complicity with apartheid;
U.S. policy towards the
Portuguese areas accepts the myth
that the Portuguese are not
racists." 40
Mr. Butcher expressed the hope
that through the Com-

mittee "public awareness, and public
discussion will eliminate
38 Ibid.

,

p.

8.

39

Goler T. Butcher, staff consultant of
the African
les Association to the House
Subcommittee on Africa U S
House of Representatives, statement made
to the African ^dies
Sadies
Association, November, 1971, ASA papers,
pp. 13-17.
c u
.

,

.

4°

Ibid

.

,

p.

14.
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many ° f the P ° UCy cont
radictions " outlined above.
..Moreover, informed public
opinion can play a
determining part in
the shaping of u.S.
interests in these areas.
This is being
demonstrated by the anxiety
with which business
and military
interests are reacting to
the almost weekly
increase in the
number of groups seeking
y the racts
c
facts on tt
U.S.
involvement in
ortuguese Africa and in
Southern Africa."^
•

There is total agreement
among the members of
the
Committee with the remarks
of one of its members.
Professor
C. Sylvester Whitaker,
when he stated that:
"Underlying the
formation of this Committee
is the notion that the
Committee
must work with the realisation
that of all the potential,
ve, effective, political
clienteles within the broad
American spectrum, the Black
community represents the
greatest
potential interest in U.S. foreign
policies as they affect
African affairs and African issues." 42
i n order to work
toward this objective. Professor
Whitaker suggested that concerned members of the Committee
constitute themselves
as a

brain trust" and operate closely
with the Congressional
Ibid., p. 14.
Another good example of the imnartof enlightened public opinion on
American overseas policv
W en en t0r Edward Kennedy led a
liberal Democrat Party
fiaht ? the
ih
c
Y
fight
Senate
to discourage the adoption of the
Bvrd
Amendment to the Military Procurement Bill
(October 1971)
hich would have lifted the ban on trade
with Rhodesia.
.

m

Syivester Whitaker, Statement to the African
Studies Association, November 1971.
See ASA papers, p. 3.
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"Black Caucus,

thus enabling concerned
congress.en to relate
to their colleagues the
urgency and importance and
relevance
of various measures
affecting Southern Africa.
The 1972 Presidential
Election campaign was to serve
as a unique opportunity
for discussion of the
emerging crisis
in Southern Africa and
for the exploration of
useful
"

u.S.

responses to that crisis.

Richard Sklar, Chairman of
the

Committee, was authorised by the
Committee to appoint a subcommittee to plan such an effort
for the election campaign.
The work of the subcommittee
was to be referred to as
"Politics '72. 44

Politics

?

72

"

was to be viewed as an educational

effort.

The subcommittee did not endorse,
promote, or favor
any political party or any candidate
for office.
Professor
Leo Cefkin spoke for the committee
when he said: "The mission
of educating through the provision of
information to the

American electorate falls within the purview
of the African
Studies Association." 45
In referring to the struggles for national
liberation

being waged by Africans in Portuguese Africa,
Namibia, and
4

no.

1

Ibid

.

,

p.

3.

44 See statement by
J.
(Spring 1972) , p. 1.

45

Ibid

.

,

p.

1.

Leo Cefkin in Issue, vol. II.
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Rhodesia, Cefkin contended
that these independent
movements
"are justified and merit
the understanding and
support of u S
forei g n policy ,'<6
„
0ur aim t . tQ
parties
for national office in
that direction .
we see the „ PoU .
tics -72" as a center
for harmonising the
interests of members
who want and who are
opposed to apartheid, minority
rule,
colonialism, exploitation and
oppression. We would

_

^

.

.

i ike ' to

see U.S. foreign policy
work in support
4>7
African liberation

of-not against-

.

The failure of the Subcommittee
(Politics ’72) to
get a strongly-worded statement
in either of the Democratic
or Republican party platforms
in 1972 moved many black
representatives in the House to reveal
the almost total American
disinterest in African affairs.
One of the Committee's significant contributions took place
at one of George McGovern's
fund-raising cocktail parties. Members
of the Committee asked
McGovern about his policy vis-a-vis
the $400-plus million
Export-Import loan to Portugal. On the
basis of that confrontation, apparently, McGovern produced
a position paper
46

Ibid., p. 7
The task of gaining
national party platforms presented problems a plank in the
of a specific
an
lar ge, party platforms are written in
advance
the nationalf convention.
They are superficially debated
at the national convention and rarely altered
there.
.

47 See

Patricia C. Gloster, "Africans and Black Americans: Dialogue or Monologue," African Progress,
vol. I nn
(June 1972), pp. 26-27.
.
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saying that he would withdraw
aid to Portugal. 40
The Congressional Black
Canon*
„ a
aucus,
statement to the
President of the United
States, made the following
suggestions
With the purpose of increasing
African participation in programs which would lead to
the advancement of both
Africa and
Black America.
It called for an
adjustment of national
priorities away from enormous
military expenditures and
towards much needed domestic
programs, such as "economic
security and economic development,
community and urban development,
stice and civil rights, and
j
many other unfulfilled interests of the Black community

m

It was noted that "Europe,
Japan, Latin America and

the Middle East have all been
the recipients of massive
U.S.
aid for building and re-building
and stated they felt Africa's
turn is overdue." 50 it was argued
that Africa now must be
given priority and attention on an
equal basis with other
parts of the world. 51
The Black Congressional Caucus
concluded by stipulating

the following demands
1.
All military aid to Portugal should be
stopped and
the Nixon $435 million deal for
unneeded Azores bases should
be cancelled.

48 Cefkin
49

Gloster

50 Ibid.

,

op.

,

,

p.

op.

cit

.

cit

p.

f

.

y

p.

3.

26.

26

5

See J. Leo Cefkin, "Southern Africa and The 1972
Election Campaign," Africa Today vol. 19, no. 3 (Summer
1972),
,

p

•
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•
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U.N.

2.

sanctions aqainst

zl

t-hp

i

1

SI

t0 the
racial totalit^
Th U S 9 overn ment should act firmly to
press n q k‘
businesses ln South
Africa and Portuguesee ^rrica
Africa
?n take measures for
to
.r,
f nll „ n
*

•

,

!

.

The

“—

^

No D.S. company or its subsidiary
should be oiven
t0 «hite-minority-rulld
count rie S °of ^Africa
5

•

T**

With specific respect to Portugal,
the open letter
proposed that the United States stop
"the military aid which
enables it to suppress its colonies in
Africa, and discourage
private U.S. investment in Portugal.
Lastly, the Caucus called for Black Americans
to

mobilize support for the Black Caucus in Congress,
the Ad
Hoc Committee of Afro-Americans concerned about
U.S. policy
in Africa, and the African Studies Association.

time,

At the same

"we need to know what the thinking of Africans
seems to

be on these pronouncements.

We should be apprised of their

recommendations to make lobbying for increased international
aid for Africa as effective as possible." 54
52 Ibid

.

,

p.

62

53 Ibid

.

,

p.

62

54 Gloster,

op.

cit

.

,

p.

27.
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clear, as this chapter
has demonstrated, that

until recently Afro-American
interest in, and identification
with, Africa has been
limited and isolated.
The work of the
Congressional Black Caucus, the
African Studies Association,
and a handful of other
Black organizations, all
made up mainly
of Black intellectuals,
have had an important impact
on American foreign policy
formulation toward Africa; however,
they
have had little impact on
the mass of American Blacks.
The reality of the matter
is that, according to
Philip w. Quigg, there are only
five identifiable constituencies in the United States which
for better or worse take an
active interest in Africa. Quigg
defines them as follows;
"first, the professional Africanists,
academic and professional,
they are liberal, well-informed and
fairly influential; second,
black Americans whose increasing interest
in Africa has tended
to be cultural and tied up in the
questions of identity with
a view of the problems of the
continent restricted to the

relatively well-educated; third, the humanitarian,
missionaryoriented middle-American who gives money to
clothe and catechize native children; fourth, the self-declared
apolitical

businessman; and fifth,

(presumably the opposite of the first)

are the apartheid enthusiasts, partisans of
Rhodesia, old

supporters of Katanga secession, who are as vocal in the
ad-

vocacy of white supremacy as the first group is in its support
of independent black status
55 Philip W.
.

." 55

Quigg, "The Changing American View of
Africa," Africa Report vol. 14, no. 1 (January 1969),
pp. 8-9.
,
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It goes without saying
that each of these
constituen-

ts

perceives African affairs in
somewhat different ways
and the intensity of
their effect varies as
does its continuity and duration.
Professor Quigg tells us
that for each
group a certain set of
preferences exist as to the
nature and
content of a more dynamic
African policy and what the
notion
of greater involvement
56
means.
The focus within
the various groups, moreover,
may be found to be quite
disparate and the degrees of
sophistication reveal considerable
variance.
The particular area of
investigation varies appreciably from group to group.
"it is probably unrealistic
to
assume that these groups which
constitute Africa's constituency
the United States could be
aggregated for the purpose of
forging a single new dynamic policy
for Africa." 57

^

m

The

cleavage lines on issues, intensity,
geographic focus, and
overall political preferences are
such that a policy based on
the combined interests of all
five would probably be meaningless.

"

58

As an illustration of the above.
Professor Baker looks
at the question of colonialism and "white
supremacy."

Accor-

dingly, the professional Africanist and
"apartheid enthusiasts"
5

Ibid

.

,

p.

8.

57 See

Ross K. Baker, "Towards A New Constituency For
A More Active American Foreign Policy for Africa,"
op cit
p.

4

*

.

58

Ibid.

,

p.

4.

'
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both regard the colonialism
issue as having relatively
high
importance but each group
has a different policy
orientation
other, with the former
group favoring
decolonisation
and the latter being
supportive of residual
colonial power
or white-ruled regimes.
Accordingly, "the establishment
of a
constituency joining these
two groups on the issue
of colonialism in Southern Africa
would be infeasible." 59
Overall
orientation, then, becomes an
important element in
"the forging of a
constituency and the nature
of the constituency would have to be
refined by the addition of
an orientation variable." 66
It is necessary, according
to Professor Baker,

to pair
the overall orientations of
the various groups with
"discreet
issues" in order to determine
those questions which could
draw
together the largest feasible
constituency 61 For example,
"the overall political orientation
of all five constituencies
might not induce cleavages in a
coalition of these groups
.

when advocating a program of mass
innoculation against smallpox or a program of water treatment
to eliminate schistosomiasis." 62 Mr. Baker contends that
the sole area in which
^6
Ibid.

,

60 Ibid.

61

Ibid.

p.

5.

P.

5.

P*

6.

ueveiupment might also receive the support of
fou^
or more of the groups.
But it can be seen that the areas of
convergence of let us say, three or more groups on
unrelated to health or infra-structure are likely matters
J to be
minimal."
6

Ibid.

,

p.

6.
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* 17 h& ln a reem
9
ent is the
"politically-

all groups would
P

neutral h
e

rr

™

'

^
—^

-1 —fa -spiritual

area

of black

turai ties with Africa

<s

,

in „ hlch

who advo .

numer US of the constituency
groups) would prevail. "63
On an issue such
as colonialism.
Baker sees the African constituency
breaking down almost
totally.
The policy
ferences of individual
groups on other "politic
a ily- char ged
issues" would very likelv
kely result
rpquH in considerable
division of
opinion wh.011 Xobbvinrr
Obbying for government
policies in these areas. 64
The points at which
men America
AmpriVa'cs African
^
policy can be
influenced by all or part
of the constituency are
generally
four in number: Congress,
the state Department,
the Presidency,
and to a lesser extent
the National Security
Council. To be
sure, those points of
influence have within them
African constituencies which process,
modify, and articulate the
demands
of the "pressure group"
in a fashion "harmonious
with their
own operations and
."65
predispositions.
7\

.

CanlSt "

President Kennedy was himself
a "professional AfribY the stan <Jards Professor Baker
establishes. Members
63 Ibid

.

,

p.

6.
”

were limitlr^an/f
groups it is utJt

gr^r^d
65

emerg^

Ibid

.

,

p.

^
^
7.

If th ® ran e of governmental
options
?
runnin g high among competing
SOme P ° Ucy Which
3
single

^se,
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of Congress such as
Congressmen Brazier, Diggs
Morse an(J
others are also not only
recipients of constituent
pressures
but originators of
policy suggestions.
Likewise, "old Africa
hands" at the State
Department often have their
own welldeveloped ideas and policy
preferences
F^ibrences.
t-f «
if
one accepts the
proposition that it is likely
lik^iw +-k^+.
that i_u
the orientation of
the
President will cause
cau^p ’nim
k
mm to be more attentive to appeals
from
some outside constituencies,
so a President attuned
to cultural or humanitarian appeals
might be more inclined to
place
policy priority on humanitarian
concerns rather than those
of a more controversial
political nature.
,

,

It then becomes understandable
that the most dramatic
upsurge in interest in Africa
among black Americans in recent

times has tended to be more
cultural than political. Despite
Harold Cruise's admonitions
to Blacks to politicize culture, 66
and Bobby Seals’ stricture in
Seize the Time that "political
power does not grow out of the
sleeve of a dashikii," the
prime focus still runs to the cultural.
It remains to be seen
whether or not culture can serve as a
medium to insure political involvement in African affairs.
There is evidence that
it can be in the case of the campaign
of the black Polaroid
,

Company workers in Boston and their call
for corporate disengagement from South Africa, 67
66

Cruise, op. cit

67 ^

.

,

p.

33.

,

Robert C. Maynard, "Polaroid's Challenge: Racism
0rall y
Washington Post Outlook section, January 17,
.

J

'

1971, p. ^
47.

?n-i ?

,

J
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Despite the growth
potential of black
American groups
W1
Str ° n9 ° UltUral
d Unitarian
orientations towards
Africa, the potential
for politicizing
these groups, and the
enduring qualities of
the Professional
Africanists, 63 the
tactical advantage still
lies clearly with
African corporate
interests doing business
in Southern Africa,
and the supports,
of "white supremacy."
i„ Southern Africa.
Professor Baker
argues: "They are
well-disciplined, well-financed,
wellinformed, and disposed
to use their influence
to shape policy.
In addition, they have
the ear and the heart
of the Nixon

“

stration

In no recent instance
has their efficacy beer
as clear as in the joint
effort of business interests
and
.

conservative elements to amend
the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 so as to
allow the importation of chrome
from
Rhodesia in contravention of
the U.N. embargo." 69
Conclusion
Any discussion of what would
constitute progressive
policies that the United States
ought to adopt towards Africa
68 -

.

Baker characterizes
exhibitina a°"hroad gauged and abiding the professionals as
interest in the political affairs of fs ® con tinent
inasmuch
as their day-to-day
tasks Lf
1 regulre them t° possess
a
comprehensive knowledae of a
PmentS
Prof ® ssional Africanists (academics,
intellectua?s?
1
government bureaucrats, foundation executives
iourna??^
f
0re professional Africa-watchers thai
!"
ocner
other groups.
qrouos
See Baker, op. cit
p. 11.

f

J"

*

'

'

.

69
P ho
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Re lations

,

Con 9 ress, Senate, "U.S. Sanctions Against
H earings befor e the Committee on
Foreign
i
92nd Cong., 1st sess
J uly 7 and S
1971.
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ust take into account
the traditional or
historical split
between Af ro-American
intellectuals and
non-intellectuals
which has been a constant
source of conflict and
frustration.
that for the moment,
those Afro-Americans
capable
Of participating in
new relationships with
Africa are representative of the small hut
visible number of
Afro-Americans
who have benefited from
the relaxation of
American racial
exclusionary practices in
the fields of education
and the
professions. Remaining is the
vast majority of Afro-Americans
Who have not had the
opportunity to take advantage
of the
growing contacts between
the better educated
Afro-Americans
and Africans.
The inability to connect
the intellectual and
cultural concerns of the "elite"
of Afro-Americans with the
aspirations and direction of the
majority of Afro-Americans
represents not only the crisis of
the Negro intellectual, but
also reflects the frustrations
and limitations in developing
3 strong Africa lobby.

Specifically, one might list the
following issues as
being components of a forward-looking
foreign policy as perceived by Afro-Americans:
1
The avoidance of outmoded cold
war assumptions. The "logic" of the
cold war which has dominated the formulation of American
foreign policy at least
since the end of World War II is now
irrelevant in the minds
of most Afro-Americans as they do
not perceive Communism as
the threat it supposedly offers to the
"free world."
Policies towards Africa which are based upon
great power rivalry
(

)
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r other forms of
the cold war are
viewed by

Afro-Americans

to be detrimental
to Africans who are
capable of determining

err own needs and
policies;

,2, The second component
would
be the economic and
social development of
African people as
designed by African people.
The objective of u.s.
poii cy
towards Africa should be
one in which the benefits
of utilizing African markets
and resources would be
shared on an
equitable basis and would
be geared as much as
possible towards the economic
development and self-sufficiency
of
Africa.

Another aspect of a favorable
foreign policy would
be increased participation
of Afro-Americans in the
formulation and implementation
of American foreign policy.
This
would involve increased
recruitment of Afro-Americans
for
foreign policy positions and
improving and upgrading proced
ures within those agencies that
are primarily responsible
for American foreign policy
towards Africa.
In addition,

a task force created in the
executive branch comprising the

ranking members of the Departments
of state. Commerce, Defense
and other agencies would be created
to review in a comprehensive manner American foreign policy.
Added to such a task
force would be Afro-Americans of
recognized expertise on
Africa who are employed in the private
sector.
It would be
clear that no important policy would be
formulated without
continual input from Afro-Americans. Finally,
in terms of

participation, ideally there would exist an
"African lobby"
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as effective in its
work as the "Israeli
lobby" in its ability to influence policy
concerning Israel and the
Middle East.

Clearly, abstract appeals
to right, reason and
justice
are not enough.
Preferential status for any
state or group
of states arises from the
articulation of demands by an
authentic interest group.
Powerful constituencies both
within
government and outside have
successfully fostered a "forward
strategy" toward China and
the Soviet Union.
A "NATO lobby"
sustains and nurtures what is
now a largely symbolic military alliance. And even the
Iron Curtain is not an impediment to Polish-American groups
in their campaign to obtain
favorable trade concessions for
Poland.
The question, then,
is what are the chances of
moving America's Africa policy
off dead-center through the
development of a vocal constituency?
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CHAPTER

VI

THE UNITED STATES,
THE UNITED NATIONS,

AND PORTUGUESE AFRICA
The United Nations as
an outside force, in
which the
nations of the world attempt
to work out their own
individual
and collective foreign
policies, has not been a
convenient
tool of united States
foreign policy. Nevertheless,
because
the United States is
the most powerful nation
in the United
Nations, it has often used
that body to multilaterize
its own
policies, especially where
less-developed countries were
concerned.
Julius Holmes stated that the
United Nations constituted a "stabilizing force"
for African nationalism.
In
his words:
ter
P rovides opportunities for African
naPinnSi'
tionalism lto appeal to world opinion;
stabilizina
t
d Na i ° nS membershi
u P°n independence
P
crea?Is
reates aa°framewo
frameworkk off responsibility and
securitv for
new regimes. Mso it provides
the means for peaclfu?
olution of disputes, dangers of
external attack upon
d rS
nd a counterwei g h t to internal
pressure
build
build-UD
up for ?launching
n
unprofitable
*

*

’

projects^

Holmes stated further that the United
States was

willing to assist the stabilizing process
through financial
support of the United States Export-Import
Bank Development
Loan Fund, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the Expanded Program of Technical
Assistance in Africa
lsee Julius Holmes’ speech entitled "The
United States
and. Africa: An Official Viewpoint," quoted in
the Department
of State Bulletin Vol
38, May 26, 1958,
859.

^

.

,

.

p.
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°u th ° f thS Sahara
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States consiaered
the

th e ;
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"
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At leaSt

reasons why the

- tions

so critical in

were (1) the
possibiUty
tha
hat
t rampant
nationalism could
ouia lead to violence
and (2) manv
•

StatSS WOUld COme
tG independencs
grossly unpreeXamPle
1953 ' ” allaCe IrWln
'
**lie slrvi1C at
Unlte<3 StatSS
M1SSion to the united
Nations,
l
in a speech
at Elmhurst College,
referred to Woodrow
Wilson's
letum that the fight
for liberty must be
more than "an insurgent madness in blood.
And. in his discussion
Qf
lution of emergent
nations, he suggested
that the word "revolution" could mean
violence and destruction,
and that it was
up to the United
States "to see that
explosive political
forces of our time are
directed into peaceful,
constructive
channels.
In that effort the
United Nations is a real
asset. "3
Frederick w. Jandrey, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs, contributed
to the implication that
the
Africa Bureau took much
of its early policy
direction from the
European Bureau. In a
speech at Georgetown University

ZZ T

'

^

^

-

^

^

in

March, 1958, he distinguished
between United States support
for ''self-determinism"
and United States support
for nationality.
Jan drey stated that some
dependent territories should
2 Ibid

.

P*

878.

Ibid

.

P-

878.

4 Ibid

.

P-

866.

3

,
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not become nations
evoking the "dangers of
premature inde _
pendence
He pointed out that
5 new states
were vulnerable
to subjugation and,
although independence
too long delayed
harmful, he cautioned
a policy of evolution
toward
independence with thp
SUb3eCt territory being
guided toward
independence by the metropole
x.

Bloc Politics: Organizing

For Participation

While it is true that the
United states has, along
with other developed
nations, exercised a controlling
influence in the United Nations,
it is also true that
this situation has changed with the
increase of new states in the
GenAssembly.
The following statement by
Irwin Wallace shows
the situation as of I960*

wealth.
But in practice the leadership
?
of the h
big powers in the General
Assembly is just as evid5n£
mUCh th ® Same patience there as
elsewhere
in the worJdTg
In 1963, Sidney Bailey,

scholar on United Nations

affairs, observed that doubling the
United Nations membership
made it a more cumbersome body. 7
Earlier, Lincoln Bloomfield
5 Xbid

.

,

868.

p.

^^artment

Irwin „
Wallace

of state Bulletin

.

,

p.

875^

7

,

Vol

.

38, Speech by
y

lj2e_U nited Nations: A Short Politi cal
Guide (New
York: Praigir^ T963 ,157~T77
)
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had also pointed
to the implication
not only of the
increased
African, but also of
the Afro-Asian
group in the United
Nations
San Francisco^onference^the'^Af 0
CUS
Fr ° m 10 at the
r ° -a
Asian membership has
grown to 46 and will
soon
were two African
1
spates sou^ofth^ ?* Where there
now 20. Add Cuba
Sahara, there are
and Mexico
d > comes very
a numerical majority
close to
Add
the
c
to 9, plus Yugoslavia
bl ° C grown from
5
and onfv
6 m
make up the crucial
are needed to
aAd
°f?
decisive"??
decisive 23 in the General
bl V-8
Assem*

i

Y^

'

The effect of African
independence was an erosion
of
influence and control
exercised by the great
Western powers

Manor concessions had
been made to African
representation in
the Security Council
and it was clear that
the presence of
Africa resulted in
substantive emphasis on new
African issues
as well as organisational
business in the General
Assembly

Establishing Political
Machinery
African states found very
quickly upon entry into the
United Nations that unless
they were well-organized,
they would
not be effective politically.
The first step was the African
Caucusing Group which was formed
pursuant to Resolution XI of
the Accra Conference of
Independent African States in April,
1958.
This agreement, drafted in May,
1958, after the Conference, was signed by the
Permanent Representatives to the
8

Lincoln Bloomfield

(New York: Harper and Row,

Ne w Diplomacy in the United Nations
1970)
p. 247.
7

,
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United Nations from
Ethiopia, Ghan a, Liberia,
Llbya Morocco,
Sudan, Tunisia and the
United Arab Republic.
it provided
for a coordinating body
wording through a
Secretariat at the
United Nations which would
act on matters of common
concern to
all African states,
making recommendations,
and implementing
decisions of the future African
e
Conferences,
as well as making
preparatory arrangements for
9
them.
For these purposes the
tion established the
Informal Permanent Machinery
of
the Secretariat.
,

,

Although the African Group
was the primary caucus,
were others. For example,
the Commonwealth caucusing
group dealt informally with
Afro-Asian-Anglo
matters; the

Afro-Asian group was primarily
interested in Middle Eastern
and Northern African problems,
within the African continent
by the end of 1960, two
primary groupings of states had
emerged
which were to be reflected in
African politics from time to
time within the United Nations.
The "Brazzaville group," as
it came to be called, was
composed of the former French territories and was a generally more
moderate, more Europe-

centered interest group.

The "Casablanca group" was smaller

and generally more radical in character
(Morocco, Ghana,
Guinea, Mali, Libya, Algeria, United
Arab Republic). Until
this time the Afro-Asian states had a
rather neutral status
in world affairs.

^Thomas Hovet, Africa In The U nited Nations (Evanston,
Illinois: Northwestern University Press,
1963), p. 79.
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Africa Establishing A
Political Posture
The Bandung Conference
once in 1955 had
provided the AfroAsxan states with a
framework of "neutralism
and nonalignment „
as a course to follow
in world politic..
Oespite this, at the
Accra Conference of
Independent African States
in April, 1958.
the Ghanaians drafted
a memorandum which
posed the following
questions "On what pattern
are we going to model
our foreign
policies- -isolation ism-non-entanglement?" and "Shall
„e adopt
an independent course,
or Sha11
sh^n WG allow
n ourselves to
be caught
up in European affairs
when our interests are
dissimilar,"
The result of conference
deliberations on the questions
of
foreign policy was a
condemnation of the division
of the world
into two competing blocs
and African states were
urged to follow a policy of nonalignment. 10
other Asian states, such as
India, consciously following
the non-violent principles
of
Gandhi, also counseled that
"neutralism" should be a key ingredient of African policy. But
African leaders who could not

m

:

'

accept strict neutrality on
issues which affected them
either
directly or indirectly, opted for
"positive neutrality." The
late President Sylvanus Olympio
of Togo
said in 1961, for

example,

"Thus we have chosen to be neutral
in all issues con11
cerning world blocs."
The same year, Doudou Thiam (former
10 Ibid

.

,

p.

31.

Philip Quigg, ed.
p.

299.

,

Africa (New York: Praeger, 1964)
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Sm . wl

,

„a

hua

of t#>

wki

the United Nations
floor:
r

S

on

cSunC"^^^ V
S«

W ° blocs is expressed
by the di!fe?ent
fully scrutinized.
must
=«espeak
and others of
p °^ b:lve neutralism"
"non-commitment"
tlU others of "nonalignment." what is
mula but the reality important of course, is not the forof inapno's
avoid using ambig^L
therefore
Llms SSchT''6 ° PenmUSt
tQ criticis ">When we speak of
Positive
6
ber that it is impossible Neutralism
firSt remem to be nel^a^
The course which
we have chosen is not
a neutral nn^ 11
l'-18 a
attitude, a specific
P oli tical
* S
?
action,
regard to the
problem of peace.
l2

^

^

'

m

Although Asian and African
countries had adopted a
"positive neutrality" doctrine,
the United States had a
more
difficult time accepting this
position. But by the "Year
of
Africa" it would achieve
acceptance in both the Eisenhower,
and later the Kennedy
Administrations. President Eisenhower,
on September 22, 1960, at
the opening session of the
United
Nations, speaking to the United
Nations General Assembly, asked
that all nations respect the
African peoples' right to choose
their own way of life and to
determine for themselves the
course they choose to follow."^- 3
One major effect of the United
Nations anti-colonialism
was to encourage the revolutionary
element in the "non-selfb2 General Ass
embly Official Record s, 16th Plenary
^
Meeting, noT 1012 September 22,
1961, p. 43.
.

,

13 Public

^Papers of the Presiden ts of the United States
AXI^WTidemar Nielso A,
P- 707.
Th^Grpflt- P owers and Africa (New York:
ghej3reat
Praeger, 1969), p. 275.
lelson s interpretation of this about-face in
President Eis e n^

^

governs

territories."

As . result

,

^
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became increasingly
subjected to two kinds
Qf
and the other,
territQries cont
ie
y revolutionaries, growing
agitation by nationalist
parties
encouraged and sometimes
financed from abroad>

“

_

^

-

^

^^

mpnsonment of leaders, and
more agitation.

in

^

the

Onited Nations, pressure
took the form of
resolutions against
colonial powers.
It was at this point
that Portugal became a
member of
the united Nations in
1955.
The colonial powers fought
tena-

ciously against encroachment
by the General Assembly
on their
sovereignty in the non-self-governing
territories.
In the
previous year, however, the
Bandung Conference of Asian,
African, and European Communist
countries had passed a resolution condemning colonialism
"in all its manifestations"
and
declaring that "the subjection
of peoples to alien domination
exploitation constitutes a denial
of fundamental human
rights, is contrary to the
Charter of the United Nations,
and
is an impediment to the
promotion of world peace and cooperation .
Portugal felt that the United Nations
Charter was
being used to hasten decolonization
and wanted to avoid this
howei's attitude toward African neutralism
and self-determinahis administration is tied to the
political vulnerability of his Administration
on
these
issues
during the election of 1960.
tion, coming so late

D

m

i

Macmillan! 1964)"'pp? 6-7?

Se

'

SgHnants of Em Pire (New York:

etati0n ' 15

oToT

—

DStermined n0t t0 SUbmit
t0 the
° niai p ° wers
'

°

*

r
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y non self-governing
territories
t0rles

-

“lienee

d the POSSesslon

An 9°la,
Mozambique, and
i

h,a

,„ tll
Portugal tev lseg lts g
0nstieutiotl in 1951 ana
reintrQ _
oed the term provinces,"
a term used prior
to 1910.
Portugal claimed that these
overseas areas could not
be considered
non-self-governing territories,
since they were part
of the
national territory, a
unitary state governed
by one constitute. franco Mogueira, the Portuguese
foreign minister, wrote
"this constitution did
not recognize the
existence within the
nation of non-self-governing
territories, and it would
be unconstitutional for some parts
of the nation to have
one international status and others
a different one.
The interpretation
and application of its
constitution was a question of
each
government alone, and the
Portuguese government denied
the
United Nations the least
competence in the matter." 16
consequence, the Portuguese did
not consider that Chapter
19

m

XI of

15 Ibid

.

,

p.

’

7.

*

..

e

Anti colonialist voices in the
United

a d m ° re numerous than
colonialist ones
The Cnf^d
?
1 3 M ? ons Platform
tends to compensate for the nationalicio' ?
lack of

U

established diplomatic
Rv !!»?
By
gaining recognition as parties to an and propaganda facilities
international dispute
10
1
slren 9 the ned in their dealings with
"
Por-'
t
tugal
?? mf
9
ust! also be remembered that the term
"non-selfgoverning" was not explicitly defined
by either
ral ssemb1 ^' despite repeated attempts the Charter or
to do so by
y
°cn?
^ members.
anti -colonial
,

•

T
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the Charter applied to
them, and they had no
intention of
supplying information as
17
required by Article
7 3e

.

In the face of this
act of defiance,

the General Assembly made the first of
several attempts to establish
a committee
define the obligations of
member states under Article
73e.
Through behind-the-scenes
negotiations a committee would
be
established to study and
enumerate "the principles which
should guide members in
determining whether or not an
obligation exists to transmit the
information called for in Article
18
73e."
on December 12, Resolution
1467 (XIV) was passed by
a 54 to 5 vote, with 15
abstentions.

The twelve Principles, when
published as Resolution
1541 (XV) in mid-1960, made a
clear case for calling Portugal
to account. 19 The drafting
committee had been divided between

administering (Netherlands, United
Kingdom, United States)
and nonadministering territories.
In the case of territories

geographically separate as well as ethnically
or culturally
Franco Nogueira, The United Nations and
.
Portuaal
(London: Sidgwick and Jackson',
1963), p. 78.
tTs a univ erdoc tnne that the United Nations has no
competence to discuss the Constitution of
member-states. As an
organization of sovereign States, the United Nations
must
respect the territorial composition and structure
of each of
member —states as laid down in the respective
^
Constitution
at ^ the time of its admission.
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
isbon,
Portugal Replies in the UnTted Nations " Impresensa
Nacional 1970, pp. 5-6.
,.

T

,

.

,

18

Ibid

.

,

p.

6

19

See, for example, the speech of the delegate of Iraq,
G eneral Assembly Official Records 15th Session, 4th Committee,
1036th meeting, November 4, 1960, p. 1117.
,
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distinct fro* the
"etropole, there was
a
prima facie obu _
gation on the part of
the administering
uthorrty to ttransnut
authority
20
information.
Th „ re could
be no derogation
from these
obligations if there
were considerations
affecting "the relationship between the
metropolitan State and
the territory
cerned in a manner which
arbitrarily places the
latter in a
position or status of
subordination.
."21
..

••

1

.

Portugal rejected both
the report of the
Committee of
Six and the General
Assembly resolution that
arose from it and
argued the reasons in a
long statement during
a debate of the
Fourth (Trusteeship,
Committee in the same session
of the
General Assembly.
The basic argument of
Portugal was that its
relations
with its overseas territories
were regulated by the
national
constitution and the United
Nations had no authority to discuss national constitutions;
to do so would be flagrant
interferenCe ln the lnternal affairs
of member states, which was
20 Ibid

December

1

1

.

,

1117.

p.

Ge neral Assembly Resolution
1467

'

(XIX,

Ge neral Assembly Resolution
1541 (XV)
This pha s e of the General Assembly's
cone
Wi h
overwhelmin
approval
of
9
the P?incip£es a^d th ® specific
f
enumeration of nine territories
(six in Afrirs)
Portugal had an obligation to transmit
information
Angola Mozambique, Goa, Macao
3
and Srnor?

December 15, 1960.

T

^

,

'

'
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expressly forbidden by
Article 2(7, of the
Charter
Pur
re
has aiwa
a d ministering
powers
to Which of their
territories the Declaration
in
Chapter XI applied and
on which they
Y were win;
Wll lmg to
,
transmit
^
ormation
"For the General
Assembly to assume that
function
tG P° rtUgal WaS *
clear case of discrimination. -24
The correct interpretation
of Chapter XI, in the
Portuguese view, could be
arrived at only by examining
the
Chapter within the context
of the Charter.
it could then be
that there were no
provisions for international
supervision in Chapter IX and
X (on international
economic and
social cooperation, and
Chapter XI. According to Dr.
Nogueira
this made it clear that
the latter had a different
character.
He has argued:

;;7

“
"

«

—

- --

'

.

.

1"
order to apply
and administer the international
truo*
rusteeship
system, it
had established the Trusteffhi^Vf
unci
lBut
no organ had
been created for the
th^ c„cf
SYStem of non-self -governing terrifnn'oc
it
at aS re
this s?s?lm Se
Charter fad fot
° n the
"
part of tte
Tn'tt™

1

duties
“Sifs
23

"T" “
U^teHSs
f

,

Ulate
?™
to assume

Nogueira

,

op.

^

“

cit

^s

dations,^

Sarfe^r-

given responsibilities

.

#

p.

.

.

.

But

82.

?

24
Article reads, in part, as follows:
"Nothing containea <„
S presei t Charter shall authorize
the
United
?
Nations to intervene
i
f
in matters

which are essentially within the
domestic [jurisdiction of any state or shall
requirl tfe memUbmit such natters to settlement under
the present
Charter
.
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^

nothing even remotely
similar- i o
in
110
of the non-self
f ° r in the case
-governing
torritor
United Nations concerning
The role of the
1
9 the latter
was evidently i n tended to be passive.
'

.

25

Portugal

troubles at the United
Nations before I960
were rnsrgnif cant
compared with those
serrous to Portugal was
the develops in
the United Nations
of the idea that a
..colonial

^^^ ^

situation., is, in itself,
an

aggression that automatically
condemns the ad ra inistering
power
-d justifies an y action taken
against it.
Pepeated attests
were ma de b y the
Afro-Asians to have the
Security Council
declare the situation in
the Portuguese provinces
a "threat to
peace."
Were this done, it would
be possible to apply
Chapter VII of the Charter,
which provides for sanctions
and,
in the last resort,
military action against the
offender. 27
The Assembly was at this
point firmly in the control
Of a growi ng anti-colonial
majority. Only nine states
(includ2

P
a
m
gal, Dr. Franco Nogueirf
at the
Committee of the General 'Assembly

1
,

Minister of PortuF
??® ° Urth

February "?

^

5

•sr&aws,

2

f5

BS =?*= “S24: SSmS

See the Security Council
Official
Tol^ll||5l_fecord,
1st v
Year, f
1st Session, no. 27~mhMlitTH?r
*

27

*

"

38?
A similar attempt was made in the
P
0 Q _ or
case
of Rhodesia at the end of 1965.
However, it was the
V nmen
hat inA P ri1 1966 successfully invoked
Chapter
p ter vi
VT°r
fe its oil blockade of Beira." This was
1 to justify
P rst instance in the history
of the United Nations when
tho Security
^
Council authorized economic sanctions backed
by
f
‘

*

-,

'

.

'
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ing Portugal and the
United States)
ares) abstain
a
abstained—
mostly because
of differences over
means, not ends-on
the m aj or Declaration
on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial
Countries and
Peoples.
Resolution 1514 was passed
by the fifteenth
General
Assembly in December I960.
The importance of this
resolution
as underplayed by
the fact that it has
become the standard by
which the Assembly judges
all colonial matters.
it has come
to represent a crucial
extension of the United
Nations role
in the decolonization
process.

After a long preamble that
concluded by proclaiming
"the necessity of bringing
to a speedy and unconditional
end
colonialism in all its forms
and manifestations," the
Declaration called for "immediate
steps to be taken in trust
and nonself-governing territories that
have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers
to the peoples of these territories, without any conditions
or reservations.
," 29
.

James

J.

Wadsworth, Jr., the United States
representa-

tive, gave as the reasons for
U.S. abstention that the resolution remained silent on the
contributions of the colonial
powers, including the United States,
to the advancement of the

dependent peoples,- that, by insisting on
absolute independence,
it ignored the provisions made by
the Charter for self-government
within large political units; that the
principles would result
in political fragmentation and fly in the
face of political and
28 Wohlgemuth,

29 Ibid

.

,

p.

op. cit

12.

.

,

p.

12.
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sconomic reality*
ty, fthat, contrary
to the statement
of the third
principle,
adequate preparation tor
for self-government
self
was a
matter of elementary
prudence~
that the
th
keeping demand for
the immediate tranqfpv
r ° f POWer lgnored
need for time in
e progress toward
independence; and that,
since every territory was different,
no single timetable
could be imposed on
all
.

.

.

None of this reasoning
persuaded the General
Assembly
that "Portugal was not
preparing its territories
for selfdetermination. "32 while the
resolution

^

a recommendation, its
firm tone foreshadowed,

^

^

in 1960

,

the

increasing militancy of the
Assembly with regard to
Portugal.
In Africa, with the
rise to independence of
the Belgian
Congo, "the first flame
of African nationalism
licked the very
borders of Portugal's richest
territory, Angola." 33 By
March 15
1961, rebellion broke out in
Luanda, Angola, to be followed
by
increasingly well-organized
nationalist resistance in the
other
African territories.

—

I960.

~

ItiQn 1514

(XV)

'

December 14,

tional preparedness should never serve
.
nrof f for
a pretext
delaying
independence." For a full text n? fnf
resolution see, A/PV/947
(December 14, 1960), p 21.
'

31

Wamhouse,

op.

cit

.

,

pp.

32 Abshire and
Samuels, op.

11-12.

6-7,

cit

33wohlgemuth, op. cit ., p. 13

.

.

,

p.

379.

,
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On the same day, the
Security Council met
at the
request of its Afro-Asian
members tQ
An9 ° la
A resoluti
introduced by Ceylon,
Liberia, and
the united Arab Republic
called on Portugal as a
matter of
urgency to introduce
reforms that would enable
the Angolans
to exercise the right
to self-determination,
and it also proposed the creation of a
subcommittee to study conditions
in the
territory.
Although supported by Russia
and the United States,
olution failed, because of
abstentions, to obtain the
necessary votes.

“

-

-

^

U.S. support of the
resolution came after thorough

consultations between the U.S.
delegation to the United Nations
and the Department of State,
and after specific approval
by the
Secretary of State and President
Kennedy. 35 United States
tion up to this point had
been one of restraint on
colonial
issues; for this reason the
United States had abstained from
voting on the declaration of
colonialism. Nevertheless, American support of the Security
Council resolution was interpreted
a repudiation of the position
taken in December I960 by the
outgoing Eisenhower Administration
on the question of anticolonialism. Essentially the same
resolution was subsequently
34 ^ited_
Nati o ns General Assembly Resolution urn
_
(xv)
pril 20,
1 9617^ The General Assembly
called upon the qovernment of Portugal '•to consider urgently
the introduction of
measures and reforms in Angola for the
purpose of the implementation of General Assembly Resolution
1514 (XV)"; decided
to appoint a subcommittee of five
members to conduct such inquiries concerning Angola as it deemed necessary.
,

f act that the United States supported
this resolution is highly significant.
It indicated a change of policy

.
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submitted to the General
Assembly,
.
where
y
ere it was
wa adopted
_
overwhelmingly, the United
States
tes aagain
„„4
voting i n favor.
In the following
weeks in puoiic
public statements
throughout
e COUntry ASSlStant
SSCretary
StatS f ° r ^ican
**.1™
c M ennen Williams
repeatedly called for
Portugal to make
step-by-step preparations
for self-determination
in its African
The American position
was welcomed
enthusiastically
Afro-Asian diplomats because
it involved a risk
of rupture
the impending
negotiations with Portugal
for continued rights
Of U.S. access to the
strategic facilities
acuities of the
th
Azores, which
were due to expire in
1962
'

,

.

.

,

"

'

.

outbreak of rebellion in
Angola on March 15 placed
Portugal in the forefront
of U.N. concern, a
position that,
along with South Africa
and Rhodesia, it has
occupied ever
since.
The General Assembly has
discussed the Portuguese territories under two main headings
"The situation in Angola,"
and the Non-compliance
of the Government of
Portugal with
Chapter XI of the Charter of
the United Nations." While
Angola
was the only territory where
nationalists had resorted to outright rebellion, the first issue
received the most prominent

—

treatment; since then, "with the
spread of revolution and increasing belief that continued
Portuguese rule is the root
e

e

ment of Adl!?
"ited Nations!

election of President Kennedy and the
appointSOn
StateS delegate to

“

^

36 Abshire and
Samuels, op.

cit.

,

p.

382.
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0f thS V1 ° lenCe

the general question
of Portuguese
1Cy
"
311 ltS territ ° ri
^s come to the fore."37
Prom
961
1968 Sight reS
by the general
y ' fiVe
the
Council all critical
of Por gal s overseas policy
and demanding radical
change. 38 Por t uga 1 has
shown no si cm
^
i
9
complying
with any of these
resolu-

"

^

“l

'

-

'

*

“—
—
—‘t*
,

tions

.

An account of the
debates will indicate
the attitudes
adopted at each stage by
the major powers.
While the Soviet
bloc and the Afro-Asians
consistently voted in favor
of the
the United States and
the United Kingdom—
acting
in concert on every
occasion but two-sometimes
approved,
sometimes disapproved, and
sometimes abstained from
voting. 38
Following the first General
Assembly debate on Angola
on April 20, l 96 i, the
Security Council
on

^

^ ^^
y

consider an Afro-Asian
resolution calling on Portugal
to
desist from repressive
measures" in Angola and to give
every facility to a United
Nations subcommittee of five
to
investigate the situation in
Angola.
Opposing the motion, the
Portuguese contested the right of
the United Nations to inter37 Wohlegemuth,
38

op. cit .

,

Abshire and Samuels, op

p.
.

13

.

cit

.

,

p.

380.

381
The authors state that abstention
"is
nC° n nlent C° UrSe ° pen to a world
P°«er
like ,ne
the united Ita^a
rs so many
States, with
:
ramifications to ife
oreign policy that some are bound
to conflict."
’

frequentlvH^'l'eaae

.
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fere and asserted that
Portugal was the
petra tor, of "unbelievable
savagery" and:

^^^

were aliln-inltigated^n^follow^ recent events in Angola
la
our borders; secondly,
Prepared out side
this action bro u ht
!k °n a
wave of terrorism in
merciless
?
northern »mni
P ° la
where
peoples were victims of
peaceful
savaao
terrorists— and those peaccfn? atr °cities committed by
P
pe ° ples Were both black
and white; thirdly i n
l
national community 'should T!jj ary Justice, the interP ° n ventS in their true
light that is, pure
terror?^
^
S ° le purpose of
causing intimidation chaos
a< tlon and death
territory of a Member State- fn
to the
r
fourthly,
the light of
the Charter and car^vi
similar questions +-vL r Ut t he practice of the u.N. on
" 0t ° CCUpy itself
With a P?ob?em
Sl'intLnarordefr^
1 order and security
of a Member
State. 40
f

J

—

^

^
^
m

^

After two days of debate,
the Security Council adopted
resolution, softened by a
Chilean amendment expressing
a peaceful solution, by
9 votes to 0, with
Britain and
abstaining. Two of Portugal's
NATO allies, the United
and Turkey, voted in favor. 4

the

hope of

Prance
states

On December 19, 1961, the
General Assembly, with U.S.
and British approval, once
again condemned Portugal for
failing
40

statement made by the Representative
of Portuqal at
fiih meeting of
the 96
956th
the Security Council on June
9
1961
ge£U£ity_C ouncil Resolution 4835 June
9, 1961.'
,

4

Comme nting on the debate, Arthur
Krock wrote in the
June 13, 1961: "The perplexity of the
ernment c ^eated by the Afro-Asian activity United
in the
United Nations against the Portuguese
in Angola grows out of
1G w lch require ^e Kennedy
Administration to try simul?aieo ? ^ r de
h ° rses galloping in opposite directions,
Our fundLie°ifandame ntal military alliance in NATO, and
its strength,
do^
pen greatly on the unity which this
government is ever
urging.
Our fundamental diplomatic policy is
to demonstrate by
votes
the U.N. and otherwise that the U.S. unreservedly
supports movements for the independence of peoples
everywhere."
Quoted
Abshire and Samuels, op cit
p. 388.
v
^
^York^nes,
at

^

-

T"

m
m

.

.
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to comply with
Chapter XI of the
Charter and "refusinc
retusing tto sup_
P y information as
_
required by
Y it "42
But on this occasion,
„
debate was
.

'

.

overshadowed by India's
invasion of Goa on the
Previous day and the
fruitless efforts of
the Western powers
to obtain any support
for a "cease-fire,"
or even an expression
a '" PP
1

'™

<—11.

'

—

„„„

«*.

mitted several "worried
appeals to the Security
Council before
the fact, and two
hasty Council meetings
were held while the
fighting continued.
Portugal's failure to
obtain any resolution of support for a
cease-fire-., a result of
a Soviet veto
and African and Asian
opposition-is perhaps the most
flagrant
example of what Portugal
sees as the United Nations'
double
standard of condemning Portugal
while condoning the

acts of its
As the Representative of
Portugal at the 944th
meeting of the Security Council
on March 10, 1961, pointed
out:

opponents."

“sSs ££” “SI S' S—irs-,2,s™
t

u?.-s

—
ss —

j;
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42

December
with ChaoS It
General
43

h

“ r,

-1 H;

r—

°J

Ilc

S^S
iral Assembly Resolution
mPllanCe
tH^vernment
n

tl

K

°f

o?

Wohlegemuth, op. cit

$?.
.

1 699 (XVI)
o TPo rtugal
D “ ited Nati ° nS
" lth

27.

p.

44

^_Nations__Gene r al Assembly Resolutio n
1699 (XVI)
goo Por1:uguese
pnrf
See
Representative GaFin s statement to the 944th
meeting of the Security Council on March
10, 1961.
*

,
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'

1962

'

the General Assembly
re-opened

guestron of Angola and
considered, for the
first time, a
demand presented by
Poland and Bulgaria
for sanctions against
Thrs resolution was
rejected in favor of an
AfroAsran resolution that
reaffirmed the inalienable
right of -the
Angolan people to
self-determination and independence,
deprethe repressive- measures
against the people of
Angola and
called upon Portuguese
authorities to desist from
these measures.The Assembly decided
to continue the
_
•

Sub co[mnittee
on the Situation in
Angola; and, requested
states to use their
influence to secure Portugal's
compliance with the present

resolution; more importantly,
the Assembly requested
"members
and those of the
specialized agencies to deny
Portugal any
support and assistance which
might be used by it for the
suppression of the Angolan people. "47
The United States including
all the NATO group except
Prance supported the resolution.
In a statement before the
General Assembly, Adlai Stevenson,
the U.S. Representative to
the United Nations, cautioned
the Assembly against the use
of
force to effect changes in Angola
or any other colonial territories

January

° nS General Ass emblv R esolution
1742

1

46 Ibid

47 Ibid

.
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Our most earnest
wish i? fu 3 a
erS ° f the United
WS should w°rk
together to
^o
k? movement
exorable
ln the U rea t i n toward freedom and
nd also to keep
SSlf
determia
ation
that
peace— difficult thoughmovement in +-h
reatlve P a ths of
those path^of
often seem ... Our
feelings that peaceful
S
h ° Uld take place
these lines are confirmed
along
bv i-h Report of
ntittee on Angola
the sub-comthe
P ° rt " otes the announced
forms initiated by
rethe Portn
Se Governra ^t in
this would seem to
Angola
?
reflect
so^
63
Of Portugal of the
b
the ^ernment
nled to ad iust its
Y
?policies
realities of the sih la fin
to the
and
the
national community.
°P ini °n of the inter48
j.

10

L^w

.

L

.

fd^r?^

According to the Ngwjforkjer
aid Tribune commenting
on January 26.
"Stevenson's warning
apparently took account of
two sources of anxiety
in the United States
and among its
Western allies: the fear
that countries of black
Africa might
really try to form a
military command to intervene
on the side
of the Angolan nationalists
and the apprehension that
the Soviets
mrght send 'volunteers’
to Angola, carrying the
seeds of war to
Africa. 49
,

Portugal's response to the
resolution in the General
Assembly took the form of a
direct attack on the United
Nations
Sub-Committee on Angola:
re r
f
Nations Sub-Committee thus
reflects in ?t,
whrch from the very beginning has
characterized Se dia
cussron of the matter illegitimately

conductefin the

48

United States-United Nations Press
Release 8914
the
a tmeat
.St ate Bulletin
March 5, 1962,
^g£also
PP.
;Q0)
rr J3955 390)
y
See
American Foreign Policv°
Lurrent
Y rnrrent
D ocuments , 1961, pp. 884- 88b,
889-690.
,

.

rl

d

,

~

49 Quoted

in Abshire and Samuels, op. cit.

,

p.

382.
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Organization.
it is cHrmi-p'
condemn the initiative
th report d oes
not
!
h
massacred innocent and Lk^by^he^
lnvaders
who brutally
defen^T
Y
report is based almost
Clvilians
the
whoUv
on
h
lY
heresay allegations
false charges
and
•

.

.

.

•

-

50

The Portuguese
representative accused
the United Na tions of closing its
eves
eyes to fu
these and other
aberrations. As
an example, he made
reference to the time
Xndian troops
^berated'. Goa in December
1961 and the fact that
this ..Xndian
aggression was condoned
by
6 n
Y the
U m
N ">a:>°rrty."
The failure of
the Security Council
to order 3
a ceasecease f«rre in Goa
caused Adlai
evenson to declare: "We
have witnessed tonight
an effort to
rewrite the Charter to
sanction the use of force
when it
purpose
This approach can only
lead to chaos
to the disintegration
of the United Nations. "51
‘

-

.

In 1946,

.

.

^

_

the Indian Congress Party
took the decision

to annex the Portuguese
state of Goa.

The Indian Government
called on Portugal to hand
over Goa and its dependencies.
On
April 12 I960, Portugal
petitioned the International
Court of
Justice on the question of its
right to access to the enclaves,
and the Court upheld
Portugal's sovereignty over the
territ0rlSS and itS right to access
to them.
The Indian Government
,

50

“

the Genera ^Assembly ^January
30 ^

This

p

|^® sentative

^^4

Ga rin before

^urk^t^'u^rd
n
m n the United S tat 8
?
Ind ?a° in Goa Damao
D
* Diu; called
and
for immediate cessation
of hostim?!:
lltleS Called Up ° n India to withdraw
its forces immed?^.?fi
ely to P osl I.
tions held before December 17,
1961;
urged partles
parties
to work out a permanent solution
to their differences
'

,

.

usfoTfo^eT*

not only did »o t respect
this judgment

^^
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^

^

unilaterally declared the
annexation of t he Portugese
enclave!
Without any consultation
with the local population,
pinally.
on March 14, 1962, the
Indian Government declared
the annexation of Goa, Damao and
Diu by a unilateral act
of its Parliament, as it had done
earlier with Dadra and Nagar
Aveli.
This
was done without
consultation with the populations
concerned
and without any reference
to Portugal or, for
that matter, to

the United Nations. 52

On December 18, 1961, the
United Nations Permanent
Representative of Portugal, Vasco
Vieira Garin, addressed a
letter to the President of
the General Assembly and the
President of the Security Council,
in which he was moved
to say:

meant the General Assembly
has since then not only ignored
the question of Goa Ind
its dependencies but has
actually prevented its discussion
the General Assembly.
in order to do this
it
has resorted to a subterfuge,
which consists in alleging
at, in a certain committee
9
report, Goa and its deoen50 " 11
33 ''-tionally 'united" with thf
Indian Union ...
SdiaTunfon"
the United Nations, basing itself
on
and entlrel y arbitrary phrase
(nationally
united)
in a mere committee report, tries
to condone an act of
e
a e ti0n ° f
fundame "tal Principles
oi its own

and^^Se^

m

^

^

.

ciartef i !

? 53

^

he relevant documents on the case of Goa
have been
published ^
by the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
in a
White Paper comprising four volumes entitled
"Vinte Anos de
Defesa do Estado Portugues da India."
i

.

53 See
p.

274.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, op. cit ..
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When the matter of
the Portuguese
territories was next
-sea, at the ena of
the U.N. Ceneral
Assembly went
even further than it
had in the past.
A resolutions* aS
p sea
on December 14,
condemned the attitude
of Portugal as
inconsistent with the United
Nations Charter; reaffirmed
the
inalienable right of the
peoples of the territories
under Fortuguese administration to <^if
P t0 self-(^ e termination and
independence;
urged the Portuguese
government to: recognize
immediately the
right of the peoples of
the territories to
self-determination
and independence; cease
immediately all acts of
repression and
Withdraw all military and
other forces at present
employed for
that purpose; promulgate an
unconditional political amnesty
and establish conditions
that would allow the free
functioning
of political parties within
and outside the territories
with a
view to the transfer of power
to political institutions
freely
elected and representative of
the peoples; and grant independence immediately thereafter to
all the territories in accordance with the aspirations of the
peoples.
The resolution further requested all states to
refrain from offering assistance
to the Portuguese government,
and to take all measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms
and military equipment
to the

Portuguese government; and requested the
Security Council, in
54

December

-

General Asse mbly Resolution 1807

(XVII

)

,
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^^

the event of noncompliance
with the resolution, „
tQ
appropriate measures to
secure compliance." 55
This was the first
time since the opening
of the
debate that the United
States and Britain both
defied the
majority by recording
a negative vote;
they repeated the
performance a few days
later when a further
resolution. 55 relating
cally to Angola, requested
the Security Council
to take
all appropriate
measures, "including
sanctions, to obtain
57
Portugal s compliance."
one can conclude that
it was the
demand for sanctions,
hinted at in the first
resolution and
explicitly stated in the
second, that led the
United States
and Britain to object.
Once again the General
Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable
right of the people of
Angola to selfdetermination and independence
and supported their demand
for
i mmediate independence.
The General Assembly requested
the
e
S
ad
ed b 82 to 7, the
seven agaiHi^being t he United n
°^
Y
S tat
tbe
Unlted Kingdom,
France, Belgium, South Africa
Africa, Spain, and Portugal,
with 13
abstentions!
'

56

„

gg£g£gj^Ass embly Resolution 1819 (XVII),
December 18
t

moment , "thf

^alk

aroLed

ai

'

^

6 5

6

57

,

\

-

op?™^

and^Abshire^

1

^thf

63
Ld
Uni^Natfons
the idea was being canvassed of
neXt ag inSt the Por tuguese in
Angola
Inch
0

tead^ar^ers^n
,^ "!!™
Leopoldville
iffw 1
i
Se

ha^A^thag

?

'

'

^ “

•"

Samuels

.

T P ld

382
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har

Compulsory action can be taken only
en SO in cases fa
under
,^'
cLptL
f
r
that 13 in cases of threat to the
peace brpLh
nJ f\
each of
the peace or act of aggression.
The question
L..,,'
Is Portugal's policy in its provinces
in
a potential
potent
threat to international peace and security? Africa
..

„

-

P-

V^of^h^b

•

'

r

'

-

'

^g

250

Security Council to take
appropriate measures, including
sanctions, to secure
Portugal's compliance with
the present
resolution and with the
previous resolutions of the
Assembly
^
—
and the Council. 58
1

In July,

1963, the Security Council,
at the request of
thirty-two African states,
met again to discuss the
Portuguese
territories and to hear a
delegation representing the
OAU.

meeting was also attended by
Portuguese Foreign Minister
Nogueira, who rejected all
accusations against Portugal, and
went on to attribute the
trouble in Angola to "a vast
network
of foreign interests, ranging
from governments, political

parties and even business enterprises,
endeavouring to disturb
59
the peace in Angola."
The Portuguese Foreign Minister
went
on to invite African Governments
to "send their qualified
representatives or leaders whom they might
name to see for
58

General Assembly Reso lution 1819,
expressed th<”g“°«l.to
implemen
t
the provision!
of^heY aration on the granting of independence
to colonial
counfri P Q a d P eo Pl e s contained
in General Assembly Resolution
15^4 (XV) of
£ December 14,
1514
1960, and its refusal to implement
Resolutions 1542 (XV) of December 15,
1603 (XV) of
pnl 20, 1961, 1654 (XVI) of November 1960,
27,
1961
and 1742 (XVI)
"
n
1962
y 30
Constitute a source'of international
a a
33 WSl1 35 3 Seri ° US threat t0 world
peace and security?"
h
C

™T

f

’

'

'

Statement made by the Representative of Portugal
(Foreign Minister Dr. Franco Nogueira) at the
1042nd meeting
of the Security Council on July 24, 1963,
quoted in Portugal
2
Replies
the United Nations pp. 3 47, 354
.

m

—

,

.
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^

themselves the conditions
in the Portuguese
overseas terria
to examine f ° r

"

a nd

Y

Ch haS n ° thin9 in

scribed here by some ." 60
lnVltatl ° n

with what has been
de-

like a similar one
subsequently made
ecretary-General, WaS refused
The meeting ended
with
- e adoption
of a resolution^
by 8 votes to 0 „
,
ith
United States and the
United Kingdom abstaining.
The Security
'

to

-

^

Council rejected Portugal's
claim that its territories
are
overseas provinces of
the metropole; determined
that the
situation in the territories
was seriously disturbing
peace
and security in Africa;
called upon Portugal to
recognize the
rl ght ° f PSOPleS °
f ltS territories
to self-determination
and
independence ; requested all
states to refrain from
offering the
Portuguese government any
assistance which would enable
it to
continue its repression of
the peoples of the territories
and
to take all measures to
prevent the sale and supply of
arms and
military equipment for this
purpose to the Portuguese government. As part of a Security
Council resolution, the last
demand
was mandatory, even on countries
that abstained from voting
for it

.

62

60 t

,

.

,

Ibid.

61

,

p.

354.

Security Council Resolution 5380

62 Ibid

,

July 31, 1963.
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United States Ambassador
Q+Adiai E
Adlai
F
Stevenson
explained
the U.S. abstention
on tne
the basis that the
resolution was
drafted "in either9 gS ° r f ° rm best
^lculated to achieve
° rSSUltS Whi °h W6
311 SSek 33 quickl
y and as harmoniously
as possible
while the United States
*

,

,

.

.

.

^^^

.

provisions of the resolution
just adopted, we do
agree with much of the
substance of the resolution
and have
from the very infancy
of our republic believed
in the principle of self-determination
of peoples.
We firmly believe
that the developments
we all want can be
achieved and can only
e achieved in an
orderly, peaceful manner
and without further
violence and suffering on
both sides as a
^ consequence
of such
negotiations conducted in good
63
faith ."
.

.

.

-

AS to that portion of
the resolution calling
upon member states to refrain
from the sale or the supply
of arms and
military equipment to Portugal,
Ambassador Stevenson reminded
the Council of the United
States' longstanding policy
of providing no arms or military
equipment to Portugal for use in
its territories.
Mr. Stevenson concluded with
the expressed
hope that other states would
exercise a similar restraint,

avoiding actions of any kind which
could further increase the
qr a).„.=

“statement by Ambassador Adlai
r

n

of Vo?e ln ?he

uL
PP

307 308

?

E. Stevenson, United
SeCUrity Council, In Explanation
Territories Resolution (United States
Nations Press Release no 423~2 ~ July
31,
partm ent of State Bulletin August 19,
1963,

^
poriu
Portuguese
e

'

^

,

°

-

.

.

,
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™

assure that the solution
will
64
means
.

fully
90 w

„

•

throu 9h peaceful

^December,
reso utron

1963, the General
Assembly adopted a
by 91 to 2 (Por tu
g al and Spain against,
with

abstentions, including
the United states
and the United
Kingdom, again
renting the Security Council
to take action
this time to give
effect
feet to
t„ its own
decisions of July. The
Council met on December
11 and, in a new
resolution^ (passed
by 10 to 0 with France
abstaining) called on
members to comply with its July
resolution.
It reguested the
SecretaryGeneral to promote
negotiations with Portugal
and report back
in six months. 67
The following day the
New York Times reported
that
"African delegates welcomed
the fact that the United
States and
Britain, which abstained
on the July 31 resolution,
voted for
it today. "68
64
P-

65

Genera^ Assembly Resolution 1913
(xvttt,

1963.
66

S ecurity Cou nc il

December

3,

i

1963.

Resolution 5480 (XXII,

.

December 11,

67.

Ibid

.

68,

See New York Times

,

December 12, 1963,

p.

27.
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The December 11 Spmrif,,
Security Council
Resolution was met by
a K1
blistering attack by the
Port,,™
y
Portuguese
representative at the
1083rd meeting of the
Security Council. Foreign
Minister Dr
Franco Nog ueira criticised
the Security Council
for failing to
deal with problems
"which do affect peace
and security, or
which may affect peace
and security in the
world." 69
.

tion of Berlin ^fo^exara^p 5 rom time to time, the quesb ® comes a subject of
concern and fear to all IL
deep
th ® Se urit ^ Council
simply chooses to ignore
it
°we al^
^
1
gr< e that
a war going on between
there is
f
f*
North =
c ° Ubh
“ Nam
S
Vlet
Council has not found
But the
?
enou gh or interesting
enough to debate.
70
'

,

'

i,"

-

-

.

A few weeks before the
meeting of the Security Council,
African delegates to the
International Conference of
Public
Education at Geneva had walked
out as a protest against
the
presence of the Portuguese.
This was the beginning of a
campaign designed to exclude
Portugal from participating in
any
agencies of the United Nations
and other international organizations.
This was followed by Portugal's
explusion from the
United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa in 1963.
About
eighty delegations (of the
Afro-Asian and Soviet blocs) walked

Portu gal Replies in t he United Nations
_
d
367
Tn
reply to the Foreign Minister of
Tunliia who had delivered a
Portuga1 the Portuguese Foreign Minister
stated "wlre'T
acce Pt Mr. Slim's (Foreign Minister of
Tunics)
WS W ° Uld h3Ve t0 believe that
is not
ob °
only
nly ?hreh
threatening peace and security in Africa Portugal
but in
the whole world as well.
I ask this Council: does anyone
here
1
bel eve honestly believe, that Portugal
is
consi"nff® threatening
he peace of the world
Does this
Cnun^T
tha my ountr y is m °re dangerous to the
f
peace
?
of the
h ® wnrfd^h
” ld than situations
such as those I mentioned at the
°u t s
'

.

,

L

'

i5:

•

7 ° Ibid

.

,

p.

367

.

•

•
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United Nations Trade
and Development
Conference in
April 7 1964, in protest
against Portugal when
its
delegate began to speak.
The adoption of a
resolution in
1965, by the executive
committee of UNESCO, barred
Portugal
from taking part in the
International Conference of
Public
Education and the International
Conference on Illiteracy.
During the 19th World Health
Assembly in May, 1966,
Portugal's
right to participate in
the Regional Committee
for Africa and
in the regional activities
was suspended. 71
,

^

In 1964

the General Assembly was
paralyzed by a dispute over the question of
payment tor
for peace-keeping
v
operations,
and most of its time was
occupied in maneuvers to prevent
the
Union, as the chief defaulter,
from being expelled from
the organization.
The United Nations Committee
on Colonialism
adopted a resolution by a vote of
20 to 0, with four abstentions (Australia, Britain, Italy
and the United States) urging
Portugal to comply with previous
U.N. resolutions on granting
,

independence to its overseas African
territories, and calling
for a study by the United Nations
of foreign economic interests
in those territories which may be
"impeding" the granting of
independence. The Manchester Guardian reported
that "...
during the current debate much has been
made, particularly by
the Soviet representatives, of the
activities of British, American, and West German business interests in
Portuguese Africa.
71 World

May 27, 1966, p.

Health” Organizatio n, Press Release WP/31,
4.
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These

it was suqcrestpd
ted, are maklng
fabulous profits under
present regime and have
an active interest
nterest in preventing
,
,
the
independence of the
territories "72
,

,

•

.

On July 21, 1964,
the Organization of
African Unity

“° pl “

"h°

““

““>“*<»
'‘ r “ ay a °” “
“

up„„

....

„a
trade relations withWith Pnrfimni
Portugal and, South Africa
and to refuse
them the use of African
airports and harbors.
A second resolution urged all oil
producing countries in
North Africa and
the Middle East to
refuse oil hipments
to Portugal and South
Africa ' J
.

With the exceptions
stated above, discussion
of the
rtuguese territories had
to wait for the summer
of 1965
when the U.N, Committee
on Colonialism (Committee
of TwentyFour) visited Africa,
and received delegations
and petitions
from thirteen nationalist
parties from the Portuguese
territories.
seven were Angolan, three
were from Mozambique, one
was from Portuguese Guinea,
one was from the Cape Verde

Islands,

and was one from Sao Tome
e Principe.

the Committee, by 18 votes
to
dom) with three abstentions
7

Manchester

7

July 22,

l

if

,

T me
4
p

(United States and United King-

(Australia, Denmark and Italy)

G uardian

(L0nd0n>
.

2

At its final session,

'

,

July

3,

JUlY 22

'

1964, pp. 12-14.

1964

^

Monde (Paris)

,
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adopted a resolution 74
criticizing the NATO
countries for
thexr alleged support
of Portugal and calling
once again for
sanctions. Ambassador
Stevenson of the United
States, while
observing that he could
not accept the Portuguese
view that
"self-determination meant the
agreement and consent of
the
Population to a certain
political structure, type
of state,
and administrative
organization," said that the
United States
was against violent
solutions and still believed
in persuasion.
The British representative,
who had been under fire
over Rhodesia, took the same line.^~*
The Portuguese representative
directed his comments
that portion of the resolution
criticizing NATO countries
for supporting Portugal:

tions

n <?t s Upplying any armaments,
any muni-

or

6 Lr USS
and supply 93 percent of our own
military
'requirements and needs.
and what is more the accusing
delega9
tions seem to be thinking in terms
of vast minify
nS ln largS areas which is
certainly not the
caII? 7 g°
1
o^side^hr^^aphlcL^L^?
.^
facture
.

^ir

.

'

This was the prelude to a new drive
against Portugal
during the 1965 session of the General
Assembly.
In November,
74
Tllri

p

lf)

1

75

^
.

,

ted Natlons Document A/AC 109/124 and
Corr. 1,

Ibid

76

Portugal Replies in the Unit ed Nations p. 394.
Earlier on May 7, 1965, Senegal had requested a
meeting of the
United Nations Security Council to consider the
"repeated vio.

,
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however

the Security Council
rejected an Afro-Asian
At
demand
ror an economic boycott
oycott nf
of Portugal, and
the United states
,

.

and

^United

Kingdom both abstained
from voting on the
resou lon
finally adopted. The
Security council, ending
ays of debate on the
Portuguese territories,
passed a resolu .
ion 7-0, with Britain,
Prance, the Netherlands
and the United
States abstaining,
asking "all states to
refrain from q£
Portugal any assistance
which would enable it
to continue its
repression of the people
of the territories
under its administration." The resolution
also ashed all states
to take the
necessary measures to
prevent the sale and supply
of arms and
military equipment and
materials for the manufacture
and maintenance of arms and ammunition
to be used in the territory. 78
Having failed to obtain a
vote for sanctions in the
rity Council, the Afro-Asians
made another bid in the
Assembly, where they succeeded,
on December 18, in putting
through a resolution 79 calling
for a world-wide economic and
arms boycott of Portugal.
The resolution contained the
following provisions inter alia:
(1) a condemnation of "the
colonial
policy of Portugal and its
persistent refusal to carry out the
f Senegal s air s ace and
P
territory" by Portuguese
antho?iV°
9
authorities operating from Portuguese
Guinea.
.'

?7
19fiS

„

rit y Council
~also. The Times

78 Ibid.
79

1965.

,

p.

R esolution 218/218 November
23,
(London), December 24, 1965, p. 7.
.

7

Gener al Assembly Resolution 2107

(XX)

,

December 18
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resolutions of the
General Assembly and
the security
Security c
Council."
An appeal to United Ma+-atl ° nS mSmbers to
take the following

m

•

‘”‘" t

‘

'>

*«“*> •« «

diplomatic
closing of their
ports to Portuguese
vessels;
rSfUSal
transit facilities for
Portuguese
aircraft; M) a boycott
on trade with Portugal.
(3) An appeal
to Portugal
NATO allies to ban
the supply or sale
of arms
ammunition, and military
equipment to Portugal .'80
T he vote
this time was 66-26,
with 15 abstentions and
10 countries
absent.
The small majority
against Portugal indicated
that,
while almost all members
of the United
united Nations were willing
to
condemn it publicly, only
three-fifths were prepared
to contemplate action against
Portugal, despite the fact
that most
of them would not have
been affected by it.
similar resolutions continued to be
voted in 1966 and 1967 with
no new
development, except that, in
1966, the General Assembly
recommended that the World Bank
and other specialised
agencies
(b)

^

“

•

not cooperate with Portugal,
a recommendation that
was
respected in 1967. On April
9, 1966, the U.N. Security
Council adopted a resolution, 81
by a vote of 10 to 0 with
5 abstentions, endorsing Britain's
use of force to prevent ships
from
coming into Mozambique ports
with oil for Rhodesia. Once
again
on December 16, 1966, the U.N.
Security Council, by a vote of
8 0 lbid

.

8

Abshire cind Scunusls. op. cit
tcm
q__ Senvcal
n
Assembly R esolution 2107 (XX) Decembe
r 'll; 1965.
r-

.

n
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11 to 0 With 4
abstentions

(Soviet Union, France,
Mali

Bul _
garxa), imposed mandatory
sanctions against Rhodesia.
The
Portuguese Government made
public two letters sent to
United
Nations Secretary General
Thant by Foreign Minister
Nogueira
on February 3.
One letter stated that
the sanctions imposed
on Rhodesia had caused
Mozambique "serious financial
and economic prejudice, calculated
at some $28 million." The
letter
asked that consultations
begin to determine "the
manner of
payment of the compensation
to which the province of
Mozame
has
a right.
q
The second letter questioned
the validity
of the sanction resolution
in light of the abstention
of two
permanent members of the Security
Council (Soviet Union and
Prance) and questioned the
Council's power to legislate
against such international conventions
as freedom of the seas
and the right of landlocked
countries to access to the sea. 82
Portugal, which together with South
Africa, had upheld
freedom of trade with Rhodesia,
claimed that the blockade was
a

repudiation of the notion of neutrality.

,

Dr. Nogueira

bluntly described his country's relations
with the United Kingdom as bad, because England had "used
Portugal as a scapegoat
in a situation for which Britain knows
we have no responsi-

bility

.

As a result, in February 1967, Portugal became
the

first country to invoke Article 50 of the United
Nations
82 Portugal Replies
in the United Nations, p.

395
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Charter by claiming almost
$10 million in compensation
from
the united Nations for
"serious financial and economic
prejudice to Mozambique" resulting
from the imposition of
sanctions
against Rhodesia, a lead which
was subsequently followed
by
both Zambia and Malawi. 83

'

By November 1968, both
the strength of the General
Assembly resolution and the
voting pattern changed. Previous
references to Portuguese policy
as a "crime against humanity"
were dropped, as were requests
that the World Bank suspend
loans to Portugal. As an example,
on November 21, 1968, the
General Assembly Trusteeship Committee
adopted a resolution
condemning Portugal s refusal to
grant independence to Angola
and Mozambique.
In comparison with resolutions
adopted in
past years, this one was much more
moderate.
It did not contain any threat of sanctions, and
perhaps for this reason
the resolution received a larger majority.
The American ambassador to the United
Nations, Arthur J.
Goldberg, in an address made before the American
Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, conveyed what
was to be the United

States' attitude toward the Portuguese territories,
for the

latter part of the 60s, when he said:

Portugal is a longstanding friend and NATO ally of the
U.S.
But, regrettably, our close association is clouded
by our differences over the future of these territories.
83 Irving Kaplan, Area Handbook
for the Republic of Sou th
Africa (Washington, D C
U.S. Government Printing Office, T971)
.

p

.

162

.

.

:

,
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bodies^h^Ued^ions^f
Council.

in various
dlng
the
Security
Speakinc for
!
c
S
ateS
1 have made
clear, as have my
it
predecessors?' that we
support the riqht of fho
unequivocally
h
peoples of Angola and
to self-determination.
Mozambique
'

Portu 9 al end
representativefofthe^ricln stat
These contacts
ended, unfortunately without states
baSlc issue
remains what it wafin the
. a form ula
f nd
which the peoples of
by
the right of self-determination
spirit of the
United Nations Charter.
Q „
-

“tT??

-

in^^spL^of

84

Ambassador Goldberg went on
to state what, in his view,
would be a workable formula
for resolving to everyone's
satisfaction the problem of the
Portuguese territories.

"The first
Step, in our view, is for
the parties to commence a
genuine
dialogue on the basis of
recognition of the principle of
self-

determination.

This is the indispensable way
to a peaceful

solution of the troubles which
afflict these two territories.
The United States, as a friend
of Portugal and the peoples
of
Angola and Mozambique
win continue to do all it can
both in and out of the United Nations,
to facilitate
.

.

.

such a

dialogue

m

85

Once again

m

1969 relations between Portugal and
the

United Nations became strained when the
Security Council
adopted three resolutions on the complaints
submitted by
84 Address
a

before the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa at Washington, D.C., November
26, 1968.
See
Depar tment of State Bulletin of December
1, 1968, p. 290.
8

Ibid.

,

p.

290.
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Zambia

Senegal, and
na Guinea,
„
Guinea 88 censuring
Portugal for
"attacking villages in the
three territories."
,

Commenting on the moderation
of the language of
the
resolutions, Le Monde
reported that, "even if
other attacks
rred ... it would
probably be much more
difficult
if not impossible, to
find the necessary majority
for the
applications of sanctions
against Portugal, rather
than censuring it.
Sanctions touch on economic
interests whereas
condemnation does not.
m87
.

Seymour M. Finger, u.s.
Representative to the United
Nations, summarized the
position of the Nixon Administration
when he stated that: "In
Angola, Mozambique, and
Guinea-Bissau
we see the last remaining
major areas of the African
Southern
Hemisphere which are still dominated
by a metropolitan

power-

Portugal.

Let me say

.

.

.

that this is an anachronism in
the

modern world.

The United States firmly supports
the right of
the people of Angola and Mozambique
to self-determination." 88
Mr. Finger expressed the view
that the problems of

Southern Africa require the utmost
patience.

"First of all,

^Security Co uncil Resolution

2 68 of July 28, 1969
Re solution 273 of December 9, 1969 (Zambia)
Resolution 275
December 22, 1969 (Guinea).
,

c
(Senegal)

,

87

^?

Le Monde (Paris), July 30, 1969, p. 15.

88 o

Seymour M. Finger, U.S. Representative of the
Nations Preparatory Committee for the Tenth Anniversary United
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial of the
Countries and Peoples, United States-United Nations
Press Release,
April 17, 1969.
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it is clear that countries
outside Southern Africa are
in

general not prepared to wage
the major and probably
catastrophic war which would be
required to dislodge the regimes
now in power." 89
other words, as odious as the
denial of
human rights and self-determination

m

in this area was, the

U.S. did not believe that
the situation in the Portuguese

territories represented a threat
to international peace and
security
During the years 1970 through
1972, the United Nations
Special Committee on the Situation
with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples
(Special Committee of TwentyFour)
took up the cudgel for the granting
of independence
,

to

the Portuguese territories.

In a series of resolutions the

Committee of Twenty-Four aimed their attack
at what they
termed "massive aid from the NATO countries
and the military
and economic support Lisbon was receiving
from the United
States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
United
Kingdom,

and France."

9

A recurrent theme in these resolutions reflected the

judgment that the NATO governments would have to dissociate
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid
9

See Special Committee Resolution AC. 109/362, August 18,
1970; Resolution AC. 109/364
September 25 ,'“197 0. Department of
State Bulletin (October 1970)
vol 17.
1

,

,

.
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themselves from the insurgencies
in the Portuguese
territories, the objective
being the isolation of
Portugal at
both the political and
military levels. The
resolutions maintained that the NATO powers
were a decisive factor in
Portugal's
ability to continue her
colonial wars. Moreover,
"it must
also be underlined that
Portugal's grand design is
strengthened
by the colonial alliance
between Portugal, South Africa,
and

Southern Rhodesia.
The United States representative
to the Special Committee, commenting on the
resolution, recalled that his delegation had repeatedly expressed
its profound conviction that
the peoples of Angola, Mozambique,
and Guinea-Bissau had the
inalienable right of self-determination.
But his delegation
remained convinced that the situation
in the Portuguese territories differed markedly from that
which prevailed in say
Southern Rhodesia. The United States
therefore considered
that the Committee's approach should
be tailored to the specific circumstances in each case.
The American delegation continued to express the belief that the best
way to pursue the

goal of self-determination for the peoples in
the territories
under Portuguese administration was through
persistent peaceful efforts to find common ground.
The resolution adopted by
the Committee did not "contribute to this objective.

On the

92see Special Committee R esolution AC 109/364, September 25, 1970.

~

'
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contrary, it would help
to strengthen the
hand of those in
Portugal who opposed any
meaningful search for a
peaceful,
negotiated compromise. In
addition, the resolution
was based
number of assertions which
the U.S. delegation
did not
share and it would therefore
cast a negative vote. "93

During its meetings in
September 1971, the Special
Committee adopted three
resolutions concerning visiting
misto the territories in
Southern Africa, and territories
under Portuguese control.
The language and tone of
the resolutions reflected the United
Nations- insistence that
Portugal
take steps in granting
independence to its "colonial
dependencies
.

On September 14, 1971, the
Special Committee adopted
a ten-power resolution
relating to the Portuguese
territories,
which it reaffirmed the inalienable
right of the peoples of

m

Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau)
and other territories under
Portuguese domination to self-determination
"in accordance with
the provision of General Assembly
resolution 1514 (xv)
.

it

condemned the persistent refusal of the
Government of Portugal
to implement Resolution 1514 (XV)
and other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security
94
Council.

93

Seymour M. Finger, U.S. Representative of the Committee of Twenty-Four, United Nati ons Monthly
Chronicle,
Vol. VII, no.

9

(September 1970)

94 Uni ted
*

,

pp.

18-24

“

.

Nations Special Committee Resolut ion of
ber 14, 1971, quoted in United Nations M onthly Chronicle, SeptemVol. VIII, no. 9 (October 1971)
pp. 71-72.
,

267

The resolution reiterated
its appeal to the
military
antes of Portugal within the
North Atlantic Treaty
Organizatron to discontinue mil
itary assistance of any
Government of Portugal, and
to prevent the sale or
supply of
weapons, military equipment
and material to Portugal
which it
perpetuate its colonial
domination in Africa." An
important provision in the
resolution dealt with the
transmission of information from
Non-Self-Governing Territories
under Article 73e of the
Charter. The Special Committee
eplored that, despite the
repeated recommendations of the
General Assembly, the Security
Council, and the Special Committee, "Portugal, having
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing
Territories, had not transmitted
the required information in
compliance with Article 73e of
the Charter." 95

^^^

The United States Ambassador to
the United Nations,
Charles Yost, explained the United
States* opposition to the
resolution by arguing that since 1961 the
United States has

maintained an embargo on all arms for use in
Africa by any of
the parties involved in the disputes over
the Portuguese territories.
"Our military assistance program to
Portugal, a

NATO ally, has in recent years arranged only
$1 million
year.

a

This assistance is used to enhance Portugal's capabili-

ties in antisubmarine warfare and air and sea defense." 96
95 Ibid

.

,

p.

72.

96 Ibid

.

,

p.

73.
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in a key resolution
adopted by the Security
Council on
ecember 8 1970, Portugal's
NATO allies were
petitioned to
stop military aid to
Portugal.
The
,

resolution also asked
NATO
countries to discourage
their nationals from
making agreements
w ach would support
Portuguese domination of
Angola, Mozambique
and Portuguese Guinea,
and in particular to
cease any activity
related to the construction
of the Cabora Bassa dam
in Mozambique.
The representative of
Portugal at the United
Nations,
Ambassador Garin repeated
rpnoafo^i the
reservations that his delegation had always expressed
concerning United Nations
(and
subsidiary organs) resolutions
on the Portuguese territories.
"This year. United Nations
resolutions had been drafted in
terms that were much more
extreme and violent than those
adopted at previous sessions ." 98
The Portuguese representative could not see any
advantage in such an approach.
Such
,

.

'

resolutions almost invariably
disregarded the arguments put
forward by the Portuguese delegation
explaining in detail the
direction, objectives and realities
of Portugal's policy.
"It was an elementary principle
of justice," stated the Ambassador, "that the views expressed
by a party to a dispute
should be taken into consideration
before any attempt was
made to pass judgment ." 99
Securd-ty Council Resolutio n
by a vote of 11 to u with 4 abstentions290, December 8, 1970
(France, Spain,
United
rea
F
Kingdom, United States).
'

98 Ibid

"ibid.

'
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Ambassador Garin repeated
his earlier remarts
in
stating that the
establishment of an atmosphere
of respect
°n the part of all
nations is imperative
if Portugal is tQ
create the spirit of
mutual trust and friendship
in Africa
vrtal to the maintenance
of peace and stability
in Southern
Africa
"Such draft resolutions
such as the one under
consideration make this- impossible 10 °
.

.

Ambassador Yost maintained
that charges that Portugal
is diverting u.s. arms
to Africa are untrue,
charges that
U.S. military assistance
frees substantial resources
for use
in Africa were unfounded.
Reports of U.S. arms in the
Portuguese territories, when
investigated, according to Yost,
invariably proved to be World
War II or Korean War vintage
articles long since passed out
of U.S. control. 101
On November 14, 1972, the
General Assembly on the
recommendation of the Special Committee,

adopted Resolution

2918

(XXVII) which affirmed that
the national liberation

movements of Angola, Mozambique,
Guinea (Bissau) and Cape
Verde were the authentic representatives
of the "true aspirations of the peoples of the territories
concerned."
It

recommended that, pending the accession
of those territories
100 Ibid.

101 See Statement
by Ambassador Yost (U.S.)
States-United Nations Press Release 190 December United
8, 1971.
r
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independence

,

all Governments,
the S p ecialized

^

and other organizations
within the United Nations
should, when dealing
with matters pertainin
g to the territorres, "ensure the
representation of those
territories by
the liberation
movements concerned an d
in consultation
with
the Organization of
African Unity (OAU)." 102
The Assembly deemed
it imperative that
negotiations
should be initiated at
an early date between
the Government
Of Portugal and the
national liberation movements.
The
Assembly expressed its
concern for the full and
speedy implementation of the Declaration
on decolonisation with
respect
to Angola, Mozambique,
Guinea (Bissau), and Cape
Verde, particularly in order to bring
about as a matter of priority
"the immediate cessation
by Portugal of its colonial
wars and
all acts of repression
against the peoples of the
territories
In apparent contradiction
to those paragraphs in the
resolution calling for negotiated
settlement of the disputes
within the territories, the Assembly
went so far as to appeal
to all Governments, specialized
agencies and other organizations to render to the peoples
of the Portuguese territories,
particular the populations in the liberated
areas of those
territories, all the moral and material
assistance necessary

m

(vwtt)
(XXVII)

102 United

—

Natio ns General Assembl y Resolution 2918
—
November 14, 1972
at

,

.

103 Ibid.

,,103
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to continue their
strugqle
"for
ugy
tor the achievement
of their
inalienable right to sel f d et ermination
and indepen<Jence

„

104

While supporting the
right of the people of
the territories to choose their
own representatives,
the U.S. legation
could not agree with
the operative paragraph
which sought to
have the General Assembly
mahe that designation
on their behalf
It expressed once
tore its reservations
about violent solutions
to those problems and
to reference in the
draft resolution
implying support for such
activities. The U.S. delegation
expressed its opposition to
the words in the operative
para4
graph of the resolution
calling for "all the moral
and material
assistance necessary to continue
their struggle for the achievement of their inalienable
right to self-determination
and inde-

pendence.

The U.S. delegation interpreted
this as an
implied approval of armed
struggle.

The Portuguese representative
observed that the main
objective of the draft resolution
was to have the Assembly
"accept as true the claim by certain
political movements (in
the territories) that they were
the representatives of the population of Angola Mozambique, Portuguese
Guinea, and Cape
10
6
Verde.
The Portuguese delegation accused
the sponsors of
,

1

The Resolution was adopted by a vote
of 98 in
(Brazil, Portugal, South Africa, Spain,
nnTiL^United Kingdom, United States) with 8
abstentions.
Ibid.

.

^
6

105 ^ited Nations
Monthly Chronicle
(December 1972)
pp. 33-34.
,

106 Ibid, p. 34.

,

Vol.

IX,

no.

11

272

the resolution with
attempting to pressure the
General Assembly into giving legitimacy
to what was nothing more
than a
"gratuitous assumption of
certain political groups
in the
Portuguese provinces, since
the populations in question
had
never recognized in them the
title which they claimed."
Since
the populations in question
had never recognized these
political groups as their
liberators, "the draft resolution
before
the Assembly fell to the
ground because it no longer had
any
solid basis 10 7
.

The fifteen years of debate
over the Portuguese territories can be summed up by saying
that, as the tenor of discussion became more inflamed, the
pressure of some Afro-Asian
states to pass from words to deeds
became so intense that in
the 1970s both the General Assembly
and the Security Council
have passed resolutions appealing to
member States to extend
moral and material support to the
Portuguese insurgents. Having
succeeded for several years in keeping the
demand for sanctions
out of resolutions by diplomacy, the United
States and the
United Kingdom were forced, in spite of the
risk of alienating
the Afro-Asians, to vote against such resolutions.

If it were

illustrated by a graph, Anglo-American support for
the opponents of Portugal in the General Assembly would appear
as a

curved line rising from the abstentions of 1960, reaching
its

apogee in the affirmative votes of late 1961 and early 1962,
and then descending to the "nays" of December 1962.

The

abstentions of 1963, dropped once more to the "nays" of 1965
lQ7 lbid

.

,

p.

34
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through 1967, levelled
with the abstentions of
1968, and
descended again with the
"noes" of 1969 and the
early 1970s
For the Security Council,
a graph would have
much the same
shape

Conclusion

Portugal's Case
Portugal's case rests on strict
legal interpretations
of the United Nations
Charter. As have other colonial
powers
in the past, Portugal
sees Article 2(7) of the Charter
as its
main protection: "Nothing
i„ the present Charter shall
authorize the U.N. to intervene
in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state.
," 108
As Portugal points out, "there is
nothing more vital for Portugal
than its territorial integrity."
The U.N. resolutions on its
overseas territories "amounts to
interference with the internal
life of the Portuguese nation." 109
Therefore, says Portugal,
the resolutions clearly violate the
Charter.
.

.

.

.

Portugal invokes both the Charter and
United Nations

history in contending that Chapter XI is
inapplicable.

The

history of the General Assembly, in Portugal's
eyes, proves
that the applicability of Article 73 is for the
individual
108 Portugal

s legal argument for claiming exclusion
from the process of decolonization is presented in
Franco
Nogueira s book, The United Nations and Portugal
pp. 139-188.
'

,

109 Ibid

.

,

p.

134
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administering state itself
to decide.
Resolution 66,!) of December

The Assembly, through

14.

1946, merely -took note"
of
the original list of
non-self-governing territories
submitted
by colonial powers.
Even the twelve Principles
were in the
form of a "guide" to
members.
The only possible conclusion
for Portugal is that all
states consider that "it
is exclusively up to them to interpret
their own laws and to
determine
which of their territories,
even if non-self-governing,
do not
come under Article 73. "HO
By passing such resolutionSi

Assembly acquiesced in this
practice.

^

Thus, even if, for the sake
of argument, Portugal's

rseas provinces are considered
non-self-governing, "it is
still up to Portugal to decide
whether they come under Article
73.
Portugal must decide in the negative,
since Article 73e
admits of security and constitutional
limitation on the obligati°n to transmit information to
the United Nations." 111
"The
Portuguese nation constitutionally is,
and always has been, a

unitary State, regardless of the relative
geographic situation
of its various provinces." 112 Furthermore,
this relationship
was obtained when Portugal was admitted
unanimously
to the

United Nations.

This very fact "signifies beyond any possible

110 General Assembly
Official Reco rds, 11th Session,
656th Plenary Meeting, February 20, 1957, para. 82.
Ill
Ibid.
para. 73
,

1

12 Ibid.

,

para. 73.

—-

the
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accepted states as t
hey
were, recognizing
their constitutions
and basic structures. -U3
Since Portugal considers
Article 73 as clearly
inapplica
e, rt rs not
surprising that it
dismisses resolutions
allegedly based on that
article-including Resolutions
1541
and 1542-.. because they
are at variance with
both the letter
and the spirit of that
article
Portugal complains that
the Charter is being
amended "by a simple
majority vote," which
St 1 Vitably haVe
effect of "killing the
":
Charter it_
•IIS
self.
.

”

T

r~

Most important of all,
however, and most disturbing
to
Portugal, is united Nations
"blindness to the value of
Portugal’s unique philosophy of
government and civilization. "U6
For centuries, Portugal has
been building the only
successful
multiracial civilization the world
has seen-not merely "coexistence of different racial
groups" but a "society
where all ethnic groups are
knitted together with a deep
feeling of oneness." 1
The present disturbances
.

.

.

.

.

.

^

^

^

territorie s are explained as resulting
not from a genuine desire
113 Nogueira

,

op. cit

.

,

p.

140.

114

Comrcitte^T^^X sT^eeting^November^^ig

5

sT^para?

^

011

'

115 Ibid.
116

1963, para

^

117 Ibid

Nations Document A/AC 109/36, April

1,

276

for national independence,
but rather are "revivals
of past
stages of evolution
not by themselves vigorous
enough
to counter the unity which
has been acquired." 118
•

-

.

After so many years of defending
itself in United
Nations debates, it is not
surprising that Portugal has
come
to feel itself the victim
of the "grand anti-Portuguese
conspiracy on the international
scene." 118 For Portugal,
the

General Assembly is "giddy with
racial and political hatred." 120
The nationalists are either
controlled by communists or are
communists themselves.
"Russia
j-k
d is
LS oenina
behind ail
a n the
movements of
12
pseudo-emancipation." ! Onlv conspiracy,
consnir^™
^
-

u

it seems, can

account to Portugal for so much
unremitting hostility.
Portugal has made a vigorous and
skillful defense of
its position before the United
Nations on legal and diplomatic
grounds, steadily insisting that the
country is a unitary state
and that it is irrelevant to consider
the "provinces" in Africa
in connection with debates on
colonialism.

African Case
The African states in the United Nations, however,
con-

sider all talk of Portugal's sovereign rights irrelevant;
sovI 1 O
xxo
General Assembly Official Records 17th Session,
Annexes, Add! to Agenda Item 29 A/ 5286)
November 14, 1972,
para. 63.
,

(

X3Q Nogueira

1 1

,

op.

cit ., p. 137.

120 United Nations Document A/PV
1155, October 18. 1972.
p.

22.

121 Ibid.

,

pp.

28-30.
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ereignty acquired bv colonial
Y colonial conquest is
"not only Immoral,
illegal. "122 India, when
faced with the problem
of
redeeming Goa, stated the
position most clearly:
"„ e cannot
thS tWentiSth ° entUry
aCCe
P-t of international law
which was laid down by
European jurists
specifying that
colonies in Asia and Africa
which were acquired by
conquest
conferred sovereignty, on
the colonial Power ." 123
Since it is the Africans
who are most intimately
inlt is they who have
been most impatient with
Portugal's
"intellectual sleight of hand." 12 *
In the General Assembly>
where their numbers carry
great weight, they maintain
that the
promise of economic and social
reforms (while welcome if these
are actually implemented)
merely serves to deflect world
attention from the central issue
of self-determination and
independence.
Since Portugal has shown every
sign of remaining obdurate on this principle, the
Africans came to feel that "radical
surgery is required ." 123 The
General Assembly has already
called for sanctions on Portugal and
has asked that member states
aid the nationalists with money,
material, and diplomatic sup-

"

^

.

.

.

TOO,

m Clark, " NeW Forces in the United
Nations,"
Internation^l’
internat
Af?
T
ional Affairs
vol.
XXXV (July 1960),
1

-

,

123
~
R
ecords
,

,

p.

—

329,

Delegate of Liberia,
^^ 4-cl ~
L.ctu
Security
i xuy Council
council urricial
Official
tn Vpa
rQP7f>i
m^^
16th
Year,
987th Meeting,
December 18, 1961, para. 90.
4-

,

4-

^Delegate of Senegal, United Nations Document
„
S/PV
1031, April 22, 1963, p. 6
.

125 Delegate
of Ghana, United Nations Document S/PV 1044.
, ,
„ _
.
July
26, 1963, pp. 17-20.
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111

P ° rtUgUeSe Poiicy,

they may then go
further

the Africans have
hinted that

c
The Security
Council may one day
„ „ UPOn
t0 dlSCUSS more
serious
incidents
thrSaten t0 Plt p
°rtuguese troops against
the united
African nations
nl26
'

,

*

^

.

.

.

.

.

The United Nations
Case

Like Portugal's, the
United Nations' case has
both legal
and political aspects
pects.
mho
^
The legal
argument is based on the
assumption that the Charter
is a "dynamic instrument"
consisting of the original
document and the interpretations
resulting from the Security
Council and Assembly actions
and
^
27
resolutions
i

i

.

^

Resolution 1541 (v), 12 * which
laid
groundwQrk fQr
asserting Portugal's obligations
to the United Nations,
was
the climax of a long
process of interpretation,
explanation and
application of Article 73. The
United Nations contends that
under the Charter, nations
pledged themselves to develop
friendly relations based on
respect for the principle of
equal rights
and self-determination of
peoples (Article 1, para. 2), and
&

1

Document "s/py

!

03

n

Apri^^ 9 ?

127 Wohlgemuth,
128 stud

op.

cit

BraZZaVille,
I 96
.

,

:|

p.

'

^

ted

28.

Y of Principles which should guide members in
determining whether an obligation exists
to transmit mrorma
information under Article 73(e) of the
Charter.
.

.

.

.
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administering powers declared
it their duty to
develop selfgovernment (Article 73 b,
fl long series
Qf elabQrations and
interpretations, culminating in
Resolutions 1514 (xv> and
.

1654

(XVI), 129 have afflrmed
that self-determination
and a

"full measure of self-government"
normally exist only under
conditions of political
independence.
Self-determination has
become a fundamental human
and political right, a valid
principle in international law.
What may have been simply a
solemn declaration in the
Charter is today a recognised,
perhaps enforceable, obligation.
In insisting on an older,
out-

moded interpretation of political
reality, "the Portuguese are
trying ... to stand against
the tide of history." 130

Article 73, according to Portugal's
opponents in the
United Nations, is not restricted
to "colonies," but covers all
"territories whose peoples have not yet
attained a full measure
of self-government."
The factors listed in Resolution
1541 are
simply an explanation and elaboration
of the meaning of this
Charter phrase. Analysis of the status
of Portugal's overseas
129

—

1 Gd
ations Resolution 1514 (XV
Declaration on
^
the Granting or^ independence
to Colonial Countries and Peopler ^° luti ° n (A/L 323 and Add
1-6); adopted
fBQ/S/qf Q^
7
947th
Plenary meeting, December 14, 1960, pp. 1273-74„
Uni ted Nations Resolution 1654 (XVI
Implem4ntatiin of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and People: 38 power draft resolution (A/L.366
and Add. 1adopted (97/0/4), 1066th plenary meeting, November
27, 1961
pp. 871-72.
'

)

^

*

,

-

)

.

'

13° Deie gate Qf India/ security Council Official Records.
16th Year, 987th Meeting, December 18, “1961, para. 45.
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provinces in t6rm
n-F these
^^
j
terms? of
factors •'makes it clear
that they
are non-self-governing
and that Article 73
applicable=
3bltantS are ge °^phicau
y ethnically and culturally
dl „.
tmct from metropolitan
Portugal: the minister
for overseas
1 tones and the
governors in each territory
have wide
powers to impose rules
developed
eveioped in the metropole;
the central
government can pass arbitrary
decrees and take executive
measures in the territories:
and very few indigenous
inhabitants
participate in what little
voting and local self-government
there is."
Thus the fact that Portugal
calls its territories "provinces" rather
than "colonies" is irrelevant
to its
obligation under Chapter XI.
c

4-

v-,

-

^

“

,

,

m

.

The most important part
of the Assembly's case
against
Portugal is that its policies
constitute an inherent threat to
international peace and security.
"if p r00 f is needed, one
need only to point to guerrilla
activities in Angola, Mozambique,
and Guinea; to the support
and sanctuary given the
nationalists
by other Africans; and to
Portugal's military build-up in the
territories, including the arming
of white settlers ." 132 As
a consensus grows that the
situation in the Portuguese terriies
is seriously disturbing peace
and security in Africa"

(this wording parallels neither
that in Chapter VI nor VII, but

131
^legate of Liberia, United Nations Document
pv 1040,
lnin July 22,
S/PV
1963, p. 28.
n.

132 Ibid

.

,

p.

28.
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couia presumably prov
i(ie a basis for
action under either),
the
case against Portugal
is immeasurably
strengthone ; for then the
variety of remedies
provided by the Charter
both for peaceful
settlement of disputes and
for countering
threats to the peace can
be brought into play.
The strength of Portugal's
opponents in the United
Nations with respect to
that organization's handling
of colonialism would not be
complete without reference
to the growing
efficacy of African wars
of "national liberation."
As an

example, the cause of the
insurgent forces fighting in
Portuhas been, to all intents
and purposes, legitimized
by the United Nations
System.
The importance of this
legitimization of African wars of
"national liberation" by the
international system means the
recognition by various U.N.
bodies
that the struggle against
colonialism and apartheid in
Southern
Africa is a "legitimate endeavour"
as far as the purposes and
the principles of the United
Nations Charter and other
U.N.

declarations are concerned.

Against all this there has always
been the complaint
133
by some critics
that the Afro-Asian group is using
its nearmajority position in the United Nations
simply to stir up racial
and political trouble in the
Portuguese colonies. The argument
is often made that United Nations
concentration on colonialism
"
* ome
The United Nations: The Crisis of ConVital Spe eches of the Day (February
1, 1962), pp. 237'

f i ripripp

23 g

,
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had led to the adoption
of a double standard
of behavior by
“n y ° f thS nSWly eleCted countries
Lord Home has observed
that:
No one who has witnessed
what has happened in
Hungary
and East Germany can have
any doubt that Russia's
colonialism
is the most cruel and
ruthless in history. The
United Nations
members know this to be true,
but they seldom condemn
the Russians and constantly harass
Portugal "134 Because
double
standard as applied to Europeans
and Russians, and Europeans
and Afro-Asians has become
so blatant. Lord Home was
moved to
say
.

.

^

U
N i nS; and in articular
P
this Assembly, must
show itself to
snow
tn be
h
impartial, must be seen to be imoartiai
t0 ask this question: I am not
sure
answer” h^t-he
th ® re growing up, almost imperceptibly, of the
a cod I
Of
W er the
iS ° ne rUle fo ^ the^ommuAst
countrSs°and a the
fh
for the Democracies and their
F
allies’
One for the bully,
k ??° who
deals in fear, and another for
Democracies and their allies
135
.

•

r

.

.

The Unite d States Case
As a former colony with a strong
anticolonial tradition,

the United States shares many of the
ambivalences of the non-

colonial European states.

It is eager to assure the former

colonies that it has steadfastly supported the
principle of

self-determination and has publicly and privately and continuously urged Portugal to accept its obligations. But
the NATO
obligations of the United States and its security interests
in
134 Ibid.

,

p.

237.

135 Ibid

,

p.

238

.
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the military base on
the Azores have played
an important role in
shaping United States
policy on the question
of the Portuguese
territories in Africa. And
as Portugal often
reminds the
united States, U.S.
obligations to support its
NATO allies caneasily be divorced from
an obligation to support
their
colonial policies. Thus
the United States in a
generally unsuccessful attempt to placate
both sides, finds itself
pleading
for resolutions that
amount to much less than what
the majority,
and rather more than what
Portugal, feels able to accept.
During debate, the U.S. may
indicate "there is no conflict
of
principle before this house,"
but it votes more often with
France and the United Kingdom
than, say, with Norway or
Sweden.
Fundamentally, the United States
approach to the issue
of the Portuguese territories
has proceeded on several premises
st, to discredit the notion
frequently expressed in United
Nations debates that Western involvement
in the Portuguese ter-

ritories merely sustains Portugal's
resolve to keep hold of the
colonies; the United States responds
with the argument that the
influence of any nation, however powerful,
in this day and age,
the internal affairs of another country
is severely limited.
The idea that the United States, by any
action including the
use of economic and military force could
bring about funda-

m

—

—

mental changes in another society is without
foundation.
Secondly

,

the United States understands that it cannot

pursue policies which simply accept the situation in
Portuguese

Africa as it is, or contribute to its perpetuation, nor those
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which endorse violence
as a means to change.
Consequently, the
United States has claimed
to pursue an arms
embargo policy
all sides within the
Portuguese territories.
Thirdly, the United States
believes that any meaningful
contribution to change in
the area of the Portuguese
territories
IS not through the
pressure of isolation but
through keeping
open the doors of
communication with all elements
of the popu
lation
,

stly, while the United
States has remained
sympathetic
to the objectives of many
of the United Nations
resolutions, it
has mounted increasing
opposition to the types of U.N.
action
it considers beyond the
organization's ability to implement.
The changes in tactics from
early support of Portugal's opponents in the United Nations to
one of opposition in the late
1960s and early 1970s reflects
this belief.
These manuevers

were the result not only of
American reluctance to take drastic
measures against a NATO ally, measures
that, without any certainty of being effective, would
further divide the Western
alliance and risk more unrest in Africa;
they also reflected a
growing disillusionment with the
consequences of too precipitate
a decolonization.
One independent African country after
another
had succumbed to civil war--the Congo,
Sudan,

Nigeria— or had

been taken over by military dictatorship—
Algeria, Ghana, Dahomey,
Upper Volta, Sierra Leone, the Central African
Republic while

—

most of the remainder became one-party states.

All this caused

second thoughts about the timing of self-determination
and the
need for a fresh diplomatic approach toward decolonization.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Robert Gardiner, former
Ghanaian head of the United
Nations Economic Commission,
once proclaimed that Africa
is
for the Africans, and the
Portuguese will not be Africans.
Gardiner maintained that so
long as there is an idea
of a
civilizing mission," some
pattern is being imposed from
the outside, and this is
"implicit paternalism." 1
At the same time, Gardiner
noted that there were dif-

fering viewpoints among
African leaders. President Banda
of
Malawi, adjacent to Mozambique
and within the South African
economic orbit, firmly believes
in economic cooperation,
rather than isolation, throughout
Southern Africa.
It is
his view that economic development
in Portuguese Africa now
benefits Malawi. He explained his
position to other black
African diplomats asserting that the
railroads of Mozambique
eventually be African, and therefore,
all economic development and independence should be encouraged.
Some Africans
of former British Africa are resentful
of the many ways— cultural, economic, and even military that
states of former

—

French Africa have maintained their ties with
the old metropole.

To them, an independent Angola and Mozambique
could,
L

p.

107.

W.P. Kirkman, Unscrambling An Empire

(London 1966)
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if independence evolved
under the aegis of
Portugal, offer
a similarly distasteful
2

situation.

Victor Ferkiss has
appropriately observed that
the
Portuguese Africa poses
the question of African
identity more clearly than
has any former colonial
territory.
This would be true, he
says, even if Angola and
Mozambique
were to become independent
while yet forming part of
a Lusitanian cultural community,
an action that would
conflict with
the spirit of Pan-Africanism;
Ferkiss states: -The very
ties
of culture which might
bind an interracial Angola
and Mozambique together and to
extra-African countries would be
a
rejection of most of what is
symbolized by 'negritude and the
African personality'": Ferkiss
notes that "independent states
of black Lusitanians states
based not on traditional African
cultural bonds but on a universalistic
mystique, run counter
3
to African cultural nationalism."
African nationalists
could not easily accept this situation,
which clashes with
their goals, and independent Angola
and Mozambique could be
torn apart not only by racial, social,
and tribal divisions
but by a conflict between those
seeking to reinstate purely
African identifications and those opting
for a nation primarily nonwhite in race but consciously Western
4
in Culture."
,

2

3

.

Ibid., p. 107.
,

.

Victor C. Ferkiss, Africa's Search for Identity (New
L
York: Praeger, 1966), p. 1077
4

Ibid.

,

p.

107.
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The issue of Portuguese
Africa, then, for American
foreign policy is so complex
and so overlaid with
emotion,
that it is essential to
formulate with the greatest
possible
clarity the guiding features
of a workable new American
policy.
The difficulty of this
task, for American policymakers, is exacerbated by
the recent military coup
in Lisbon
which overturned the Caetano
government and brought General
Spinola into power. A great
deal of speculation is now
taking
place over what the new regime
intends for Portugal and its
territories, but this brief treatment
of the situation will
confine itself to examining the
highlights of the coup and
its implications for American
foreign policy toward Portugal
and its territories.

Background
The outside world was as surprised
as Portugal was
stunned at the recent military takeover
in Lisbon on April 25
1974.
Owing to the colonial implications of
the coup, the
leaders of African liberation movements,
certain news agencies, and even other governments believed
that the well-

publicized ideas of General de Spinola were to be
the guidelines of a new policy.
But that is an oversimplification
which can seriously mislead one as to the nature and
purpose
of what happened in Portugal.
5

5

Antonio De Figueiredo, "Portugal: A Country for
Historians," Nation vol. 218, no. 20 (May 18, 1974), p. 616.
,
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The junta, which
proclaimed a few basic goals
that
have apparently met with
the approval of the
overwhelming
majority of the population,
confined itself to the
overthrow
of the President, the
government, and institutions
such as the
DGS (security police),
the censorship board, the
regime's
Single-party system, paramilitary
organizations like the
Portuguese Youth, etc. The
actual business of governing
is
to be entrusted to a
"provisional" or caretaker government

appointed by the junta; most likely
it will be drawn from the
"Center," where most of the
best-known political and financial
nicians are to be found.
The immediate emphasis, it seems
is upon the economic and
social situation, and one of the
first tasks of the provisional
government will be to engineer
a return to normal business
conditions.
The crucial first question, for
American policy-makers,
is what the government and the
junta decide to do about Africa,

and how far they are ready to drag
their new President into
ending colonial involvement. Critics
of Portugal's African
policy feel that "only a clean break there
can undermine the
kind of interests and attachments, whether
commercial, financial, subversive or merely demagogic, on which
the ultras and

their likely allies must rely.

Only that sort of break can

bring the Portuguese people face to face with the facts
of
their own 'under-development', can restore the hughly
inflated
6

Ibid

•

1

p.

616

.
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a™y

to civilian life, and
can then give this
the chance of economic
salvation." 7

_

in an exchange of
remarks following a meeting
between

President Nixon and President
Spinola, on June 19
President
Spinola alluded, rather
obli que l y to the colonial
situation
when he said: "A very
important factor underlying
the success
of these talks was a
total identity in the thinking
regarding
a staunch defense of
peace, the respect for
democratic principles, and the hallowed
principles that underlie the
right
to self-determination
of peoples which is expressed
in the
free will of those peoples
regarding the choice of their
destiny. "8 President Nixon
responded by assuring Spinola of
the continuing support of
the United States.
"Because,"
President Nixon stated, "an
independent, free, prosperous
Portugal is vital not only to the
Atlantic alliance but vital
also to the interests of the United
States as well as to the
interest of the people of Portugal.",9
,

,

American expert on Portuguese colonial
affairs, Basil
Davidson believes that it is Spinola 's
objective "to contrive
that Portugal should somehow retain its
position
of 'privi-

leged economic intermediary' between African
land and labour
Ibid

.

,

p.

617

O

no.

State Department
Bulletin,
~~~

1829, “p. 119.
9

Ibid

.

,

p.

120.

(July 15,

1974)

,

vol

.

71,
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on one side, and, on
the other
r

311 those interests
which now
them or wish to exploit
them, principally the
large
'

transnational corporations
concerned with the extraction
of
minerals including oil.-”
Oavidson concludes
this in mind, "Spinola
rightly sees this as the
only sure
guarantee of 'survival' now,
or Portugal's existing
'system'
of power relationships,
however archaic and stultifying
these
in fact may be; and he
believes that Portugal's
NATO allies
will support him in this.
What he seeks, in short,
is some
kind of NATO-buttressed
'neo-colonial solution .'" 11
Whatever course of action
Spinola may adopt, there is
every good reason to believe
that the liberation movements
will
negotiate for nothing less than
Portuguese military and political withdrawal.
The wars may be reduced by
an un„illi ngnes s
of parts of the Portuguese
armed forces to continue with
them;
they may also be enlarged by
South African intervention. Yet
the Portuguese position remains
relatively weak, so that one
may speculate that Pretoria will
intervene only "in extre7
mis

^^

,

1

10 Basil Davidson,
"The New Portugal and Africa," New
vol. 87, no. 2253 (May 24,
1974), p. 724

c
Statesman
.

.

,

.

7
Davidson conjectures that: "This
P
??:
that the wars will
go on so long as the junta and the
government are prepared to agree with him,
every reason to believe that the liberation since there is
saying what they mean when they reject any movements are
such solution."
*

12

Ibid

.

,

p.

722
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Given these and other such
factors. United States
foreign policy toward Portugal
and its territories should
seek
the following objectives:
First, the goal must
continue to
be the avoidance of great
power rivalry, dominance,

or conflict, within the Portuguese
territories.
During his Africa
trip (February 1970),
Secretary of state William
Rogers made
this quite explicit. when
he said: "We do not believe
that
Africa should be the scene
of a major power conflict.
We on
our part do not propose to
make it so. Fundamentally, we
consider that such a course would
be wasteful to all parties.
It certainly would not
be in the interest of the African
13
.

states

Second, negotiation or settlement
can only be accom-

plished, practically and in principle,
by the parties directly
involved. What has ultimately to be
done cannot be done by
third parties or elements alien to
the areas in question. 14
Of course, the behavior of the other
great powers will have
a direct bearing on these objectives
and on how we respond to
a given situation.
Third, in exercising its influence, the United
States

must for reasons of self-interest and self-respect
continue
13 New
14

York Times

,

February 12, 1970,

p.

3.

Whether literate or not, the Portuguese for decades
have had no clear access to new ideas and new facts, at
least
of a political sort.
No doubt many may really think themselves at grips with the agents of Moscow or Peking or, as
Salazar used to warn, of the USA.
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to support the principles
of self-determination
and equal
human rights. The United
States early recognised
the force
Of African nationalism
and the African achievement
of independence, and nationhood
for African peoples.
The United
States now has a practical
interest in the maintenance
of
that independence, within
an environment of political
stay nd growth.
In areas such as Angola
and Mozambique,
where the problems of colonialism
are stubborn and filled with
passion, the United States has
unfortuantely been caught in
the crossfire between those
advocating violence to achieve
'

'

decolon ializat ion, those who seek
change by peaceful means,
and the preservers of the status
quo.
American policy-makers,
however, can receive some surcease
in the fact that every
recent indication from the leadership
of the liberation movements, whether private or public, shows
that they have no wish
to make their victory a means of
Portuguese humiliation.
Nor

is there any suggestion that
Portuguese military and political

withdrawal need imply the withdrawal or
dispossession of the
bulk of the settler communities.^
The American response to this troublesome
problem

area is that African people have the right to
self-determina15

M

On the contrary most of the settlers can expect
to stay exactly where they are.
There is evidently no reason,
furthermore, why the new Portugal could not then hope for a
privileged cultural position, and even possibly for some kind
of privileged commercial position, in territories where the
Portuguese language will remain the medium of instruction and
of common use."
See Davidson, op cit
p. 724.
,

.

.

,
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tion.

Official U.S. response h
as been to encourage
peaceful
Progress towards that goal,
and to eschew violence
as a
prescription for the political
*
1 llls
iliq n
off Southern Africa.
One
conclusion re ra ains, however,
quite clear: as long as
residual
colonialism and racial inequality
prevail in Portuguese
Africa, our interest in
self-determination and majority
rule,
those ultimate practical
considerations in stability and
order, will be placed in
jeopardy.
Likewise, colonialism
adversely affect our other
interests elsewhere on the
African continent.

would appear, then, a propitious
opportunity for
the United States to encourage
the creation in Portugal of a
democratic government. President
Spinola has promised that
elections will be held within a year,
and the country is already moving toward them, with formerly
clandestine parties
declaring themselves, and exiles and "emigres"
returning.
Although the provisional government may
propose a truce to
the African liberation movements, colonial
policy would have
to emerge out of the normal functioning
of a duly elected

government and constituent assembly.
Today in Lisbon, Oporto and Coimbra, as well as in

Luanda and Lourenco Marques, the middle-class parties,
including the Socialists and the Communists, display an impressive degree of cohesion and maturity, as if the people
realized
that, given its geographical position in Europe and its re-
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sponsibili ties in Africa

D
Portugal
cannot afford reckless
,

'

adventure or civil war. 16

Against this background,
resort to force by any
outside power would not only
upset the fragile process
of
"coalition-building" in Portugal,
but would be contrary
to
commitments under the United
Nations Charter and a breach
of
detente" the United States
presently enjoys with
the two

major communist powers.

There is an additional
practical
reason of great human meaning
which deserves to receive
special emphasis. There
exists, within the Portuguese
territories, an almost total
disparity of armed strength between
the whites and the Blacks.

This relative disparity, plus

the moral climate prevailing
among the whites who monopolize
the modern weapons, has made
it possible on a few occasions
for thousands of Blacks to be
killed within a period of a
few weeks in reprisal action. 17
If by the sudden introduction
of a major new external

military factor the lif e-and-death struggle
between whites
and Blacks
the region were precipitated, the
immediate
result could be an appalling loss of life—
Black life— because

m

1

De Ffgueiredo, op. cit
p. 617.
De Figueiredo
NOW fc at the parties are emerging, it appears
that
the^n-U
e
the
most significant
group within the left wing is to be the
Portuguese Democratic Movement (formerly CDE) a mixed
front
of Socialists and Communists rather than the
established Portuguese Communist or Socialist Parties.
..

.

IIXT

f

,

17

For a detailed account of casualty figures, see
Herb Shore, "Mondlane, Machel and Mozambique: From
Rebellion
to Revolution," Africa Today vol. 21, no. 1 (Winter
1974),
,

p

.

12
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of the present inability
of the Blacks to defend
themselves
and the practical
impossibility of outside forces
to rescue
or protect them.
Thus, in effect, the United
States, and other outside
powers, must continue to
stand firm on its political
principles; it must begin to
show a more vigorous and
purposeful
kind of concern over the
dangers posed by Portugal's
colonial
crisis for international peace
and stability.
Yet the United
States must put aside the one
element of its power which might

make a decisive difference, its
armed strength. Obviously,
such stipulations are nearly
self-contradictory. But not
totally.
the narrow space between lie
areas of possible
and appropriate diplomatic action.

m

First and more foremost, the United
States government
should continue its active participation
in multilateral
efforts through the United Nations and
other diplomatic
machinery to condemn discriminatory practices
and colonialism,
and to employ measures other than force
to attempt to persuade
the present regime in Portugal to take a
fresh diplomatic

approach towards their African possessions.
action is not in itself likely to have
significant, effect.

a

Such multilateral

decisive, or even

But the principles embodied are those

which the United States symbolizes and which the
international
community, if it stands for anything, must assert.

So long

as efforts are directed toward activating a political
process,

rather than toward the imposition of a formula or the use of

296

force, they deserve
backing.

Moreover, it is not inconceiv-

able that over the longer
term, despite intractability
of the
present situation, they can
result in some gains as
circumstances change. Combined
with other efforts, the
possibility
of their effectiveness
greatly increases.
Second, with respect to its
own national action, a
fresh and hardheaded review
of all remaining forms of
cooperation and assistance with
Portugal (which would require
a fuller
understanding of the present regime's
intentions regarding
their territorial possessions)
is necessary in order to
determine whether American economic
and military assistance to
Portugal under NATO arrangements,
does not in fact constitute
intervention" on the side of white
control in Africa.
The policy here suggested is one
that began and, unfortunately, ended with the Kennedy
Administration. For the
first time the United States, in reviewing
its relations with
Portugal, went so far as to vote against
Portugal, a NATO
ally, in the United Nations and argued
forcefully for change
in her territorial policies.

embargo was imposed.

In addition, a form of arms

It is true that the Kennedy policy did

not limit shipment of arms and equipment to Portugal
in the

context of NATO, but pressure was brought to bear to
insure
that these NATO arms were not used in Portugal's African
wars

Under the current administration, the basic thrust of
the Nixon Doctrine is to maintain a low profile in world
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affairs and to avoid
Vietnam-style commitments.
Nevertheless
Portugal has retained an
important bargaining point
vis-'a-vis
the United States: the
important United States
military base
in the Azore Islands.
The Portuguese have used
the base rights
as a lever to influence
the Nixon Administration's
policies
toward their country.
Such island bases are vital
to the
United States. They permit
overseas influence without
involvement in countries that
are often turbulent and
hostile to
the united States military.
In return for a continued
American presence in the Azores,
which the Nixon Administration
views as vital to NATO and to
U.S. interests in the Middle
East, Portugal has been able
to obtain a change in United
States policies toward Southern
Africa and toward
itself.

This process has worked as
follows.

Independent of any Portuguese initiatives,
but at the
same time as the Portuguese were
pressuring the United States
about use of the Azores base, the Nixon
Administration made
a study of policy in Southern
Africa. As often happens in
issue areas of low salience, this policy
reevaluation was
conducted entirely within the confines of official
Washington.
It did not attract public notice until
1971, some two years
after it was completed.
Upon the direction of the President,
Dr. Henry Kissinger ordered preparation of a
National Security

Council memorandum outlining policy options for Southern
Africa.

Requests for such memoranda are regularly made and

passed on to the appropriate offices in the Department of
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State, Department of
Defense, and other interested
agencies.
They are drafted by
interdepartmental coordinated
groups, and
the draft memorandum is
sent to Dr. Kissinger's
office for
final polishing by his staff.
The memorandum is then
brought
before the President in a
meeting of the National Security
Council for his decision. 18

The study of u.S. Southern
African policy presented
19
the President with three
options.
The first was called the
"Dean Acheson" option after
the late Secretary of State,
who
had argued this point of view
publicly and privately.
it

stated that

the United States should treat
Portugal and the
Republic of South Africa as friendly
sovereign nations without regard to their internal policies." 20
The second option
was the "more of the same" option, a
continuation of the
policies of the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations. This
involved verbal attacks on South African
apartheid and Portuguese colonialism combined with arms embargoes
and limited

official involvement with these two governments.

The third

18

F r a full critique of the policy process
involved
?
in the planning
of United States foreign policy, see Herbert J
Spiro, "Planning of U.S. African Policy," paper
orepared for
the annual conference of the African Studies
Association,
Denver, November 3-6, 1971.
19 New York
Times

April 2, 1972. See also, U.S. Congress,
Senate, "Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain,"
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relat ions on S. Res.
2JL4, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., February 1, 2, and 3, 1972 (Washington, D.C.
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).
:

20 Ibid.

,

p.

234.

,

299

option

,

„ hich was adopted by

fche

administrat on> has
.

characterized as the "tar-baby"
option. This is the
given it by opponents
within the State Department
who feared
that if begun it could
not be abandoned if it
proved to be a
failure.
This option argued that
the United States influence on Portuguese Africa
and South Africa could
best be
exercised if increased
communication and contacts with
the
white government were begun.
"Selective involvement and
friendly persuasion rather
than constant condemnation
were
regarded as more likely to
achieve changes in the racial
and
colonial policies of the region." 22
The Nixon Administration
accepted the "tar-baby" option
for three apparent reasons.
"First, it accorded with the
President's and Dr. Kissinger's
beliefs that the United
States is only a marginal actor
in that area." 23 Moreover,
involvements like that in Vietnam must
be avoided in the
future.
"Second, the 'tar-baby' option is
consistent with
the arguments of those who hold
that increased economic development in Southern Africa as a whole
will lead to an improvement in the situations of local black
Africans." 24
Thus, as

21

Ibid

.

22 Ibid

.

23 Ibid
24 Ibid

P-

234

P-

235.

.

P-

235.

.

P-

235.

f

.
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the local economies grow
they will increasingly
depend upon
local demand for goods and
services to spark continued
growth
in production and employment.
Finally, the option selected
is in agreement with the
arguments of American corporations
such as union Carbide, Gulf
oil, and the Foote Mineral Company, which demand a more
"businesslike" relationship with
Portugal and South Africa. 25
In yet another important way,
the application of the

Nixon policy in Southern Africa has
been consistent with the
options outlined above. The military
embargoes were redefined so that two Boeing 707 airliners
could be sold to the

Portuguese government.

These planes can carry troops to

Angola and Mozambique.

Small civilian-type jet aircraft were

sold to South Africa.

naissance as well.

These planes can be used for recon-

The United States government granted

Union Carbide's request to import chrome ore from
boycotted
Rhodesia: President Nixon's failure to oppose the Byrd

Amendment to the Military Procurement Act of 1971, which
ended the ban on the importation of Rhodesian chrome, is

charged by critics "to have contradicted international law as

established in a United Nations resolution

.

2^

An agreement

was signed under which South Africa could resume selling gold
to the International Monetary Fund; this eased the seriously
25 Ibid

.

,

p

26 See U.S.

.

235

Congress, House, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittees, 91st Cong., 2nd
sess.
February-December 1970, vol. TT
,
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strained South African balance of
payments situation and
earned South Africa $307 million
from gold sales in the first
six months of 1970.
In the United Nations, the
United States
for the first time in history
used its veto in the Security
Council to defeat a resolution calling
for an expansion of
sanctions against Rhodesia.
This led black Congressman
Charles Diggs of Michigan to the
unprecedented step of resigning from the United States delegation
to the United Nations
charging the government with "hypocrisy" in
its voting
on

African affairs at the United Nations. 27

The United States

also voted against the General Assembly's
annual resolution

against apartheid.
The most dramatic demonstration of the Nixon Admin-

istration's commitment to the Nixon Doctrine in Southern

Africa took place when the United States and Portugal reached
a new agreement over the continued use by the United
States

forces of the Azores base.

The new Azores pact remains wit-

ness to the overall strategic significance of the Portuguese

empire to the Nixon Administration.
Finally, an essential element of any future United

States role in Southern Africa (Portuguese Africa) would be
to permit the forces of change to operate short of the point

where African disorders would produce major international
27

Report

,

Charles Diggs, "We're On The Wrong Side," Africa
vol. 18, no. 3 (May-June 1973), p. 37.

302

dangers.

With this objective in mind,
the first task of
United States policy would be
to help create a strategically
sterile environment in Africa.
Basically, this objective
will require taking the
initiatives to remove Southern Africa
as an area of direct or
indirect cold war military competition and to buffer it against
disruptive intervention by
external powers. This, in turn,
means attention to the possibility of an understanding or
agreement between the United
States and the Soviet Union, tacit
or explicit, regarding
security matters in Southern Africa.
Such an understanding

encouraged by a new spirit of "detente"
between the two major
superpowers is a distinct possibility.
On these grounds there is reason to
believe that the

Soviet Union might possibly be receptive to
American initiative in this direction.
Sub-Saharan Africa is not a region
of primary importance to Soviet strategic
objectives.

Like

the United States, the Soviet Union is not bound by
general

strategic commitments in Africa and has relative freedom of
maneuver.

Soviet economic, political, and military programs

on the continent to date have produced no great profit; and
in the Congo, where a near-confrontation with United States

forces occurred, Russia was humiliated.

In actual fact, a

degree of withdrawal by both the United States and the Soviet
Union from head-on competition in Africa and other parts of
the world has been the case.

Soviet behavior in relation to

current security issues, such as the SALT talks, suggests the
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possibility that

,

to advance its own
vital objectives,

the
U.S.S.R. may be prepared
to reduce the scope
of its present
international exposure and
burdens
Africa would seem a
likely place to begin.
If an approach along
these lines were decided to
be

desirable and feasible, the
broadest possible area of
agreement should be explored.
Recent political developments
in
Portugal demand the reduction
of any further supply of
arms
and military equipment that
could be used by either Portugal
or the insurgents within
the territories.
Agreement

on the
total and permanent removal
of military, naval, and air
installations on the African continent
might be another objective. Another goal would be
an agreement between the two
superpowers to desist from military
intervention— directly or
by surrogate— when disorders
erupt in independent Africa and
from attempts to change boundaries
or political regimes by
force

Such a pattern of Soviet-American
cooperation, in
short, would be a step of fundamental
importance both in pro-

tecting Southern Africa and the rest of the
continent from
external meddling.
The opportunity for a timely, new initiative in Soviet-American cooperation in Southern Africa
would

seem to be considerable.
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